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ABSTRACT 
CROSS-CULTURAL ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE: 
WHEN ARE FAIRNESS PERCEPTIONS UNIVERSAL OR CULTURALLY 
DEPENDENT? 
FEBRUARY 2016 
KIRK D. SILVERNAIL, B.A. AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 
M.B.A. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Jane K. Miller 
 
 Organizational justice research over the last fifty years has provided an 
understanding of the antecedents and outcomes of fairness perceptions within 
organizational contexts. Justice perceptions have proven to be related to important 
outcomes such as job performance, organizational commitment, and withdrawal 
behaviors. Initial research seemed to indicate a certain universality of justice perceptions 
in that they had similar antecedents and consequences regardless of country or culture. 
However, a burgeoning cross-cultural justice literature now shows that some fairness 
perceptions may actually be culturally dependent. The question therefore remains as to 
when fairness perceptions are culturally variant or invariant. 
The current research investigates three overarching questions. First, are justice 
perceptions universal or are they affected by cultural values? Second, is there an 
interactive effect of cultural dimensions on justice perceptions? Third, what is the 
relationship between cross-cultural faculty governance differences and perceptions of 
 vii 
fairness? Two studies were conducted to answer these research questions. One was 
qualitative and used semi-structured interviews of university faculty to provide an initial 
answer to both the first and third research questions. The other was quantitative and used 
survey responses collected from business school faculty to answer the second research 
question and provide a more complete answer to the other two questions. 
Results of the studies indicate that there is wide variation in faculty governance 
systems. However, the perceived fairness of those governance systems may be dependent 
on the aspect of the employment relationship being investigated. Evidence found here 
suggests there may be certain core values of a profession that when absent from the 
employment relationship are seen as unfair regardless of country. On the other hand, 
evidence also suggests that the perceived fairness of some aspects of the employment 
relationship may be culturally dependent. Additionally, evidence showed that the 
antecedent relationship between cultural dimensions and justice variables may be limited. 
This research not only furthers the theoretical understanding of the relationship between 
culture and justice but also cross-cultural fairness responses to varying human resource 
practices. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade there has been an increase in research studying the 
relationship between culture and organizational justice (Greenberg, 2011). Although 
much of the initial organizational justice research was conducted in Western contexts 
[mostly in the United States (US)], it has been found that fair1 outcomes and procedures 
are significantly related to outcome variables in multiple cultural contexts (Li & 
Cropanzano, 2009). However, Li and Cropanzano (2009) also found that the strength of 
the relationship between justice and work outcomes appears to be different cross-
culturally. This speaks to the idea of how the salience of justice differs cross-culturally 
and evidence to support these differences was found in a recent meta-analytical study. 
Specifically, the meta-analysis demonstrated that justice perceptions were more strongly 
related to outcomes in some countries than in others (Fischer, 2013). Thus, although it 
appears that fairness is important no matter the cultural context, there are differences in 
how justice manifests itself cross-culturally. However, many of the cultural differences to 
this point are only understood in terms of their role as moderators/mediators in justice-
outcome relationships, not in their direct effects on justice perceptions. Thus, although it 
is worth discussing how scholars have begun to understand the cross-cultural differences 
in justice perceptions the full effect of culture on justice perceptions is not well 
established. 
One of the methods used to explicate these differences has focused on cultural 
values (Hofstede, 1980a, 2001). Cultural values are defined as the patterns of thinking, 
                                                        
1 Consistent with organizational justice literature, I use fairness and justice 
interchangeably. 
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feeling and acting that are shared by individuals from the same nation (Hofstede, 2001; 
Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). It is also important to point out here the difference 
between culture and country. There have been calls to distinguish between the terms 
cross-cultural and cross-national as the latter is often used as a proxy for culture assuming 
that national boarders define homogeneous cultural groups (Nasif, Al-Daeaj, Ebrahimi, & 
Thibodeaux, 1991). However, many of the cross-cultural studies are actually cross-
national consisting of individuals from different cultural backgrounds grouped based on 
national or country boarders thus conflating cross-cultural with cross-national. To be 
clear, although to a certain extent I use the terms cross-cultural and cross-national 
interchangeably in theory development, the research conducted here falls explicitly 
within the cross-national context. 
Research utilizing the Hofstede (1980a) cultural dimensions has shown that 
national culture impacts many important aspects of organizational life such as conflict 
resolution preferences, human resource practices, leadership style preference, and 
organizational citizenship behaviors, to name a few [for a full review see Kirkman, Lowe, 
& Gibson (2006)]. Most importantly for the proposed research, it has also been shown to 
impact the relationship between perceptions of justice and organizational outcome 
variables (Kirkman et al., 2006). However, the studies cited in Kirkman et al. (2006) all 
used country or the cultural dimensions as mediators/moderators in the relationship 
between justice perceptions and outcome variables. Research investigating the main 
effects of cultural dimensions on fairness perceptions (Hang-yue, Foley, & Loi, 2006; 
Ramamoorthy, Gupta, Sardessai, & Flood, 2005) has also shown that cultural values have 
an impact on fairness perceptions. This is supported by theory that suggests that national 
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origin can be a source of a considerable amount of common mental programming 
(Hofstede et al., 2010). That is, cultural values will have an important influence on justice 
perceptions or what is perceived as fair treatment for members of the same nation. 
Furthermore, although current research using cultural values has extended our 
understanding of cross-cultural justice, there are still differences that have yet to be 
explained. Specifically, “the current body of research on this topic fails to suggest 
precisely when, why, and how culture’s influences on justice are exerted” (Greenberg, 
2011, p. 306). I seek to address this gap by proposing the main and interactive effects of 
all six of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions in order to predict cross-cultural variations in 
justice effects, an undertaking that has yet to be attempted (Shao, Rupp, Skarlicki, & 
Jones, 2013). 
The interaction of cultural dimensions is an important aspect to consider because 
culture does not exist in isolation (Leung, Bhagat, Buchan, Erez, & Gibson, 2005). That 
is, individuals do not consist of one cultural dimension or value that is in isolation of 
others but instead these dimensions make up part of a multi-layered, multi-faceted 
cultural identity (Leung et al., 2005). Therefore, explicating the manner in which cultural 
values interact will give a more complete picture of how culture impacts perceptions of 
justice. 
In order to conduct this research, a unique context in which to test the impact of 
cultural values on justice perceptions lies within universities. Specifically, the manner of 
faculty governance in terms of hiring processes, promotions, and pay raises is different 
institution to institution and country to country. In order to fully understand how fairness 
exists in cross-cultural settings, triangulation (Jick, 1979) was used. Thus, two studies 
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were conducted. The first used interviews to establish the extent to which faculty 
governance differs country to country and how fairly this is viewed. The second tested 
the effect of cultural values on perceptions of justice. This research therefore adds to our 
understanding of the relative fairness of differing faculty governance systems and 
expands the cross-cultural justice literature by further determining the impact of cultural 
values on justice perceptions. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter presents a short overview of the 
organizational justice literature as it is understood in Western contexts. A review of how 
this understanding differs in cross-cultural organizational justice literature is then 
presented. A discussion of the research plan follows. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the faculty governance context in the US. 
 
Organizational Justice 
Although the concept of fairness has been discussed by academics and 
philosophers through much of human history, it was not until the past sixty or so years 
that the concept emerged in management literature (Colquitt, Greenberg, & Zapata-
Phelan, 2005). Interestingly, it appears that the response to fairness is relatively automatic 
(Tabibnia, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2008). That is, reactions to (un)fairness initiate 
affective responses in reward areas of the brain (Dulebohn, Conlon, Sarinopoulos, 
Davison, & McNamara, 2009; Tabibnia et al., 2008). This finding is of particular import 
for organizations as within the workplace people are often faced with potential (un)fair 
situations and reactions to judgments about those situations have far reaching 
implications (Greenberg, 1996). Particularly, employees within organizations often seek 
to determine the fairness of their rewards, appraisal systems and their relative treatment 
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(Greenberg, 2011). Indeed, research suggests that there are four dimensions of 
organizational justice (Colquitt, 2001). 
The first of these dimensions is distributive justice, which refers to the fairness of 
rewards received for given inputs (Adams, 1965; Homans, 1961). The second is 
procedural justice, which is the fairness of the procedures used to determine reward 
distribution (Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). The third and fourth dimensions 
are collectively known as interactional justice and are named interpersonal justice, which 
is the relative treatment of the individual and informational justice, which is the extent to 
which explanations are clear when outcomes are explained (Bies & Moag, 1986). Within 
organizational contexts, these dimensions have been shown to impact important work 
outcomes such as job performance, organizational commitment, organizational 
citizenship behaviors, retaliation and turnover intentions amongst other outcomes [For a 
complete review see Greenberg (2011)]. However, much of the research investigating the 
conceptualization and outcomes of organizational justice was initially conducted in 
Western contexts (Greenberg, 2001). I now review the cross-cultural studies that have 
been conducted since this gap was identified almost fifteen years ago. 
 
Cross-cultural Organizational Justice 
A burgeoning literature has followed Greenberg (2001) lamenting the lack of 
coherence in the cross-cultural justice literature. This has resulted in three interwoven 
lines of research. The first revolves around explicating when the justice-organizational 
outcome relationship differs in non-Western contexts, the second investigates how the 
four justice dimensions are defined cross-culturally, and the third investigates various 
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cultural factors that influence justice perceptions. This section outlines the first two of 
these literature streams. The third is used in hypothesis development in Chapter II. 
A study conducted in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), found that distributive 
and procedural justice were positively linked to job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment and negatively related to turnover intention (Elanain, 2010). Consistent with 
Western studies, procedural justice was more strongly related to organizational 
commitment than distributive justice. Furthermore, in a study of employees from the US 
and Bangladesh, little difference was found in the reaction between the two groups when 
it came to the effects of organizational justice on organizational commitment and 
turnover intentions (Rahim, Magner, Antonioni, & Rahman, 2001). A meta-analysis of 
studies conducted in the US and East Asia concluded that distributive and procedural 
justice are also related to affective organizational commitment, job satisfaction, 
supervisor/organizational trust, and turnover intentions in both US and non-US contexts 
(Li & Cropanzano, 2009). These findings suggest that distributive and procedural justice 
exist with similar consequences across US and Asian cultures. 
However, although the relationships between organizational justice and 
organizational outcomes have been shown to hold outside of the US (Morris & Leung, 
2000) and similarities have been found in the above mentioned articles, there is also 
evidence of cultural differentiation. For example, contrary to Western studies, procedural 
justice was more strongly related to job satisfaction than distributive justice in the UAE 
(Elanain, 2010). Additionally, Li and Cropanzano (2009) showed that the strength of the 
relationship between justice and outcome variables differs cross-culturally. Specifically, 
justice perceptions were more strongly related to outcome variables in North America 
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than they were in the Asian sample. Furthermore, in a study of Taiwanese and US 
employees, Bidder, Chang, and Tyler (2001) found that reactions to procedural justice 
were similar across the samples, with Taiwanese employees slightly less likely to 
retaliate against the organization as a result of procedural injustice. Finally, using the 
Sweeney and McFarlin (1993) two-factor model in which distributive justice was linked 
to job satisfaction and procedural justice was linked to organizational commitment for a 
US sample, distributive justice was also shown to impact intent to stay and evaluation of 
supervisor in a sample of employees from Hong Kong (Reithel, Baltes, & Buddhavarapu, 
2007). In the Reithel et al. (2007) study, procedural justice is actually a mediator of the 
distributive justice/job satisfaction relationship for the Hong Kong sample. Taken 
together, these studies demonstrate that justice outcomes vary cross-culturally as do the 
relationships between justice variables and outcomes. Additionally, as procedural justice 
has been shown to act as a mediator in the distributive justice/job satisfaction relationship 
and therefore an antecedent to job satisfaction in some countries and not in others this 
suggests cross-cultural variation in justice judgment antecedents. 
The above research furthers our understanding of when justice perceptions differ 
cross-culturally as the studies outline the differences between justice in Western countries 
versus in other countries. The second line of cross-cultural justice research looks at how 
the justice dimensions differ cross-culturally. Some of this research has been outcome 
based and revolves around reward allocation preference (distributive justice). 
The Fischer and Smith (2003) meta-analytical review showed that there are 
reward allocation differences across cultures suggesting that cultural differences in 
perceptions of justice have a role in shaping what fair allocations of rewards are. This 
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was demonstrated in a study of employees from the United Kingdom (UK) and what was 
formerly East Germany, employees that exhibit more individualistic traits found 
performance based reward allocation as fairer than those who exhibit more collectivistic 
traits (Fischer & Smith, 2004).2 In looking at the effects of distributive justice, although 
the concept appears for Japanese individuals, the sense of what is fair in the distribution 
of rewards is quite different than the Western sense. That is, the Japanese are more likely 
to choose an equal split of rewards compared to their US counterparts (Benjamin, 2011). 
Benjamin (2011) indicates that this is likely due to the fact that the Japanese are raised to 
think more about the collective society than their US counterparts. Furthermore, it has 
been shown that Russian managers make similar allocation decisions compared to their 
US counterparts when working in international joint ventures (IJVs) (Giacobbe-Miller, 
Miller, Zhang, & Victorov, 2003). However, when working in state owned enterprises 
which traditionally emphasized egalitarian reward distribution, the Russian managers in 
Giacobbe-Miller et al. (2003) were more likely to emphasize egalitarian and need based 
reward allocation. On one hand, this suggests that organizational goals may be playing a 
role in reward allocation preference as Russian managers in IJVs are exposed to 
organizational goals focused on firm performance. Therefore, they are more likely to 
prefer equitable rewards as it motivates employees to work to enhance firm performance. 
On the other hand, this could also indicate the differentiation of in-group versus out-
group. That is, when working in state-owned enterprises the Russian managers are 
working with other Russians but when working in IJVs the Russian managers are 
working with people who are not Russian. This difference may then indicate the 
                                                        
2 This study used cultural dimensions at the individual level. 
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preference to reward those in your in-group in line with the cultural norms of your in-
group but reward effort when no in-group alliance is present. Either way it suggests that 
there may be cultural differences in heuristics used when determining fairness. The above 
findings are also mirrored in research conducted in China.  
In a study of perceptions of pay fairness within IJVs in China, when comparing 
salaries to other Chinese employees, employees of the IJV had higher perceptions of 
justice than when they compared salaries to expatriate employees (C. C. Chen, Choi, & 
Chi, 2002). This finding can in part be explained by ownership change which has 
increased employee preference for equitable based rewards in China and subsequently 
reduces employee preference for equal rewards (He, Chen, & Zhang, 2004). Additionally, 
the He et al. (2004) study showed that as the goal of the organization moved towards a 
productivity orientation, the preference for equitable rewards increased. 
Indeed, again in the Chinese context, there has been a shift from a preference for 
equality based reward allocation to a preference for equity based rewards (Y. Chen, 
Friedman, Yu, & Sun, 2011). The Y. Chen et al. (2011) study demonstrated that the 
“guanxi”3 practices of the Chinese were seen as fair at the personal level but unfair when 
practiced at the group level. That is, individuals thought it was fair when they alone 
received guanxi preference but not when the standard for human resource decisions was 
based highly on guanxi practices. This further suggests that perceptions of justice may be 
related to group membership like was found with the Russian managers in Giacobbe-
Miller et al. (2003) mentioned above. That is, a Chinese employee will be more likely to 
see another Chinese employee getting rewards based on guanxi as fair and not have the 
                                                        
3 Guanxi is the tendency in Chinese culture to base business related decisions on personal 
relationships. 
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same sense of fairness when an expatriate gets the same guanxi treatment (Koch & Koch, 
2007). This suggests that in- and out-group membership does indeed moderate the 
relationship between organizational procedures, reward allocation and perceptions of 
justice. This also speaks to differences in preferences for the procedures used to arrive at 
rewards (procedural justice) and is the second of the justice dimensions that cross-cultural 
researchers have investigated. 
In an example of procedural justice research conducted outside of the US, an 
investigation of the selection techniques used in the hiring of individuals in Italy 
indicated that those techniques that had higher validity (i.e. were more related to the 
potential job) were seen as more fair (Bertolino & Steiner, 2007). The perceptions of 
procedural justice were similar to those found in other countries as in a study of Indian, 
US, and Irish MBA students there appeared to be no difference in preference for 
procedural fairness across the three countries (Ramamoorthy et al., 2005). Interestingly 
though, individualistic orientation was found to be positively related to a preference for 
procedural fairness in appraisals and rewards (Ramamoorthy et al., 2005). 
This speaks to cross-cultural differences in procedural fairness preferences and 
there have been a number of studies that suggest this. For instance, voice in procedures is 
one aspect of procedural justice as defined in the seminal work by Thibaut and Walker 
(1975) and found in Western empirical research conducted by Greenberg and Folger 
(1983). That is, when employees are given voice in the procedures used to arrive at 
rewards they find the procedures as fairer than when they are denied voice. However, the 
effects of the denial of voice have been shown to vary cross-culturally (Brockner et al., 
2001). A sample comparing French and US employees found that although voice was an 
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important factor in fairness perceptions of performance evaluations, interpersonal 
responsiveness (defined as the extent to which people felt they were treated with respect 
and given appropriate information when receiving explanations about decisions made) 
mediated the relationship between voice and decision fairness for US employees and not 
for French employees (Fodchuk & Sherman, 2008). The definition of interpersonal 
responsiveness in the Fodchuk and Sherman (2008) article is essentially the same as what 
Western justice research has coined interactional justice and represents the third and 
fourth justice dimensions that cross-cultural justice researchers have investigated. 
Returning to the Chinese context, interpersonal justice has been shown to reduce 
negative perceptions of justice of Chinese employees regarding pay discrepancy (C. C. 
Chen et al., 2002). Additioanlly, perceptions of compensation fairness were positively 
related to satisfaction with compensation and negatively related to turnover intentions (C. 
C. Chen et al., 2002). Furthermore, in a study conducted in Portugal it was found that 
interactional justice might have more of a positive effect on organizational citizenship 
behaviors than distributive or procedural justice in cultures high in femininity (Rego & 
Cunha, 2010). 
The research outlined here seems to support the idea that response to (un)fairness 
is automatic (Tabibnia et al., 2008) and one could say that fairness concerns are 
universal. It also demonstrates that attention is focused on fairness within organizations. 
However, the literature cited above also shows extensive cross-cultural differences in 
both organizational outcome variables associated with justice perceptions as well as what 
aspects of the four justice dimensions differ cross-culturally. Although these studies 
further our understanding of when and why justice differs cross-culturally, we are left 
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wondering precisely how culture impacts justice perceptions. One potential method of 
pinpointing how culture influences justice is through the use of cultural dimensions. In 
the above cited literature, I have made cursory references to two of the Hofstede (1980a) 
cultural dimensions. Research utilizing these dimensions is the third area that has 
garnered interest for cross-cultural justice researchers and it is through these dimensions 
that I attempt to answer the question of precisely how culture impacts justice. Much of 
the research utilizing the cultural dimensions looks at them as moderators in the 
relationship between justice and its various outcomes. However, to fully explicate the 
impact of culture on justice perceptions it is important to understand the effects of 
cultural dimensions as antecedents to justice perceptions rather than moderators. This is 
the gap in our understanding that the current research seeks to fill. Further literature 
review of the known effects of culture on justice will be conducted in Chapter II. 
However, I will now proceed with a discussion of the context in which the proposed 
research will be conducted as this will help clarify the theoretical development. 
 
Research Plan 
The overarching research questions that are investigated here are: Are justice 
perceptions universal or are they affected by cultural values? Is there an interactive effect 
of cultural dimensions on justice perceptions? And, what is the extent that faculty 
governance differs cross-culturally and the effect of these variations on perceptions of 
fairness. 
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Faculty Governance: A Unique Context 
In order to complete this research the context of faculty governance within 
universities worldwide was used. This provides a unique lens to investigate fairness 
cross-culturally as the manner of faculty governance in terms of hiring processes, 
promotions, and pay raises varies from institution to institution and country to country. 
These differences provide varying ideas of what is fair as well as allow for the 
investigation of the impact of cultural values on justice perceptions. By completing this 
research, we have hopefully come to better understand the differences in fairness 
perceptions of various faculty governance systems that exist, an area in which there is 
currently a dearth of research. 
The ideals of academic freedom and university self-governance are of great 
import to members of the academic profession not just within the US but also worldwide. 
Indeed, these issues have garnered the attention of the United Nations and caused them to 
outline the rights of academic institutions and those working within them. Particularly it 
is stated that academic personnel should not be hindered in thought or expression and in 
order to ensure that academic personnel have these rights, institutions of higher education 
should have autonomous self-governance (i.e. be free from national government 
interference) (UNESCO, 1997). In addition to institutional governance references, the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) guidelines 
state that faculty should have an active role in the governing bodies of higher education 
institutions and should be involved in the appraisal of the work of fellow academics 
(UNESCO, 1997). This suggests faculty involvement in faculty governance related 
issues. The resolutions laid out by UNESCO go on to state that tenure or its equivalent is 
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an essential part of maintaining academic freedom and that it should be safeguarded 
(UNESCO, 1997). Although these resolutions demonstrate the importance of faculty 
governance and academic freedom to academics worldwide, they are simply guidelines 
laid out by an independent third-party with limited to no authority over academic 
institutions and the various stakeholders of said institutions. They also do not speak to the 
perceptions of fairness of the faculty governance systems in place at universities 
worldwide. 
Perhaps speaking to the importance of academics at a global level, or simply our 
drive to understand ourselves, there have been two multi-national studies conducted 
investigating faculty’s feelings of the profession as a whole. The first of these was 
conducted in 1992 at the behest of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching. The second was a continuation of the first conducted in 2007 as part of the 
Changing Academic Profession (CAP) series. The results of the latter survey have been 
published as the second volume of The Changing Academy – The Changing Academic 
Profession in International Comparative Perspective series. The fact that there is an 
entire series (currently consisting of 15 volumes) investigating the life of the academic 
speaks to the importance of understanding faculty governance systems, the fairness of 
which is a pivotal factor in that understanding. 
Interestingly, despite research cited below that speaks to the limits on academic 
freedom that exist worldwide, the editors of this volume of The Changing Academy (vol. 
2) paint a somewhat rosy picture of academics throughout the world. Specifically, data 
has shown that faculty feel as though they are the primary decision makers on most of the 
essential decisions relating to research, teaching and service (Cummings, Fisher, & 
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Locke, 2011). On one hand this suggests faculty feel they have a certain amount of 
authority or power within their institutions over decisions that affect them. On the other 
hand, there also seems to be a shift in the balance of power in which academically related 
decisions that used to be overseen by faculty or a faculty governing body (such as the 
faculty senate) are now being overseen by managers (such as Deans, Presidents, etc.) thus 
diluting faculty power (Cummings et al., 2011). 
Although this begins to provide a glimpse of faculty governance, the general 
comments above regarding faculty governance say little about the specifics or fairness of 
this governance. I will return to a discussion of the country level differences in faculty 
governance found in this volume of The Changing Academy as well as other research, but 
for now it is prudent to establish a common frame of reference from which to make some 
comparisons. Therefore, the manner in which faculty governance exists in the US will be 
explicated both from the theoretical and practical perspectives as examples from 
universities within the US closely embody the UNESCO (1997) principles. 
The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) was established in 
1915 to set guidelines for faculty governance within institutions of higher education in 
the US. Indeed, the AAUP states that its mission is to: 
“…advance academic freedom and shared governance; to define fundamental 
professional values and standards for higher education; to promote the economic 
security of faculty, academic professionals, graduate students, post‐ doctoral 
fellows, and all those engaged in teaching and research in higher education; to 
help the higher education community organize to make our goals a reality; and to 
ensure higher education's contribution to the common good” (American 
Association of University Professors, 2014a). 
 
In meeting the goals of this mission the AAUP has issued a number of standards. 
These standards provide general guidelines for both the governing of institutions and the 
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rights of faculty and those university employees engaged in teaching and research. The 
1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure states that teachers are 
entitled to full academic freedom both in research and teaching and that with few 
exceptions they should be afforded permanent tenure after a probationary period that does 
not exceed seven years (American Association of University Professors, 1940). 
Importantly, it is also outlined that tenured faculty are afforded due process in instances 
of removal (Monahan, 1983). Although, this was an important step in establishing the 
rights of faculty within universities in writing and speaks to an aspect of faculty 
governance it does not outline faculty governance as a whole. 
It should be noted here that although academic freedom and tenure are important 
to issues of faculty governance and even guide what appropriate faculty governance looks 
like to the extent that they have been called “inextricably linked” (American Association 
of University Professors, 1994 p. 143), tenure and faculty governance are two separate 
entities. Therefore, in its Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities the 
AAUP asserts that faculty status and related matters are the primary responsibility of the 
faculty (American Association of University Professors, 1966). That is, all decisions 
regarding the hiring, promotion, dismissal, etc. of faculty are to be overseen by fellow 
faculty. This covers the theoretical underpinnings of faculty governance within the US. 
Now two examples will be given of how this works in practice. 
As a means of illustrating how the AAUP guidelines are carried out in practice, I 
will delineate the practices of a land-grant university in the Northeast US (referred to as 
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U1).4 Potential faculty are interviewed for Assistant Professor positions once they are 
close to earning or have earned a Ph.D. (or other terminal degree in their field) (U1, 
2005). Although potential colleagues, deans, department chairs and students are involved 
in the interviewing process, a hiring committee voted on by and made up of faculty 
members from their potential department make the ultimate recommendation as to whom 
the department should hire (U1, 2005). This recommendation is made to the hiring 
committee chair who then passes the decision on to the Department Chair. The 
Department Chair then either rejects or accepts that decision. If the decision is accepted, 
then the Department Chair passes on the hiring committee’s recommendation to the 
Dean. The Dean then has the same ability to accept or reject and depending on that 
decision, the recommendation can then be carried to the Chancellor of U1. Although the 
Board of Trustees of the state-wide university system of U1 has ultimate authority over 
decisions regarding faculty status on all campuses, that authority has been delegated to 
the President of the statewide system (U1, 2005). Therefore, the President of the 
statewide system has the final say as to whether or not to hire a new faculty member. 
However, consistent with the AAUP guidelines stating that faculty status and related 
matters are the primary responsibility of the faculty (American Association of University 
Professors, 1966), the U1 “redbook” states that: 
“No academic administrative official shall make a recommendation or decision 
which is counter to the original faculty recommendation without compelling 
reasons in written detail which shall specifically address the content of that 
recommendation as well as established standards and criteria. In addition, the 
President, in making tenure decisions, should disagree with the campus 
recommendation only in rare circumstances” (U1, 1976). 
  
                                                        
4 This discussion focuses on tenure and tenure track faculty and omits adjunct and 
lecturer positions. 
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Thus, although department chairs, deans, etc. have approval rights, the fact that any 
recommendation that is counter to the faculty committee’s recommendation must be well 
defended and only done in “rare” cases suggests that the power for faculty personnel 
decisions at U1 does, in fact, rest with the faculty. 
Regarding academic freedom and tenure, U1 follows the 1940 Statement of 
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure (outlined above) set forth by the AAUP 
(U1, 2005). Assuming that the position being filled is for a junior level faculty 
appointment, the new faculty member initially holds the title of Assistant Professor.5 
Also, assuming that the new assistant professor is not hired with an accelerated tenure 
clock, the seven-year probationary period then begins (this can be paused for certain 
circumstances but this is the timeframe the majority of the time). During this time, the 
faculty member is expected to perform in three main areas which are research, teaching, 
and service to the University and profession (U1, 2005). Faculty are required to complete 
an annual report of their work in these areas on which comments are made by an elected 
department personnel committee, the Department Chair and the Dean. After their sixth 
year/ at the beginning of their seventh year of employment the faculty member submits 
their tenure packet for review. In order to be considered for tenure, faculty must be 
deemed excellent in two and strength in the third main areas of research, teaching, and 
service (U1, 2005). The same procedure as outlined above for the initial hiring is then 
initiated again with a faculty committee reviewing the tenure packet (U1, 2005). If the 
                                                        
5 New faculty can be hired in any capacity from assistant to full professor. However, U1 
does not allow new faculty to be hired with tenure. There is a waiting period of at least 
one year while the tenure packet is reviewed. 
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vote is to grant tenure, then the recommendation is advanced to the Department Chair, 
then the Dean, etc. 
It is important to note here that the concept of tenure in academic institutions was 
established to ensure academic freedom. That is, tenure guarantees lifelong employment 
barring severe violations of employee conduct (such as failing to fulfill minimum duties) 
for faculty members regardless of what they choose to research. This was established as a 
way to remove political influences from academia and ensure that academics were free to 
research whatever they felt was relevant without fear of retribution (American 
Association of University Professors, 1940). This employment guarantee demonstrates 
not only the importance of obtaining tenure generally, but the motivation for assistant 
professors to obtain it. In addition, the failure to obtain tenure is accompanied by a 
terminal contract, a situation of “up or out” for the faculty member. 
It is often the case that when tenure is granted, the Assistant Professor is also 
promoted to Associate Professor, which comes with an increase in pay. Promotions from 
this point on are not on a predetermined time period but instead are faculty-driven. 
Additionally, the promotions can be administrative or academic. In the case of the 
former, faculty can become department chairs (as voted on by fellow faculty members), 
associate deans, deans or take on various other administrative roles. In terms of the 
academic advancements, there are academically oriented endowed professorships and the 
title of full professor. Both of these are merit-based promotions and are generally given 
due to research productivity. 
One aspect of the faculty employment relationship that is somewhat unique to U1 
compared to other US based universities is the existence of the faculty union. All U1 
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faculty are required to join the union (or pay an agency fee without a representative vote) 
upon commencing employment (Union, 2012) and in exchange the union provides 
faculty with additional protections not provided at all US universities. One example 
includes the right of faculty to file grievances against administrative officials who counter 
decisions made by faculty committees (Union, 2012). 
As a point of comparison, a small, private, liberal arts college (referred to as U2) 
has a number of differences in faculty governance compared to U1 even though both 
institutions are geographically located close to each other. Although U2 states that they 
too hold to the 1940 AAUP principles on academic freedom, their faculty governance 
differs from that of U1. For instance, not only do the President and/or the Dean of Faculty 
have final say as to whether or not a candidate should be hired for a faculty position, but 
they are also involved in interviewing each candidate (U2, 2014). Decisions to grant 
promotions and tenure are initiated by ad hoc committees who are appointed by and 
report to the President and these decisions are also vetted with a special committee (U2, 
2014). This special committee is composed of six faculty members from the university 
who are at the assistant, associate or full level and who are voted to be members of the 
committee by all of their fellow faculty members from the university as a whole. 
Therefore, where much of the power for hiring and promotion at U1 comes from the 
faculty of the department that the candidate or faculty member works in, at U2, more of 
this power resides with the President and an elected, representative committee composed 
of faculty from the entire university. Additionally, where U1 requires excellence in two 
of the three categories of research, teaching and/or service, “Effective teaching is 
regarded as a prime factor for reappointment and promotion” at U2 (U2, 2014). 
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Despite the variation even at institutions located geographically close to one 
another, the AAUP standards ensure that much of the faculty governance relationship at 
US based universities is standardized. For example most universities hire junior faculty 
as assistant professors and then have a seven-year period to determine if tenure should be 
granted. Although there have been no studies examining the extent to which this system 
is viewed as fair by faculty, given the prevalence of its existence, I expect that many 
faculty in the US would see this system as the most fair. Similarly, faculty involvement 
or even control over vital personnel processes, as dictated by the AAUP standards, would 
likely be seen as fair as it is part of the cultural fabric of academic institutions in the US. 
Putting aside the question of faculty governance fairness, the above mentioned 
CAP survey results seem to suggest that the AAUP guidelines regarding faculty 
involvement in faculty matters have an effect within the US. That is, of the US faculty 
represented in the CAP survey, sixty-one percent indicated that faculty bodies were 
influential or very influential in choosing new faculty and fifty-one percent indicated the 
same influence for making promotion/tenure decisions (Finkelstein, Ju, & Cummings, 
2011). This was compared to thirty-three percent and thirty-one percent respectively for 
deans and department chairs and six percent and eighteen percent respectively for central 
administration and external stakeholders (Finkelstein et al., 2011).6 This demonstrates 
that at least on the two issues of choosing new faculty and making promotion/tenure 
decisions, faculty feel that they have relatively more power than university authority 
figures. Interestingly, there were some differences in these categories in comparing the 
1992 survey results to the 2007 survey results with faculty gaining power in promotion 
                                                        
6  “Faculty Bodies” was not defined but is assumed to include individual faculty, faculty 
committees and faculty senates. 
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decisions and deans and department chairs gaining power in choosing new faculty. These 
shifts in power seemed to come with the result of an overall reduction of central 
administration and external stakeholder power. This seems to corroborate trends over the 
twenty-year period preceding 2001 in which deans, department chairs and faculty in the 
US have reported an increase in influence over governance (Finkelstein et al., 2011). 
Interestingly, this seems to run counter to CAP results from other countries indicating a 
loss of faculty power in this area (Cummings et al., 2011). 
The above discussion outlining what would likely be perceived as fair based on 
the U1 and US faculty governance systems provides an initial understanding with which 
we can draw comparisons. The discussion of faculty perception of their power over 
choosing new faculty and promotion decisions furthers this understanding for US based 
institutions. Chapter II will integrate the known differences in these systems cross-
culturally with the stream of literature dealing with the cultural factors that influence 
justice perceptions in order to build hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
As noted previously, much of the initial organizational justice research was 
conducted in Western, and mainly US contexts (Greenberg, 2001). Perhaps this stemmed 
from the fact that initial tests of novel justice theories seemed to demonstrate that justice 
perceptions and antecedents did not vary by culture. That is, in some of the more 
paramount works in the area of procedural justice (Thibaut & Walker, 1975), it has been 
found that processes that provide for more voice are deemed more fair than those 
processes that do not and these findings seem to hold regardless of country (Lind, 
Erickson, Friedland, & Dickenberger, 1978; Lind, Tyler, & Huo, 1997). Taken with the 
above discussion regarding the standardization of the academic profession in the US that 
the AAUP guidelines provide, it is possible that there are certain core values of the 
academic profession that make it less likely that there is variation in justice perceptions 
cross-culturally. 
However, there has also been an extensive amount of evidence that suggests 
culture plays a role in shaping justice perceptions (Leung, 2005; Li & Cropanzano, 2009). 
One of the conceptualizations used to understand the cross-cultural differences in justice 
perceptions is through Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1980a; Hofstede & 
Bond, 1988; Hofstede et al., 2010). Thus, it seems that there may be times in which there 
are universal definitions of fairness (not culturally dependent) and other times in which 
culture does shape fairness perceptions. 
This chapter will provide the theoretical development for hypotheses looking at 
the relationship between justice perceptions, faculty governance, and cultural values. 
 24 
Furthermore, hypotheses concerning the possible interactive effects of cultural values on 
justice perceptions will be presented. However, before I begin theorizing, I would be 
remiss if I did not provide a brief discussion of why the Hofstede cultural value 
dimensions were chosen over other conceptualizations of culture as well as an overview 
of the meaning of each of these dimensions. 
 
Why Hofstede? 
There are a number of conceptualizations of culture (Hofstede, 1980a; House, 
Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004; Schwartz, 1994) and how individuals behave 
within different cultures so it is important to understand why I am choosing Hofstede’s 
dimensions. Although Hofstede’s (1980a) dimensions have been criticized as reducing 
culture in an overly simplistic manner, it is due to this parsimony that many researchers 
have gravitated towards it (Kirkman et al., 2006). This is evidenced by the fact that it has 
been frequently cited (Hofstede, 2001) and has become the dominant cultural paradigm 
of cross-cultural research (Sivakumar & Nakata, 2001). The Hofstede (1980a, 2001) 
cultural dimensions have also been called one of the most influential cultural value 
conceptualizations (Kirkman et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, within organizational justice research specifically, Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions, particularly the Individualism-Collectivism and Power Distance 
dimensions, have provided useful guideposts for understanding cross-cultural differences 
in justice perceptions (Leung, 2005). In fact, recognizing the usefulness of Hofstede’s 
dimensions in our attempts to further understand these differences, Shao et al. (2013) 
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have challenged cross-cultural justice researchers to hypothesize on the manner in which 
these dimension interact to predict cross-cultural differences in justice perceptions.7 
 
The Cultural Dimensions 
Individualism is characterized as looking out for one’s own best interests whereas 
collectivism is characterized as having more of a focus on the larger community 
(Hofstede, 1980b). Specifically, collectivists are characterized as having an identity based 
on the “social system” and absolute loyalty is given to the in-group in exchange for the 
security that is provided the individual by that group. On the other hand, individualists 
find their identity within themselves and membership in wider groups is “calculative”. 
The individualism-collectivism dimension is one of, if not the most, individual-
level and cultural-level value dimension used in cultural research (Earley & Gibson, 
1998). The concepts of individualism and collectivism have often been studied in 
conjunction with equity, equality and need based reward allocation decisions (Deutsch, 
1975) and have been used to describe differences in reward allocation preferences in 
cross-cultural research (C. C. Chen, 1995; Giacobbe-Miller et al., 2003). 
Hofstede (1980b) refers to power distance as the extent to which power and status 
differences in society are accepted. Low power distance relates to values such as equality 
for all and accessible superiors in the work place. On the other hand, high power distance 
is the belief that those in power have special privileges and that this is part of a natural 
                                                        
7 It should be noted here that Hofstede’s dimensions (1980a) describe culture at the 
national level and are variables that represent an aggregate of the individuals within that 
country. He notes that this does not mean that every individual within a country will hold 
exactly the same values. That is, there are variations in cultural values at the individual 
level. For a complete discussion of the dangers of using cultural value scores at the 
individual level see Journal of International Business Studies, 2006, (37) 6, pg. 881-931. 
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order. This definition seems to indicate that those high in power distance would not 
expect to have input into procedures and that they would defer to the decision of an 
authority figure. 
Uncertainty avoidance is defined as the extent to which uncertain and ambiguous 
situations are tolerated (Hofstede, 1980b). Those high in uncertainty avoidance tend to 
value hard work, avoid conflict and prefer written rules and regulations. 
Hofstede (1980b) states that masculinity encompasses the idea that sex roles are 
strictly divided with men expected to be more assertive and women expected to be more 
nurturing. The masculine orientation also emphasizes domination, performance and 
obtaining financial and material goods. By contrast, in feminine cultures, sex roles are 
more “fluid” as both men and women can be nurturing. Furthermore, feminine values 
emphasize quality of life (what one might consider having a work-life balance), as well 
as considering people, environment and society as a whole. 
Confucian Dynamism or Long-term orientation refers to future-oriented values 
such as persistence and thrift (The Chinese Culture Connection, 1987; Hofstede & Bond, 
1988). Although this dimension was added to Hofstede’s original four more than twenty-
five years ago, it has not been widely used in studies of cross-cultural justice. In fact, I 
have been unable to obtain a single reference in which justice and long-term orientation 
are mentioned in the same article. The meaning was also recently expanded beyond the 
time orientation of a society to include a pragmatic versus normative association 
(Hofstede, 2014b; Hofstede et al., 2010). Having a normative orientation is defined as 
having a desire to explain as much as possible in order to establish absolute truth 
(Hofstede, 2014b). Hofstede (2014b) also suggests that this dimension results in a respect 
 27 
for social conventions and traditions and having little interest in saving for the future. 
Pragmatic cultures on the other hand believe it is impossible to fully understand the 
complexities of life and that the context is an important aspect of understanding. 
Pragmatic societies also value saving and investing for the future (Hofstede, 2014b). 
The final dimension that is also a recent addition to Hofstede’s original cultural 
values is that of restraint versus indulgence (Hofstede et al., 2010). Restraint refers to a 
society that limits gratification of needs through strict social norms (Hofstede et al., 
2010). Indulgent societies on the other hand allow for free gratification of needs that 
relate to enjoying life and having fun (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
 
Justice and Faculty Governance 
Distributive Justice and Academic Freedom 
One of the fundamental findings that gave rise to interest in justice concepts was 
the idea of relative deprivation (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams Jr., 
1949). In a study involving military personnel, Stouffer et al. (1949) found that despite 
the fact that members of the Army Air Corps had a higher rate of advancement 
opportunities than their Military Police counterparts, the Military Police reported being 
more satisfied with advancement opportunities. It was found that the reason for this 
unexpected finding came from the group with which those surveyed were comparing 
themselves. The Military Police were not comparing themselves to their Air Corps 
counterparts who seemingly had a better chance at promotion but were instead comparing 
themselves to members of their training class. Thus, when promotion was achieved the 
Military Police felt special as they had achieved something that relatively few in their 
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referent group had. This not only speaks to the focus on rewards, but also to the 
importance of a comparison or “referent other”. 
This initial finding was succeeded by theorizing that distributive justice was the 
relative reward versus cost in an exchange relationship (Homans, 1961). That is, fairness 
exists when each party in an exchange relationship receives outcomes that are 
proportional to their investments/costs (Homans, 1961). Alternatively, distributive 
injustice exists when one is either under- or over- compensated for their inputs. 
Expanding on these ideas Adams (1965), introduced Equity Theory which became the 
dominant paradigm in justice research for the better part of two decades (Colquitt et al., 
2005). Equity theory posits the idea of weighing the ratio of one’s inputs to outcomes 
versus some referent other. Going beyond Homans’ (1961) conceptualization of 
distributive justice and following cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1962), Adams 
(1965) suggested that when there is an imbalance of the input/outcome ratio, individuals 
will work to restore this balance. 
These theories gave way to a robust stream of research in which it was theorized 
that equity is not the only allocation norm that is seen as fair [e.g. equality and need 
(Leventhal, 1976)] and that the fairness of a given allocation rule is contextually 
dependent (Deutsch, 1975). Specifically, it has been suggested that when promoting 
productivity, rewards based on equity are the most fair, when promoting group harmony, 
equality based reward allocation is the most fair and when promoting personal 
development, need based reward allocation is the most fair (Deutsch, 1975). Evidence of 
these reward allocation norms has been shown in Western contexts (Greenberg, 1978a, 
1978b; Greenberg & Leventhal, 1976; Leventhal, Michaels, & Sanford, 1972). 
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Demonstrating the importance of distributive justice within workplace settings, research 
has also found that there is a strong relationship between distributive justice and various 
workplace outcomes such as outcome satisfaction, job satisfaction, organizational 
commitment, trust, evaluation of authority and withdrawal (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, 
Porter, & Ng, 2001). 
In the case of faculty governance, the AAUP outlines precisely when a promotion 
is to be given (in this case tenure is to be granted or denied after seven years) which 
directly relates to an outcome (American Association of University Professors, 1940). 
However, the AAUP guidelines also explicitly state that the goal of higher education is 
for the common good and depends on the free search for truth and that academic freedom 
and tenure are essential for those ends (American Association of University Professors, 
1940). Thus, there is nothing in the AAUP guidelines that suggest any contextual factors 
that would lead to the preference for one allocation norm over another. These sentiments 
also appear in the UNESCO guidelines as they state that higher education should exist for 
the purposes of human development and the betterment of society and that academic 
freedom and tenure (or its functional equivalent) are important aspects of those goals 
(UNESCO, 1997). Given the international reach of UNESCO, it would seem to indicate 
that the idea of academic freedom represents a core value of universities and their faculty 
members regardless of which country the university or faculty member is working in. In 
essence, academic freedom might be so important to the profession that it is a universal 
standard. 
Despite the seeming universal importance of academic freedom as discussed in 
the UNESCO/AAUP guidelines and outlined above, there are stark differences in the 
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extent that academic freedom exists at universities throughout the world. Therefore, in 
order to develop hypotheses, it is prudent to include a discussion explicating these known 
differences. This begins with a comprehensive discussion of faculty governance, in which 
Altbach (2001) discusses the extent to which various countries and areas of the world 
allow faculty members academic freedom. It is suggested that Latin American countries 
have a history of holding academic freedom as sacred (Altbach, 2001). This resulted in 
universities going as far as not allowing members of the government on campus without 
an invitation. As might be expected, this separation of academe and state was eroded 
under many of the dictatorships that have existed in various Latin American countries. 
Although specific examples of countries are not provided, Altbach (2001) maintains that 
once democracy returns to Latin American countries, the practice of maintaining 
academic freedom will be quick to return as well. Furthermore, Altbach (2001) points out 
that it seems where colonization occurs, so does a reduction in the existence of academic 
freedom. As academic institutions tend to be drivers of civil unrest (Altbach, 2001), 
colonial powers maintained tight control over universities and therefore the idea of 
academic freedom was often repressed. 
Given variations in cultural attributes that neighboring countries can have8 it is 
difficult to make generalizations about how all of the faculty working in individual Latin 
American countries view faculty governance. Therefore, where possible, I try to focus the 
remainder of the discussion on specific countries. 
                                                        
8 As an example, the US and Mexico vary greatly on four of the six dimensions with 
respective scores of 40 and 81 for power distance, 30 and 91 for individualism, 62 and 69 
for masculinity, 46 and 82 for uncertainty avoidance, 26 and 24 for pragmatism, and 68 
and 97 for indulgence. Thus, even though these countries are neighbors, the scores place 
the US and Mexico in opposing categories for power distance, individualism, and 
uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 2014a).  
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In Argentina there is a “test” or “control” mechanism that makes all academic 
appointments fixed-term (of 6-7 years) at the end of which results in a re-post of the 
position and subsequent search (Bennion & Locke, 2010; Lamarra, Marquina, & Rebello, 
2011). Although this suggests limits to academic freedom in that faculty can be replaced 
after the term has ended, it seems that during the employment term they enjoy 
considerable freedom in that they can only be removed in “extreme circumstances” 
(Lamarra et al., 2011). 
Perhaps mirroring the above assertion that Latin American countries value 
academic freedom, seventy-six percent of the Mexican CAP respondents reported that 
they felt the administration supported academic freedom (Galaz-Fontes et al., 2011) 
which was the highest percentage of any of the countries in the survey (Postiglione & 
Shiru, 2011). Although Mexican faculty do not report as much power in faculty related 
personnel decisions as do their US counterparts, they do seem to enjoy academic 
freedom.  
Moving to countries in which academic freedom seems to be limited, an extreme 
example comes from Burma (now known as Myanmar). In an effort to reduce student 
protests and critiques of the Burmese government by faculty, the government of Burma 
actually closed the universities (Altbach, 2001). One question this presents is what would 
a fair faculty governance system look like to the jobless faculty of Burma?  
China, Cuba and Vietnam also have significant limitations on academic freedom, 
especially during crises [e.g. Tiananmen Square (Altbach, 2001)]. Given that current 
examples of communist governments exercise strict control over their populations, it is 
not surprising that as China, Cuba and Vietnam are communist states they exhibit similar 
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characteristics in terms of faculty governance. For instance many in the social science 
discipline are not allowed to be involved in activities that are deemed to go against the 
wishes of the ruling regime such as challenging decisions of those regimes (Altbach, 
2001). Engaging in this type of behavior can lead to anything from loss of appointment to 
imprisonment. Islamic countries are another example of countries that severely limit 
academic freedom (Altbach, 2001). This may be the result of an absence of democracy, 
political instability, or intellectual struggles between fundamentalists and secular forces. 
The lack of a tradition of academic freedom and institutional autonomy in these cases 
make academics particularly susceptible to outside influence (Altbach, 2001). 
Although China was surveyed as a part of the CAP survey, a chapter dedicated to 
this country is not included in the book. However, there is a chapter for Hong Kong that 
includes some discussion of the faculty responses from Mainland China. Although hard 
numbers were not published, Mainland Chinese faculty report the least amount of power 
over policy compared to their counterparts in the other seventeen countries (Postiglione 
& Shiru, 2011). Echoing the above discussion regarding faculty control, Mainland 
Chinese faculty also report a high degree of government power over policy compared to 
their peers in the other countries (Postiglione & Shiru, 2011). Interestingly, even with the 
lack of perceived power, Mainland Chinese faculty report having academic freedom at an 
average rate compared to their counterparts in the other seventeen countries of the CAP 
survey (Postiglione & Shiru, 2011). It is possible that this is attributable to Mainland 
Chinese faculty having a similar level of academic freedom as compared to faculty 
outside of China. However, it has also been suggested that justice perceptions are a result 
of the norms and expectations that evolve from our situations (Rawls, 1999). In this case, 
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Mainland Chinese faculty reporting similar access to academic freedom as their peers in 
other countries may actually be the result of having lower expectations of academic 
freedom, not because they are able to research and teach as they please.  
In one of China’s neighboring countries, a majority of Japanese faculty strongly 
agree or agree that the university administration supports academic freedom (Arimoto, 
2011). This suggests that Japanese faculty enjoy similar academic freedom as their US 
counterparts and that they might see a faculty governance system in line with 
UNESCO/AAUP standards as fair. 
Another area where academic freedom seems to be limited compared to Western 
counterparts is in some smaller African countries and Cambodia. These countries have 
academic freedom in the classroom and for non-politically or ideologically sensitive 
areas, but are restricted from researching and teaching in politically and ideologically 
sensitive areas (Altbach, 2001). In Malaysia and Singapore there are bans on some 
research topics such as ethnic conflicts, some religious views, and local corruption 
(Altbach, 2001). Thus it seems that there are limits here on academic freedom. Results of 
the CAP survey conducted in Malaysia shows that faculty there are in the lower half of 
the countries in terms of academic freedom and that there is a large governmental 
influence over staff appointments as a result of the Universities and University Colleges 
Act of 1971 (Azman, Jantan, & Sirat, 2011). 
In terms of faculties’ perceptions of administration support of academic freedom, 
South African faculty reported one of the lowest scores on this dimension compared to 
the other seventeen countries in the CAP survey (Postiglione & Shiru, 2011). This might 
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suggest that South African faculty would see a system giving them more power and more 
academic freedom as fairer than their own. 
There is also a group of countries that seem to have academic freedom but the 
manner in which tenure (or its equivalent) is achieved is ambiguous. The first example of 
this is in Hong Kong, where there is a relatively high percentage of fixed-term employees 
even though tenure (or its equivalent) is somewhat available (Bennion & Locke, 2010). 
The reason for the high percentage of fixed-term non-tenure track faculty in Hong Kong 
seems to be the result of stiff competition for tenured positions (Bennion & Locke, 2010). 
As a whole, although actual numbers are not reported, Hong Kong faculty appear to be in 
the middle of the eighteen CAP countries in terms of how much power they have over 
policy issues and how much influence is exerted by the government (Postiglione & Shiru, 
2011). However, the majority of the power appears to rest with the school administration 
(Postiglione & Shiru, 2011). Supporting the claim that Hong Kong faculty have academic 
freedom, about fifty percent of respondents strongly agreed or agreed that the 
administration supported academic freedom with another thirty percent being neutral 
(Postiglione & Shiru, 2011). 
Germany also has a high percentage of faculty in junior positions that are fixed-
term but contain uncertainty as there is no time frame for when the possibility of tenure 
(or its equivalent) is obtainable (Bennion & Locke, 2010). In terms of faculty 
governance, German faculty did indicate that faculty committees have the most authority 
over choosing new faculty and making promotion decisions and they feel they have 
control over their own research agendas indicating a degree of academic freedom 
(Teichler, 2011). However, they are also in the bottom of the eighteen CAP countries in 
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terms of feeling that the administration supports academic freedom (Postiglione & Shiru, 
2011). 
The European Union is an example of an area of the world that has a wide range 
of protections for academic freedom and institutional governance.9 Most of the EU 
member countries have specific language in their national constitution or legislation at 
the national government level that addresses both academic freedom and governance 
(Karran, 2007). 
In the United Kingdom (UK) there is legislative protection of academic freedom 
but no tenure (faculty can be fired for performance reasons even if they have 
“permanent” posts) or faculty power in institutional governance (Karran, 2007). The case 
of the UK is interesting because up until 1988 faculty there enjoyed tenure similar to 
what currently exists in the US. That is, after a probationary period and pending a tenure 
review by fellow faculty members, academics were granted tenure that ensured 
permanent employment except for just-cause dismissal. However, the 1988 Education 
Reform Act although still protecting academic freedom removed the possibility of 
obtaining tenure. This law also seemed to remove any self-governance that the faculty 
had previously enjoyed as now there was a significant influence of lawmakers in 
institutional governance. Interestingly, faculty respondents from the UK still report that 
individual faculty and faculty committees have the majority of the power in choosing 
new faculty and making promotion decisions (Locke & Bennion, 2011). However, they 
also feel that there is a top-down management style and little collegiality in decision 
making processes and this feeling has increased since the 1992 survey (Locke & 
                                                        
9 The term institutional governance here refers to the manner in which decision making 
authority over the whole university exists. 
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Bennion, 2011). They are also in the bottom of the eighteen CAP countries in terms of 
feeling that the administration supports academic freedom (Postiglione & Shiru, 2011). 
Based on these results and given the relative recent change from having tenure to not 
having it, it might be safe to say that faculty in the UK would see a faculty governance 
system in which tenure or its equivalent exists as more fair than their own. 
In comparison to the UK, Finland, Hungary, Slovenia, Spain and the Czech 
Republic have very specific national laws that guarantee academic freedom and power to 
the faculty in terms of institutional governance (Karran, 2007). The language used in this 
legislation ensures that the institutional governance it affords is free from outside 
influence essentially creating a form of faculty self-governance (Karran, 2007). Thus, it 
seems at least in the case of the countries with both academic freedom and self-
governance protection that they would find the UNESCO/AAUP guidelines as fair. 
The above discussion particularly surrounding Germany, Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
and the UK does seem to suggest that when faculty feel they have little power in 
governance, this erodes feelings that they have academic freedom. This suggests that 
feelings about academic freedom seem to be universally held by members of the 
profession. 
Therefore, despite warnings against generalizing Western justice theories cross-
culturally (Leung, 2005), it seems that in the case of faculty governance there is no 
evidence that the goal of ensuring academic freedom invites cross-cultural differences. 
However, as outlined above, there is considerable variation in the amount of academic 
freedom afforded university faculty around the world. As ensuring academic freedom is 
the goal of both UNESCO and AAUP standards, the focus of distributive justice in this 
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context is simply on the fairness of academic freedom at the organizational level. This 
leads to the following universal hypothesis, 
Hypothesis 1a (universal): Institutional policies and practices that comply with 
UNESCO/AAUP guidelines in assuring academic freedom for faculty will be 
seen as more distributively fair than those that do not comply. These perceptions 
will not vary by country. 
 
 
However, there are also instances in which faculty working at universities 
following UNESCO/AAUP guidelines report lower perceptions of academic freedom 
than their counterparts in other countries. Indeed, in the case of Finland, faculty 
respondents feel as though they and faculty committees have authority over faculty 
personnel selection and promotion (Aarrevaara, Dobson, & Pekkola, 2011). However, 
Finnish faculty respondents to the CAP survey reported the lowest perception that their 
administrations supported academic freedom (Postiglione & Shiru, 2011). The case of 
Finland actually offers an interesting natural experiment as to why they, despite having 
power in faculty personnel decisions, feel as though they do not have academic freedom. 
Specifically, a US style tenure system was implemented at Aalto University in Finland. 
Rules outlining the governance of this system note that a Departmental Tenure Track 
Committee makes decisions regarding a candidate’s qualifications indicating that it 
provides a similar amount of control to faculty as provided by UNESCO/AAUP 
standards (Aalto University, 2014). However, faculty were skeptical of what the system 
actually meant in terms of academic freedom with the concern being that it would force 
them to narrow their research focus and limit their ability to engage in interdisciplinary 
research (Herbert & Tienari, 2013). These fears stemmed from the observation that US 
style tenure-track systems did not reward interdisciplinary research but instead required 
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scholars to publish in top-tier journals in specific fields (Karran, 2007). Thus, the faculty 
at Aalto University was afraid the new system would benefit a few “elite” scholars. On 
the other hand, the strategists (those implementing the system) thought that the US style 
tenure system would ensure high quality research and provide a clear understanding of 
what is required to obtain tenure and job security which, in their eyes, would increase 
fairness (Herbert & Tienari, 2013). This change in governance structure may suggest that 
the Finnish faculty feel their rights are being eroded away and hence their low beliefs 
about their academic freedom. This also further demonstrates the dangers of importing 
human resource practices (Aycan, 2005; Hempel, 2001; Lunnan et al., 2005) that are 
deemed fair in one country and expecting them to be deemed fair in another. It also 
suggests the apparent differences in perceptions of fairness of similar faculty governance 
systems that can exist cross-culturally. 
With roots stemming from Germany, the UK, and the US, Canada seems to have 
academic freedom and tenure that is similar to the US but with more self-governance than 
what generally exists within the US (Monahan, 1983). As an example, the Governor of 
the State appoints the majority of the Board of Trustees at U1 (Union, 2012) and fellow 
board members vote on who to include in the Board of Trustees at U2 (U2, 2014). This 
effectively removes some of the decision-making authority from the faculty and places it 
in the hands of a third party. However, Canadian institutions of higher education have 
more self-management by faculty as their faculty senate seems to have more authority 
than US faculty senates. Specifically, Canadian university faculty senates have power not 
only over issues of academic freedom but also over university governance (Monahan, 
1983). This is perhaps fueled by the fact that there is no standard overall governance 
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structure in Canada as the individual territories and provinces have unique governance 
structures (Metcalfe et al., 2011). Instead, the Association of Universities and Colleges of 
Canada (AUCC) acts as a non-governmental overseer of Canadian universities (Metcalfe 
et al., 2011). Similar to the AAUP in the US, the AUCC in Canada has no formal 
authority but unlike the AAUP it acts as a de facto Canadian university accrediting body 
(Metcalfe et al., 2011). Suggesting the greater authority that faculty may have over 
faculty governance in Canada, a greater percentage of Canadian faculty report that 
faculty bodies have the authority in new faculty selection and promotion decisions 
compared to their US counterparts (Metcalfe et al., 2011). This would suggest that 
Canadian academics might see the faculty governance that exists in the US, particularly 
at U2 in which the President of the university (as appointed by the Board of Trustees, 
thus a third party to the faculty) has final decision making over hiring, promotion and 
tenure of faculty, as less fair than their own system. 
Finally, much like the country itself, Australian universities seem to operate under 
a system that puts them on a metaphorical island. That is, universities fit into three 
categories with one being heavily research oriented and the other two being labeled the 
“rest” with some research and teaching focus or just teaching focus (Coates, Dobson, 
Goedegebuure, & Meek, 2011). In the case of the research intensive universities, the 
power for personnel selection and promotion decisions rests with faculty committees, and 
with the other institutions it rests more heavily with institutional authorities and 
department heads (Coates et al., 2011). One could assume that as the faculty at the 
research intensive universities report having a similar amount of power as their Western 
counterparts, that a UNESCO/AAUP faculty governance system would be seen as the 
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most fair but this does beg the question of how the other university faculty might view 
the fairness of such a system. 
Taken together, the discussion of Australian, Canadian, and Finnish faculty seems 
to indicate cross-cultural differences in the effect of UNESCO/AAUP policies and 
practices on academic freedom perceptions and leads to the following competing, culture-
specific hypothesis, 
Hypothesis 1b (cultural effects): Institutional policies and practices that comply 
with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines in assuring academic freedom for faculty will 
not be seen as more distributively fair than those that do not comply. These 
perceptions will vary by country. 
 
 
Additionally, in describing faculty governance above, it was pointed out that there 
are some countries that have a high rate of fixed-term contracts (e.g. Argentina) or 
instances in which junior faculty spend extended periods of time in uncertainty regarding 
their job status (e.g. Germany). This uncertainty would seem to run counter to 
UNESCO/AAUP guidelines regarding the importance of establishing academic freedom 
in that without tenure (or its functional equivalent) academics could experience reduced 
academic freedom. Indeed, the CAP survey points to a wide variation of faculty feelings 
regarding how much their administration supports academic freedom (Postiglione & 
Shiru, 2011). Thus, faculty who face uncertainty in their job status may experience in 
practice or perception reduced academic freedom. Fortunately, the uncertainty 
management model may help to explicate this issue. The uncertainty management model 
linking fairness and uncertainty has been proposed in the social psychology literature. 
Specifically, Lind and van den Bos, (2002) and van den Bos and Lind (2002) proposed 
that the uncertainty management model linked these two constructs by showing that the 
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process of justice judgments is initiated in times of uncertainty and that justice is then 
used to manage uncertainty. This model took existing research showing that fairness is a 
crucial aspect of influencing stakeholder attitudes like job satisfaction, organizational 
commitment and intentions to stay with the organization (Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & 
Taylor, 2000; McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992; Tyler & Blader, 2000) and demonstrated that 
the degree to which fairness affects these variables is largely dependent upon the amount 
of uncertainty the individual faces. 
What the uncertainty management model suggests is that fairness helps to manage 
uncertainty because it reassures stakeholders that they can expect fair outcomes and 
reduces their concern that they will be exploited. Accordingly, those higher in uncertainty 
avoidance would expect fairness and would react more negatively to the absence of 
fairness compared to those lower in uncertainty avoidance. In fact, Lind and van den Bos 
(2002 pg. 205) state, "In general, where cultural or situational factors increase the 
salience of uncertainty, we expect to see stronger fairness effects.” This suggests that 
some cultures might be more sensitive to uncertainty, thus there would be stronger justice 
effects. 
The uncertainty management model was tested in cross-cultural contexts and it 
was found that justice effects are stronger among employees from countries that are high 
in Hofstede’s Uncertainty Avoidance dimension (Shao et al., 2013). Consistent with this 
view, other research at an individual (not cross-cultural level) has found that individuals 
high in uncertainty avoidance in Canada preferred equitable distribution of rewards more 
strongly than their fellow citizens who were lower in uncertainty avoidance (Otto, 
Baumert, & Bobocel, 2011). Furthermore, in a cross-cultural analysis, Otto et al. (2011) 
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found that Germans viewed the equitable distribution of material rewards as less fair than 
their Canadian counterparts but there was no difference in the German sample between 
those low in uncertainty avoidance and those high in uncertainty avoidance. As equitable 
reward distribution is the norm in individualistic nations such as Canada (Kim, Park, & 
Suzuki, 1990), it is not surprising that Canadians high in uncertainty avoidance would 
indicate that they found the equitable distribution of rewards the most fair compared to 
their low uncertainty avoidance Canadian and German counterparts. Although Germany 
is more collectivistic than Canada, with a score of 67 (compared to 80 for Canada) 
(Hofstede, 1980a) it can by no means be considered overly collectivistic. However, the 
Otto et al. (2011) study also showed that Germans found the equal distribution of rewards 
as fairer than their Canadian counterparts and that this effect was greater for those 
Germans high in uncertainty avoidance compared to those low in uncertainty avoidance. 
What this indicates is that those high in uncertainty avoidance will adhere more strictly to 
reward allocation norms dictated by their respective countries. Therefore, if reward 
allocation falls outside of cultural norms such as the case with long periods of uncertainty 
in the rewarding of permanent positions to German academics, this will be seen as less 
fair for those high in uncertainty avoidance compared to those low uncertainty avoidance. 
Taken together this leads to the following hypothesis regarding the moderating effect of 
the cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance, 
Hypothesis 1c (cultural effects): The relationship between institutional policies 
and practices to distributive justice perceptions will be moderated by the cultural 
dimension of uncertainty avoidance. Institutional policies and practices that do 
not provide guidelines ensuring academic freedom will be seen as more unfair by 
individuals from high uncertainty avoidance countries compared to individuals 
from low uncertainty avoidance countries. 
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Procedural Justice 
There are two seminal works that expanded the focus of organizational justice 
research from simply input/outcome ratios as the predictor of fairness to also include the 
process used to arrive at those outcomes. The first was Thibaut and Walker (1975) who 
found that it was not the outcomes alone that mattered but also the procedures and the 
amount of control (or voice) individuals have over those procedures. Specifically, in a 
series of experiments involving law students, the adversarial legal system (a system that 
provides control over the presentation of evidence to the parties involved) and 
inquisitorial legal system (a system in which a judge controls the presentation of 
evidence) were compared. This research determined that the adversarial system was 
deemed more fair than the inquisitorial system because the adversarial system allowed 
participants more control over the process (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Interestingly, this 
demonstrated the distinction between concerns of distributive fairness and procedural 
fairness as in both legal systems the outcomes were controlled by a third party 
(Greenberg, 2011). 
Bringing this finding into the organizational context in which control over 
processes and decisions often rests with managers (conceptually similar to a judge in the 
legal context) this finding caused Leventhal (1980) to posit six principles that are 
important in shaping the perceptions of fair process in the context of third-party decision 
making. The first principle is consistency, which states that procedures should be applied 
consistently across time and all parties involved, the second is that procedures should be 
free from bias, the third is that procedures should be based on accurate information, the 
fourth is that procedures should be correctable in the instance of a grievance, the fifth 
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principle is that of representativeness, which states that procedures should reflect basic 
concerns, values and outlooks of individuals affected by them, and the last principle is 
that procedures should keep with ethical and moral concerns of individuals involved in 
them. Subsequent research has found the concept of process control (Thibaut & Walker, 
1975) and the procedural justice rules (Leventhal, 1980) are important in performance 
evaluations and compensation decisions (Folger & Greenberg, 1985). Finally, within 
organizational contexts it has been shown that an aspect of control, voice in procedures, 
is an important factor in maintaining procedural fairness (Greenberg & Folger, 1983). 
Possibly stemming from the original Thibaut and Walker (1975) procedural 
justice tests, much of the cross-cultural research in this area investigates conflict 
resolution processes. Initial findings suggested that the idea of process control or voice in 
procedures is an important antecedent of procedural justice judgments. For instance, Lind 
et al. (1978) found that the adversarial system was preferred not only by US participants 
(whose legal system is based on this model), but also by respondents from the UK, West 
Germany and France. As the adversarial legal system allows for participant control, these 
findings seem to suggest that process control is seen as the most fair no matter the 
cultural context. Some years later in investigating the antecedents of procedural justice, it 
was found that the relational variables that are considered in procedural justice judgments 
seemed to be defined much the same way across samples of students from the US, 
Germany, Hong Kong, and Japan (Lind et al., 1997). This provides further indication that 
procedures that provide process control and that are based on accurate information will 
be judged as fair across cultures. 
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Within the research discussing the amount of control that faculty have over 
governance in non-Western contexts there appears to be much variance. This ranges from 
systems in which faculty or faculty committees retain the power as is the case at U1 to 
systems in which departmental or institutional authorities hold this power. For instance, it 
has been stated that in African countries the academic profession as a whole has less 
power than it does in the West (Herbert & Tienari, 2013; Teferra & Altbach, 2004). 
Within many African cultures, the chancellors and vice-chancellors make hiring 
decisions without faculty input (Teferra & Altbach, 2004). In essence, the new faculty 
member will one day show up and be introduced as a new colleague! Indeed, it was 
found that in answering the questions of which actor has the primary influence over 
choosing new academic staff and making promotion decisions, South African faculty 
were more likely to indicate institutional authorities over external stakeholders, academic 
unit managers, faculty committees, or individual faculty (Wolhuter, Higgs, Higgs, & 
Ntshoe, 2011). Thus, it seems that at least from a faculty perspective, institutional 
authorities have the power over these decisions. This also appears to be the case in 
Malaysia as in terms of choosing new faculty and making promotion decisions, 
Malaysian CAP survey respondents report that institutional managers and academic unit 
managers have the most power with faculty committees and individual faculty having 
very little influence (Azman et al., 2011). 
Faculty committees seem to have influence over hiring decisions in Argentina. 
However, of the faculty respondents to the CAP survey, academic unit managers were 
cited more often as the primary influencers over choosing new faculty and in making 
promotion decisions (Lamarra et al., 2011). Although faculty in Argentina seem to have 
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more power in faculty hiring and promotion decisions than their Malaysian and South 
African counterparts, it still seems that they are not the primary decision makers. 
Given Portugal’s past relationship with Brazil, it may fit with the assertion 
mentioned above that countries which were heavily colonized face academic freedom 
issues. Particularly, Brazil has seen periods of expanded private education (Balbachevsky 
& Schwartzman, 2011) that has created two seemingly contrary methods of faculty 
governance, one for the public sector and one for the private sector. Institutional 
authorities are seen as having the primary authority over decisions; however, for public 
research universities the difference between institutional authorities and faculty in 
decision making is far less than in private institutions with the latter rarely indicating they 
had any authority whatsoever (Balbachevsky & Schwartzman, 2011). It was indicated 
that faculty committees do have authority over choosing new hires and promotion 
decisions within the public research universities but academic unit managers have this 
authority in private institutions (Balbachevsky & Schwartzman, 2011). Given the 
importance of process control in justice perceptions (Thibaut & Walker, 1975) it would 
not be surprising to see faculty members from public institutions in Brazil report higher 
perceptions of justice than their counterparts from private institutions. With this, we also 
see within-country variance in the types of faculty governance that exists at universities 
but the fact that faculty at private institutions indicate that they have virtually no power 
suggests an even greater difference than their counterparts at U1 and U2 described above. 
Japanese faculty report a great influence over faculty governance related matters. 
Specifically, the vast majority of Japanese faculty feel as if they or faculty committees 
have power over personnel selection and promotion decisions (Arimoto, 2011). This 
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seems to suggest that Japanese faculty enjoy similar decision-making power as their US 
counterparts suggesting that they might see a faculty governance system in line with 
UNESCO/AAUP standards as fair. 
In another Asian country, South Korean academics report having the vast majority 
of the power in new faculty selection and the majority of the power in promotion 
decisions (Shin, 2011). Although this does not speak to the possible perceived fairness of 
a tenure system, this does seem in line with UNESCO/AAUP standards suggesting that 
South Koreans would see this system as fair. This is not surprising given the roots of 
South Korean universities in the US and German traditions (Shin, 2011). 
Norwegian academics report that faculty and faculty committees have the 
majority of the responsibility in hiring new faculty but institutional authorities have 
control over promotions (Vabø, 2011). There also seems to be some concern regarding 
the ability of the country to attract and retain top researchers as like the German system, 
there are long periods of uncertainty before a permanent academic position can be 
obtained and even after this there is no tenure system (Vabø, 2011). The fact that 
academics are leaving Finland could be an indication of a lack of jobs or it could be an 
indication that they do not see the Finish system as fair and thus they seek out an 
employment relationship in a country that falls more in-line with their fairness concerns. 
In the case of Hong Kong and Germany, the question becomes, do they see a 
tenure system with a set probationary period as outlined by UNESCO/AAUP as fairer 
than their own? Or, are there other aspects of the systems in place at institutions within 
these two countries that account for the uncertainty or otherwise make clear the 
expectations for promotion? In the case of Argentina, again the question is whether 
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Argentineans are happy with the current system given that the expectations are clear to 
everyone, or is there a sense that a tenure system like the one laid out by the AAUP 
guidelines is perceived as fairer than theirs? 
The UNESCO recommendations for institutions of higher education have many 
aspects that are in-line with the initial conceptualizations as put forth by Thibaut and 
Walker (1975) and Leventhal (1980). Specifically, UNESCO guidelines state that faculty 
should have an active role in the governing bodies of higher education institutions and 
should be involved in the appraisal of the work of fellow academics [process control and 
voice (Greenberg & Folger, 1983)], that this assessment is based on valid criteria and is 
objective (Leventhal’s rule of accuracy and representativeness), that this assessment be 
free of bias, and that faculty should have the right to appeal decisions with which they 
disagree (Leventhal’s rule of correctability) (UNESCO, 1997). As stated above, the 
AAUP standards also state that faculty status and related matters are the primary 
responsibility of the faculty (American Association of University Professors, 1966) 
which falls in-line with the process control model (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). In the 
examples of faculty governance within the countries mentioned above, there is variation 
in the amount of control faculty report that they have. There also does seem to be some 
indication (particularly in the case of Norway) that policies and practices that fall outside 
of UNESCO/AAUP guidelines might be seen as less fair. Given what appears to be 
cross-cultural support for similar conceptualizations of procedural justice it is expected 
that, universally, 
Hypothesis 2a (universal): Institutional policies (regarding hiring, tenure/ 
contract renewal, promotion, and performance appraisal) that comply with 
UNESCO/AAUP guidelines regarding governance processes will be seen as more 
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procedurally fair than those that do not comply. These perceptions will not vary 
by county. 
 
 
The general hypothesis presented above covers a range of aspects of the 
employment relationship. However, there are many aspects of this relationship that could 
be seen as fair or unfair including recruiting, hiring, promotion, tenure, and pay raises. As 
an example, the CAP survey discussed above suggests that faculty feel they have varying 
amounts of power over different aspects of this relationship. For instance, in some 
countries faculty feel they have power over both the hiring of new faculty and promotion 
decisions, in others they feel they have power over one or the other of these aspects and 
still in others they feel they have power over neither. The question becomes “are there 
variations in fairness perceptions based on different aspects of the employment 
relationship?” In other words, do some people care more about power in promotion 
decisions than they do over new faculty selection? As such, the test of this hypothesis 
will involve examining control over many of the activities involved in faculty 
governance. 
Furthermore, even though there is no evidence to suggest cross-cultural 
differences in fairness perceptions of institutional policies and practices that meet 
UNESCO/AAUP standards, research into the effect of the individualism-collectivism 
cultural value suggests that there might be moderating effects of cultural dimensions in 
procedural justice judgments. Specifically, with conflict resolution proceedings it has 
been found that collectivists (individuals from Hong Kong) were more apt to choose 
mediation than their individualist (individuals from the US) counterparts even though 
they felt this resulted in less process control (Leung, 1987; Morris, Leung, & Iyengar, 
 50 
2004). These studies suggest that at least on some level collectivists may be less 
enamored with process control. This suggests a moderating hypothesis, 
Hypothesis 2b (cultural effects): The relationship between institutional policies 
(regarding hiring, tenure/ contract renewal, promotion, and performance 
appraisal) and practices to procedural justice perceptions will be moderated by the 
cultural dimension of individualism-collectivism. Institutional policies and 
practices that leave decision control to a third party will be seen as more fair by 
individuals from collectivistic countries than those from individualistic countries. 
 
 
In terms of the impact of power distance on procedural fairness, it was found that 
individuals from Japan and Korea were more likely to appeal to authorities to resolve 
conflict (Chung & Lee, 1989). It was also found that an authority figure’s involvement in 
a dispute was seen as more fair by those in a high power distance country (China) 
compared to a low power distance country (Canada) (Tse, Francis, & Walls, 1994). This 
makes theoretical sense given the expectation of status differences within high power 
distance societies. Therefore, it would seem that decisions coming from authority figures 
would be perceived as more fair by those high in power distance compared to those low 
in power distance. Furthermore, it was found that people from low power distance 
countries (Germany and the US) had lower organizational commitment after the denial of 
voice than did their high power distance counterparts (China, Mexico and Hong Kong) 
(Brockner et al., 2001). 
Evidence from the CAP survey shows that in Mexico, it appears as though most 
of the power for the selection of new faculty and promotion decisions rest with faculty, 
faculty committees and institutional/academic unit managers (Galaz-Fontes et al., 2011). 
However, as with Argentina and Brazil, the majority of this power appears to be on the 
institutional/academic unit side as opposed to the faculty side (Galaz-Fontes et al., 2011). 
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This is further evidenced by the fact that over fifty percent of Mexican respondents to the 
CAP survey reported there being a top-down management style within their institution 
(Galaz-Fontes et al., 2011). Yet in spite of this, eighty-seven percent of Mexican faculty 
report being very highly or highly satisfied with their jobs (Locke, Cummings, & Fisher, 
2011). Thus, even though Mexican faculty reports relatively low decision-making 
involvement, they are still satisfied with their jobs. 
Taken together, the above research suggests that in high power distance countries 
faculty might not expect to be involved in hiring or promotion decisions (i.e. they would 
be denied voice) and would not necessarily see it as less fair should those decisions be 
made by a third party or authority figure. This seems to run counter to UNESCO/AAUP 
standards that indicate decision making should be left to the faculty and suggests another 
competing hypothesis, 
Hypothesis 2c (cultural effects): The relationship between authoritarian 
decision-making to procedural justice perceptions will be moderated by the 
cultural dimension of power distance. Authoritarian decision-making will be seen 
as more fair by those from high power distance countries compared to those from 
low power distance countries. 
 
 
There also seems to be a preference for more standardized processes, an aspect of 
procedural justice, based on uncertainty avoidance. For instance, one study demonstrated 
that in societies that were higher in uncertainty avoidance, there was a greater reliance on 
formalized selection procedures in hiring decisions (Ryan, McFarland, Baron, & Page, 
1999). This suggests that when uncertainty avoidance is high, there will be a greater 
reliance on formalized rules to ensure procedural fairness. It was also shown that in 
remediation for service failure, individuals indicating a preference for uncertainty 
avoidance had higher perceptions of justice when they were kept informed of the 
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remediation process compared to those indicating low uncertainty avoidance (Patterson, 
Cowley, & Prasongsukarn, 2006). Furthermore, it has been shown that uncertainty in 
markets can increase the importance of procedural justice on outcomes in joint alliances 
(Luo, 2005). These studies indicate that as the preference for uncertainty avoidance 
increases, individuals search for a means to reduce that uncertainty which often results in 
reliance on, or at the very least, knowledge of the procedures used to arrive at outcomes. 
This leads to another competing hypothesis that suggests cultural effects, 
Hypothesis 2d (cultural effects): The relationship of institutional policies 
(regarding hiring, tenure/ contract renewal, promotion, and performance 
appraisal) that provide guidelines for governance processes to procedural justice 
will be moderated by the cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance. 
Institutional policies that provide guidelines for governance processes will be seen 
as more fair by those from high uncertainty avoidance countries compared to 
those from low uncertainty avoidance countries. 
 
 
Interactional Justice 
The final dimensions of organizational justice is collectively called interactional 
justice. This is the term used to describe the relative interpersonal treatment received 
during the enactment of procedures within organizational contexts (Bies & Moag, 1986). 
Bies and Moag (1986) posited that there were four rules that govern interactional justice. 
The first is truthfulness which refers to open communications when implementing 
decision-making procedures, the second is justification which is the extent to which 
adequate explanations are given for decisions made, the third is respect which is the 
extent to which authorities treat individuals with dignity, and the fourth is propriety 
which is that authorities refrain from making improper remarks in communication (e.g. 
free from racial, gender, and/or religious undertones). The concept of interactional justice 
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seemed to relate to procedural justice and in fact there was much overlap between these 
constructs in early operationalizations [for a review see Colquitt et al. (2005)]. 
Further clarification of the concept of interactional justice led to the theorization 
that there were actually two distinct aspects of this construct, one being informational 
justice which refers to the truthfulness and justification rules and the other being 
interpersonal justice which refers to the respect and propriety rules (Greenberg, 1993). 
This results in the theoretical understanding that there are four dimensions of 
organizational justice. Indeed, in his seminal work tapping the rules of all four forms of 
justice, Colquitt (2001) found that the four factor model with the dimensions being 
conceptually distinct was the best fit compared to models in which these dimensions were 
grouped together. 
With the exception of being free from punishment as the result of violations of 
academic freedom and a mention that faculty are to be afforded collegiality in decision-
making processes there is little guiding the relative treatment of faculty members by 
institutional authorities (UNESCO, 1997). As interactional justice as a whole and 
specifically interpersonal justice involves the treatment by a manager [e.g. (Greenberg, 
2009; Scott, Colquitt, & Paddock, 2009)] and there is no theoretical reason that the 
proposed research testing the relative fairness of faculty governance systems relates to 
managerial interactions, there will be no hypotheses presented on the interpersonal 
component of interactional justice. Along this vein, the truthfulness rule also relates to 
the relative treatment by a manager, thus the focus will be on the justification rule of 
informational justice. This makes theoretical sense as the UNESCO guidelines do state 
that the results of any direct assessment of higher-education personnel should be made 
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known to the individual that it concerns. In this case both UNESCO and AAUP 
guidelines state that promotions are the responsibility of faculty, thus faculty become a de 
facto authority figure and providing the results of appraisals in this situation becomes 
justification for decisions regarding employment status. Thus, to the extent that the 
UNESCO/AAUP guidelines reflect core values in the academy, one would expect the 
following universal hypothesis, 
Hypothesis 3a (universal): Institutional policies (regarding hiring and 
promotion) that comply with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines regarding transparency 
in employment decisions will be perceived as more informationally fair than those 
policies that do not comply. These perceptions will not vary by county. 
 
However, as with procedural justice, there does seem to be some evidence that 
suggests there are differences in expectations of interactional justice based on power 
distance. Specifically, the relationship between voice and overall perceptions of an 
authority figure was moderated by power distance such that those low in power distance 
focused on the manner in which they were treated whereas those high in power distance 
focused on their outcomes (Tyler, Lind, & Huo, 2000). This seems to be in line with the 
acceptance by those high in power distance of unequal distribution of power between 
authority figures and subordinates and leads to the following competing hypothesis, 
Hypothesis 3b (cultural effects): The relationship between transparency and 
information fairness perceptions will be moderated by the cultural characteristic 
of power distance. Institutional policies (regarding hiring and promotion) that do 
not provide for transparency in employment decisions will be perceived as less 
informationally fair by those from low power distance countries compared to 
those from high power distance countries. 
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Additional Cultural Value Main Effects 
 
In the case of power distance, after some initial findings that seemed to suggest 
that individuals high in power distance had a similar reaction to procedural injustice as 
their low power distance counterparts (Lind et al., 1997), additional studies have shown 
that there are indeed differences in fairness perceptions based on power distance. As 
mentioned above, the relationship between voice and overall perceptions of an authority 
figure was moderated by power distance such that those low in power distance focused 
on the manner in which they were treated whereas those high in power distance focused 
on their outcomes (Tyler et al., 2000). This relationship was also shown to hold when 
work outcomes rather than perceptions of a third party were measured such that voice 
was more salient for those low in power distance compared to those high in power 
distance (Brockner et al., 2001). Furthering this finding, it has also been shown that 
power distance moderates the impact of voice on procedural justice perceptions such that 
those low in power distance report higher perceptions of procedural justice than their 
high power distance counterparts (Breland et al., 2011). This finding suggests that power 
distance may also act as an antecedent to procedural justice perceptions. As those high in 
power distance expect there to be status differences in society providing those with 
higher status special privileges (e.g. not involving lower status employees in procedures 
used to arrive at rewards), they are likely to ignore any perceived voice (procedural 
justice) injustice and focus on rewards. Thus, 
Hypothesis 4 (cultural effects): Controlling for institutional policies and 
practices, perceptions of procedural justice will be lower for individuals from low 
power distance countries compared to those from high power distance countries. 
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Cultural Value Interactive Effects 
Some of the cross-cultural organizational research indicates the possibility that 
there are interactive effects of the Hofstede (1980a) cultural dimensions. Specifically, it 
seems that the idea of congruence in determining how cultural values interact is 
important to consider. Congruence is the idea that there are aspects of cultural dimensions 
that will lead individuals from a country that espouses that value to prefer a certain set of 
norms or behave in a certain way. As an example, those from collectivistic societies 
prefer harmony and will work to maintain it by avoiding direct confrontation (Hofstede et 
al., 2010). When the workplace allows collectivists to avoid conflict, it is congruent with 
their preferred behavioral patterns and may have positive outcomes for the organization. 
However, when collectivists must engage in conflict it becomes non-congruent and may 
have negative outcomes for the organization. An empirical study looking at management 
practices and cultural values demonstrated how when management practices and cultural 
values were in tune (congruent), work unit performance increased (Newman & Nollen, 
1996). In this study, level of participation (low vs. high) in group decision making and 
power distance (low vs. high) of work groups were compared based on performance. It 
was hypothesized and found that work groups that had congruence (those low in 
participation and high power distance and those high in participation and low in power 
distance) would perform the best compared to their non-congruent (those high in 
participation and high power distance and those low in participation and low in power 
distance) counterparts (Newman & Nollen, 1996). 
As outlined above, the relationship between voice and overall perceptions of an 
authority figure was moderated by power distance such that those low in power distance 
 57 
focused on the manner in which they were treated whereas those high in power distance 
focused on their outcomes (Tyler et al., 2000). This relationship was also shown to hold 
when work outcomes rather than perceptions of a third party were measured such that 
voice was more salient for those low in power distance compared to those high in power 
distance (Brockner et al., 2001). This suggests that because individuals high in power 
distance expect there to be status differences in society, they are likely to ignore any 
perceived voice injustice and focus on rewards. 
In the case of uncertainty avoidance, is was mentioned above that tests of the 
uncertainty management model in a cross-cultural context found that uncertainty 
avoidance was linked to reward allocation (distributive justice) preferences (Otto et al., 
2011). In this study those high in uncertainty avoidance held more strongly to cultural 
norms regarding what was fair in reward allocation. In the current context it would seem 
that faculty from high uncertainty avoidance countries would more strongly prefer reward 
allocation in-line with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines. Furthermore, it seems that those high 
in uncertainty avoidance rely more heavily on formalized rules compared to their low 
uncertainty avoidance counterparts (Patterson et al., 2006; Ryan et al., 1999). These 
findings demonstrate congruence between those high in power distance and those high in 
uncertainty avoidance regarding adherence to reward allocation in-line with 
UNESCO/AAUP guidelines. It also seems as if those from low power distance countries 
are likely to focus more on the procedures used in arriving at rewards and there may be 
congruence with those from high uncertainty avoidance countries who focus on rule 
adherence. This leads to the last two hypotheses. As a reference, Figure 1 represents the 
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expected pattern of the relationship in Hypothesis 5a, and Figure 2 represents the 
expected pattern of the relationship in Hypothesis 5b. 
Hypothesis 5a (interactive cultural effects): Perceptions of distributive justice 
resulting from institutional policies that comply with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines 
regarding academic freedom will be highest for individuals from countries that 
are both high in power distance and high in uncertainty avoidance. 
 
Hypothesis 5b (interactive cultural effects): Perceptions of procedural justice 
resulting from institutional policies that comply with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines 
regarding governance process will be highest for individuals from countries that 
are both low in power distance and high in uncertainty avoidance. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Expected Pattern of Relationship in Hypothesis 5a 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Expected Pattern of Relationship in Hypothesis 5b 
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The Other Three Cultural Dimensions 
To this point, discussions of the main effects of the Hofstede (1980a) cultural 
dimensions within the faculty governance context has been limited to individualism-
collectivism, power distance and uncertainty avoidance and has left out the dimensions of 
masculinity-femininity, long- & short- term orientation, and indulgence-restraint. The 
reason for this is that theory and research as to the impact of these three dimensions on 
justice perceptions is unclear or sparse. if it exists at all. However, given that one of the 
goals of the proposed research is to comprehensively explicate the relationship of cultural 
values and justice perceptions, I would be remiss to leave these three dimensions out of 
the discussion. At the same time, given the lack of evidence to support a theoretical 
understanding of these dimensions on justice perceptions, this section is offered as 
speculation with the expectation that there will be effects of these dimensions on justice 
perceptions. 
 
Masculinity-Femininity 
Research into the effect of the masculinity-femininity dimension on justice 
perceptions is sparse and what does exist provides little insight into the relationship 
between these two variables. For instance, in one study it was predicted that 
individualists (students from the US) would have a higher rate of equitable reward 
allocation compared to their collectivistic counterparts (students from Japan). However, it 
was found that these two samples did not differ significantly on the rate of equitable 
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reward allocation (Kim et al., 1990). Although Kim et al. (1990) did not test for the 
effects of masculinity-femininity on reward allocation preference, they suggest that the 
non-statistically significant difference in equitable reward allocation between the two 
samples was due to Japan’s strong masculine orientation as the focus is on material 
acquisition. Therefore, someone identifying as masculine would seek equitable reward 
allocation as they would get out what they put in and would be able to obtain more 
material goods. However, equitable reward allocation was also found to be fair by the 
South Korean sample characterized as both collectivistic and feminine pointing to a lack 
of clarity as to the effects of the masculinity-femininity dimension.  
In one of the few studies that did test for the effect of masculinity-femininity it 
was found that in a sample from the US and China, masculinity was found to moderate 
the effect of procedural justice on organizational citizenship behaviors (Schilpzand, 
Martins, Kirkman, Lowe, & Chen, 2013). However, van den Bos et al. (2010) found that 
individuals in the US (a masculine culture) thought that it was unfair to be denied voice 
[one of the major factors of procedural justice (Greenberg & Folger, 1983; Lind & Tyler, 
1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975)] when performance capabilities were high (participants 
told they performed well on an experimental task) but did not see the denial of voice as 
unfair when performance capabilities were low (participants told they performed poorly 
on an experimental task). By contrast, their Dutch counterparts (a feminine culture) found 
it unfair to be denied voice when performance capabilities were low and not unfair when 
performance capabilities were high. As with reward allocation preference, it seems that in 
determining the effects of the masculinity-femininity dimension on perceptions of justice, 
context is an important factor. However, given that the UNESCO/AAUP standards do not 
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mention performance capabilities, it would be difficult to predict the main effects of 
masculinity-femininity on any of the justice dimensions in the faculty governance 
context. As a result, the masculinity-femininity dimension will be examined on a strictly 
exploratory basis. 
 
Long-Term Orientation 
Confucian dynamism or long-term orientation refers to future-oriented values 
such as persistence and thrift (The Chinese Culture Connection, 1987; Hofstede & Bond, 
1988). Although this dimension was added to Hofstede’s original four more than twenty-
five years ago, it has not been widely used in studies of cross-cultural justice. In fact, I 
have been unable to obtain a single reference in which justice and long-term orientation 
are mentioned in the same article. In addition to the complications with accurately 
theorizing about this dimension’s impact on justice perceptions due to the lack of 
research and perhaps mirroring the fluid nature of culture itself (Appadurai, 1990; 
Rosaldo, 1988) the meaning has been expanded to encompass more than simply the time 
orientation of a society (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
It is interesting to note here that there may be a paradox within this dimension. 
That is, the US scores 26 on this dimension placing it very firmly in the short-term 
category (Hofstede, 2014a). Although many Americans would agree that as a country we 
do have a need to obtain absolute truth and have a short-term focus, it is unclear if we 
would also say that we hold strong to social norms and traditions (part of the expanded 
normative versus pragmatic aspect of this dimension). Indeed, Hofstede et al. (2010) 
point out that these two seemingly opposite sets of norms (short-term orientation and 
strong social norms) is the reason that there is much variation in the individual behaviors 
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of people within normative societies (Hofstede et al., 2010). However, the aspect of 
strong social norms could indicate a preference for policies and procedures that are in-
line with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines. That is, if a culture has a strong preference for 
process control like that found in the procedural justice literature (Greenberg & Folger, 
1983; Thibaut & Walker, 1975) one might expect stronger fairness perceptions 
surrounding policies and practices that give them control. This suggests that individuals 
from short-term oriented societies might be more sensitive to fairness. 
However, as long-term oriented individuals are inclined to value keeping 
relationships intact, this may indicate that these individuals place a greater importance on 
fairness. The group-value model suggests that individuals are concerned with their long-
term relationships (Lind & Tyler, 1988) and that treatment by a supervisor or the 
organization can signal both standing within the organization and the desire for a long-
term relationship. Support for this theory has demonstrated that individuals look to 
procedural justice as a sign of standing within a group (Tyler, 1987) and a demonstration 
that relationships are in fact important in justice judgments (Tyler, 1989). Furthermore, it 
has also been shown that when trust is high, individuals may look past short-term rewards 
and consider long-term rewards as well (Brockner, Chen, Mannix, Leung, & Skarlicki, 
2000). It may be the case that fairness plays the same role in long-term orientation and 
can be a signal of standing in the group as well as an indication that a continuing 
relationship is desired. As such, those individuals who value long-term relationships will 
also place a greater importance on procedural and interactional fairness compared to 
short-term oriented individuals. Because there is no established research or theory 
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regarding the long-term orientation dimension, this will be examined on an exploratory 
basis. 
 
 
Indulgence-Restraint 
The final dimension is that of indulgence versus restraint (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
Restraint refers to a society that limits gratification of needs and restricts that gratification 
through strict social norms (Hofstede et al., 2010). Indulgent societies on the other hand 
allow for free gratification of needs that relate to enjoying life and having fun (Hofstede 
et al., 2010). As with the long-term orientation dimension, there has been no research 
investigating the effects of this dimension on justice judgments. Additionally, given the 
novelty of the dimension, there is no theory to guide how it might affect justice 
perceptions. As an example, it might be that indulgent societies care strongly about 
distributive fairness as this allows them the resources necessary to enjoy life and have 
fun. On the other hand, restrictive societies might care more about distributive fairness as 
this is a social norm and thus a way to control gratification. Either way, research on this 
dimension will be of an exploratory nature thus no hypotheses are proposed. 
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CHAPTER III 
STUDY 1 
 Primary data was collected in this study to establish the extent to which faculty 
governance varies cross-culturally and how fairly the faculty view the systems that 
govern them. This was important to establish as it was possible that universities 
structured faculty governance in accordance with cultural norms and thus, the faculty felt 
fairly treated because it is what was expected in their culture. In this case there would 
have been little to gain from measuring justice cross-culturally in the faculty context as 
all faculty would have felt they are being treated fairly.  
As culture is socially constructed (Weisinger & Salipante, 2000), it has been said 
that the only way to truly understand such a phenomenon is from within (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966). And, as justice can be experienced differently within different cultures 
(Guo & Giacobbe-Miller, 2012), given the dearth of research on the fairness of faculty 
governance, triangulation as discussed by Jick (1979) was necessary in order to gain a 
more holistic understanding of fairness reactions in university settings. Direct observation 
would have been ideal but it was not feasible to conduct research using direct observation 
within all of the countries and universities covered in this research. Furthermore, and as 
discussed in Chapter II, there is already some understanding of the differences of fairness 
concerns between cultures. Therefore, interviews were conducted in Study 1 of a 
representative sample of the total number of countries that were surveyed in Study 2. 
There were three goals of Study 1. The first was to further establish the extent to 
which faculty governance varies country to country. This helped to answer one of the 
proposed research questions by expanding our understanding of how much faculty 
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governance differs country to country. The second was to help determine justice 
judgment reactions to the varying faculty governance structures that exist worldwide. 
This deepens our understanding of how culture impacts fairness perceptions of variations 
in faculty governance. Based on the first two goals, the third goal was to help develop the 
survey used in Study 2. Taken together, the two studies provide for triangulation and a 
more valid and holistic understanding of justice cross-culturally. 
 
Sample 
Twelve faculty members working in ten different countries outside of the US 
agreed to be interviewed. The countries were Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, India, 
Ireland, Latvia, Spain, the UAE and UK. Interviewees were contacted through the 
author’s personal connections. The sample was 58% female, 83% worked in a business 
school, 50% were from the country they were working in, 75% were at the Assistant 
Professor (or equivalent) level, 17% were at the Associate Professor (or equivalent) level, 
and 8% were at the Full Professor (or equivalent) level. Interviewees lived in the country 
they were working for an average of about 17 years and had about 7 years of experience 
working in academia. 
 
Procedure 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted via the Internet. Interviews were 
recorded to ensure accurate data collection and ranged in duration from about thirty 
minutes to about one hour and fifteen minutes. As the UNESCO and AAUP guidelines 
outlined above consisted of varying aspects of the employment relationship, I, too, 
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focused the interview questions around various aspects of the employment relationship. 
Specifically, I focused on academic freedom, as it is a central concern to both UNESCO 
and AAUP guidelines. I also focused on the hiring process, the tenure or contract renewal 
process, and the promotion/pay raise process as these require the enactment of procedures 
and thus are related to procedural fairness. Finally, I asked about authority figures and the 
extent to which they shared information regarding decisions that were made as this 
relates to informational fairness. The list of questions asked during the interviews is: 
(1) What is the hiring process for faculty at your university? How are faculty 
involved, if they are at all? 
a. Is this hiring process the norm for universities in your country? 
b. Do you think this process is fair? 
c. Why or why not? 
(2) Are you familiar with the tenure process that exists at US universities? (If the 
participant was not, I explained it to them.) 
a. Do you have tenure (or the equivalent) at your University? 
b. What is the tenure process (or its equivalent) like at your university? 
c. Is this process the norm for universities in your country? 
d. Do you think this process is fair? 
e. Why or why not? 
(3) If tenure is not available and only fixed-term contracts are used, what is the 
process for contract renewal? 
(4) How are rewards such as pay raises and promotions distributed at your university 
(do faculty/students have input or is it just administration)? 
a. Is this the same as in other universities in your country? 
b. Is this fair? 
c. Why or why not? 
(5) How is your Dean (or functional equivalent) appointed at your university? 
a. Is this the norm for universities in your county? 
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b. Is this system fair? 
(6) What are some of the things that you feel are needed to have a successful career? 
a. Does your university and/or the administration in your department provide all 
faculty equal access to these things? 
(7) Does your country have faculty guidelines like those of the American Association 
of University Professor’s? (If the participant was not familiar with these 
guidelines, I explained it to them.) 
a. Does your university follow those guidelines? 
(8) How do faculty express disagreement with the decision of high-level 
administrators at your university (if they do)?  
(9) Are you familiar with the concept of a vote of no confidence? (If the participant 
was not familiar with this, I explained it to them.) 
a. Is the practice in which faculty can take a vote of no confidence in its 
administrators (or its equivalent) in effect within your university? 
b. Is it effective? 
 
Analysis 
 
Recordings made from the interviews were transcribed, coded and entered into the 
software program NVivo to establish patterns. Patterns were then analyzed to answer the 
research questions and inform the creation of the survey used in Study 2. 
 
Findings 
Given the importance of academic freedom in the UNESCO/AAUP guidelines 
and to the employment relationship of academic faculty, I will start my discussion of the 
results of my interviews with this topic. Much like with the CAP survey results, most of 
my respondents reported having academic freedom both with teaching and research, 
including the interviewee from China. There are however, two notable findings that came 
from discussions surrounding academic freedom. The first is that in Spain it seems that 
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they may have more freedom in the classroom than what might be available in the US as 
there does not seem to be a concern for “political correctness”. Indeed, the interviewee 
from Spain said "I think it’s part of Spanish culture that to be politically correct is 
laughed at, they think (people from the US) are idiots for being politically correct, (the 
Spanish) say what there is to say." This appears to be so pervasive that instructors even 
insult students and tell off-color jokes as a way to insight debate. The second is that in the 
UAE there does seem to be limits on the amount of academic freedom but this is not 
necessarily due to university interference. Instead, it seems that in the classroom students 
may be unwilling to engage in discussions regarding controversial topics. And, in terms 
of research, it is difficult as an academic to gain access to organizations much as it can be 
in the US. Therefore, the limits on academic freedom in this instance may stem more 
from cultural norms and other non-institutional forces. 
The next aspect of the employment relationship that was discussed in the 
interviews was faculty involvement in the hiring process. As mentioned above, according 
to the AAUP, faculty should be the sole decision makers in the hiring of other faculty and 
if justice perceptions were universally held, procedures varying from this would be seen 
as unfair. Indeed, there was variation in terms of the procedures enacted to hire new 
faculty members. In Canada, Bulgaria and the UK, it seems the hiring process is very 
similar to that in the US and this is seen as fair. In both Ireland and Latvia, hiring 
decisions seem to be made by authority figures with faculty having some input. 
Interviewees from both of theses countries suggested that it might be fairer for a different 
system to be in place. However, Spain and India had a similar system in which authority 
figures made the decisions but this was not necessarily seen as unfair. Furthermore, in 
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Brazil, private institutions are likely to have a closed search process in which personal 
recommendation is the only way to get hired. The extent to which this is seen as fair is 
reportedly dependent on the individual. When comparing this process to the open hiring 
process that exists at public Brazilian institutions, my participant said "it’s difficult to say 
(if it's fair or not) because, as I said to you, even when you have this public and blind 
process, it’s still a small community so everyone knows each other." This is in contrast to 
the Bulgarian respondent who stated that a “competitive process is the fairest way to gain 
an academic position." 
Regarding the extent to which tenure exists at universities across this sample, only 
two respondents (from Canada and India) reported having a tenure system similar to that 
in the US and the extent to which that exists country wide for India remains a question 
mark. In Brazil and Ireland, tenure also exists but occurs after 3 years. In Bulgaria and 
China tenure exists except it comes from your initial hiring. That is, once you are hired, 
you have lifelong employment. In Latvia and the UK, faculty have fixed-term contracts. 
All of the participants from these eight countries reported their systems as being fair. One 
interesting variation occurs in the case of Spain. The interviewee said that in Spain they 
call it tenure but “due to Spanish labor law, they have to pay you more if they want to fire 
you, they will have to pay you a larger severance package, that’s really all (tenure) means 
but they can still fire you any time they want. It’s just the amount they would have to pay 
you increases over time.” When asked the extent to which this was perceived as fair, the 
interviewee responded by saying that “yes, as long as you have a good relationship with 
the Dean and your research is of high quality (it is fair) but there is ambiguity in terms of 
standards as nothing is in writing.” Another significant departure in terms of employment 
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security comes from the UAE where my interviewee reported that there is a three- or 
four-year fixed term contract but you are “never immune from getting fired for whatever 
reason.” In this case it was not the fact that you could be fired at any point for any reason 
(this is very similar to the employment-at-will principle that exists in the private sector in 
the US) as seen as unfair but that there was no recourse or appeal that could be made. 
In terms of pay raises and promotions, in all but Latvia, participants reported that 
they are available. In the case of Latvia, pay is tied to education level and teaching load 
with the number of courses and students taught the determining factor in pay. The 
Latvian participant reported that it would be fairer if pay raises were also tied to research 
productivity. In terms of the other nine countries, the manner in which promotions and 
pay raises are awarded ranges from faculty committee to university authority figures and 
the extent to which these systems are perceived as fair ranges as well. It seems that the 
biggest issue that faculty have with the promotion/pay raise systems is a lack of 
coherence or transparency. This speaks to the results of questions regarding the extent to 
which authority figures or decision makers freely share information. Participants from 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, India and the UK all reported that decision makers freely 
shared information with the participant from India going as far as to say that “I don’t 
think there is any other place in the world where you can be treated as well as here.” In 
terms of Latvia, the feeling was generally that decision makers did share information but 
during the recent recession, the amount of sharing decreased as a lack of pay raises over 
multiple years created a “negative environment”. This environment made it so that 
sharing information and seeking input became too time-consuming as other issues were 
always raised that detracted from the issue at hand. In China, Ireland and Spain, 
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participants said that authority figures did not share information and that it would be 
desirable if they did. In the case of Ireland, it was said that worse than not sharing 
information, authority figures and decision makers did not follow suggestions from 
faculty when they solicited them. In the case of Spain, the participant pointed to a lack of 
transparency again lamenting the lack of formal guidelines. 
The final set of questions sought to determine how authority figures were decided 
upon and who had power in terms of decision-making. In terms of the former, in Ireland, 
Spain, the UAE, and UK, deans (or the functional equivalent) are decided upon by 
authority figures further up with limited to no involvement by faculty. This is also how it 
works in China but faculty in this case “ratify” the Dean or Department Chair. However, 
the Chinese participant said that rarely do faculty fail to ratify a chosen candidate, 
suggesting that power in this case rests with authority figures. In Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, India, and Latvia deans and department chairs are decided on by faculty vote. In 
terms of the latter, only the interviewee from Canada reported faculty having a similar 
amount of decision-making power as is the norm in the US. Although the interviewee 
from India also reported a high amount of faculty involvement, it was said that most of 
the decision-making power in this case rested with the senior faculty, as junior faculty did 
not necessarily have the expertise necessary to make the best decision. In Brazil, 
Bulgaria, the UAE, and UK faculty provide input into decision-making but authority 
figures are the ones making the final decisions. In China, Ireland, Latvia, and Spain 
authority figures are the decision makers with little, if any, input from the faculty. 
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Discussion 
The results of this research seem to indicate that, with the exception of 
informational justice, there is some ambiguity in term of the extent to which fairness 
rules are universal or culturally dependent in the faculty governance context. In the case 
of academic freedom, there was one instance in which the amount of academic freedom 
that was reported by the interviewee from the UAE was less than what was outlined by 
UNESCO/AAUP guidelines. In this case the lack of said freedom was more the result of 
the culture than the employer and this was not necessarily seen as unfair. This would 
seem to hold with results reported in the Chinese sample from the CAP survey in which it 
was understood that Chinese faculty had less academic freedom than their counterparts in 
other countries but still reported having a comparatively average amount of academic 
freedom (Postiglione & Shiru, 2011). However, in the case of Spain the perception is that 
they have more academic freedom than their counterparts in the US. Given the seemingly 
vehement support for this level of academic freedom that was reported by my 
interviewee, it seems to indicate that if Spanish faculty had less academic freedom than 
they currently have they would perceive it as very unfair. This seems to support the idea 
that the more academic freedom a faculty member has, the fairer they will judge it. Taken 
together, these results provide ambiguity as to the extent to which justice judgments 
regarding the fairness of academic freedom will be universal or culturally dependent. 
This uncertainty is furthered by the fact that the interviewees from Spain and the UAE 
were not actually from those countries. Thus, it seems that questions surrounding the 
perceived fairness of academic freedom in the survey used for Study 2 were required. 
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In the case of the hiring of colleagues, tenure, and promotion/pay raises there is 
variation across these procedures but this did not lead to unanimous feelings or 
perceptions of unfairness across the interviewees. Furthermore, when denied voice in 
decision-making and the selection of authority figures both of which exist at universities 
in the US and are suggested as important by UNESCO/AAUP standards, this did not 
increase perceptions of unfairness. This seems to indicate that the above outlined systems 
that are in place in countries like Argentina, Germany, and Hong Kong are deemed fair 
even though they do not provide the same level of faculty involvement as the 
UNESCO/AAUP standards provide. This is also interesting in light of evidence that there 
are some selection methods used in hiring that are deemed more fair than others 
regardless of country (Anderson & Witvliet, 2008; Bertolino & Steiner, 2007; Moscoso 
& Salgado, 2004). Together, this suggests that there is a certain amount of cultural 
dependence in terms of what constitutes fair. Therefore, questions surrounding these 
aspects of the employment relationship were included on the Study 2 survey to see how 
culture impacts the perceived fairness of these governance systems. 
Finally, in terms of questions regarding the amount of information shared by 
authority figures and decision makers, it seems that when information was perceived as 
lacking, it was also perceived as unfair. This fits with the expectation of transparency 
outlined in the UNESCO/AAUP guidelines; the lower the transparency, the lower the 
perceived fairness. There are two possible explanations for this phenomenon. The first is 
that there is universality to the need for transparency of information in employee 
governance. The second is that academics (the population sampled here) may be more 
inclined to seek information and therefore expect it in employment relationships. Either 
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way, the results here seem to indicate a need to include more questions surrounding 
informational justice than just those looking at the fairness of performance appraisal 
processes. Therefore, questions surrounding the information provided during the hiring 
process were also included in the Study 2 survey.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
STUDY 2 
 
 Like Study 1, primary data was collected for this study in order to test the 
hypotheses proposed in Chapter II. Data collection was survey based and relied on 
theoretical background and the information collected in Study 1 to inform survey 
formation. A pre-test was conducted and validity evidence suggested that the survey was 
appropriate for testing the proposed relationships. 
 
Sample 
 As explained in Chapter I, the context being used to test the proposed hypotheses 
is faculty governance within universities. In an effort to eliminate confounding variables 
based on differences between disciplines within universities, only faculty from 
management/business schools were used in the final sample. A dummy coded variable 
was used to control for the effect of participants who were working in one country but 
were from a different one (i.e. working in the United Arab Emirates but from Canada). 
Given the unwritten rule of hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) that it is necessary to 
have twenty unique samples at Level 2 (Sayer, 2012), the goal was to have individuals 
working in twenty different countries represented in the final analysis. My final sample 
consisted of individuals working in 47 unique countries! 
Personal contacts and university websites were used to recruit participants. 
Recruitment emails were sent to twenty of the author’s personal contacts who then 
forwarded the email to an untold number of their personal contacts. 144 survey responses 
were returned through personal contacts. After non-business school faculty, doctoral 
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students and incomplete surveys were removed, there were 83 usable responses 
remaining. Although this sample had a sufficient number of countries to meet the HLM 
rule (there were 24 represented), a sample of 83 individuals was not sufficient to conduct 
hypothesis testing. Therefore, the decision was made to send recruitment emails directly 
to faculty working in business schools at universities worldwide. This had the added 
benefit of reducing bias caused by recruitment that relied on personal networks and 
snowball techniques. 
10,872 survey requests were sent directly to faculty at universities worldwide with 
reminders sent two to four weeks later. Contact information for faculty was obtained 
from university websites. There were 1,423 survey responses returned from university 
faculty of which 1,061 contained usable data. The overall response rate was 14.4% and 
the final data set contains 1,144 usable responses. The sample is 36% female, age range is 
0.3% between the ages of 18 and 24, 3.6% between the ages of 25 and 29, 9.5% between 
the ages of 30 and 34, 15.3% between the ages of 35 and 39, 16.3% between the ages of 
40 and 44, 16.7% between the ages of 45 and 49, 14.6% between the ages of 50 and 54, 
9.8% between the ages of 55 and 59, 7.1% between the ages of 60 and 64, and 6.6% over 
the age of 65. 49% of respondents are from the country they are currently working in and 
also obtained their PhD there, on average have lived in the country they are working in 
for 17 years, have an average of 17 years working in academia, 11 years working at their 
current university, 75% work at a public institution, 22% report that their institution is 
research focused, 9% report that their institution is teaching focused, and 69% report that 
their institution is both research and teaching focused. 3.6% are at the Lecturer (US 
definition) or Fellow level, 25.3% are at the Assistant (or equivalent) level, 31% are at 
 77 
the Associate Professor (or equivalent) level, 23.0% are at the Full Professor (or 
equivalent) level, 5.4% are Department Chairs or Administrators (Associate Dean’s), and 
0.8% are Emeriti. Additionally, doctoral students were taken out of the sample if it could 
be determined that they were not a part of the faculty (like is the case in the US). 
However, based on discussions with participants in Study 1, it was determined that in 
some countries doctoral students work on their degrees and are employed at the Assistant 
Professor (or equivalent) level. Therefore, the sample also consists of 7% doctoral 
students. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were contacted via email. Specific language in the email for the 
recruitment of participants was as follows: 
As part of my doctoral dissertation, I am currently conducting research on the 
effects of national culture on the perceived fairness of faculty governance 
systems. Data is being obtained from faculty in business schools worldwide. You 
are being contacted because you are currently a faculty member working in a 
business school at a university. Your participation will be greatly appreciated and 
will only take approximately 20 minutes of your time. If you are willing to 
participate please follow the link below. 
 
 
Participants were then directed to a Qualtrics survey consisting of an informed 
consent form, demographic questions, items measuring organizational justice, items 
measuring perceived faculty power over decisions, and some open ended questions 
designed to gain a more holistic understanding of faculty governance worldwide. 
Cultural value scores were obtained from Hofstede’s website. Obtaining measures 
of variables from Hofstede’s website was advantageous in that it reduced concerns with 
common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003) as variables are 
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obtained from multiple sources. However, although Hofstede’s website has data for 101 
countries (Hofstede, 2014a), the data is not complete. For instance, values for the 
indulgence versus restraint dimension only exist for 93 countries (Hofstede, 2014c). 
Although the original data for the cultural dimensions came from IBM in the late 1960’s 
and early 1970’s and only included 40 countries (Hofstede, 1980a), the data for the 
original four dimensions (Individualism, Power Distance, Masculinity, and Uncertainty 
Avoidance) has since been expanded to include 76 countries and is no longer only based 
on responses gathered from IBM employees (Hofstede, 2014c). As there is no reason to 
believe that there are systematic reasons for countries either being included or not 
included in this data set other than convenience sampling, there is not a concern about 
missing country data as a result of sampling bias. 
Given the differences in faculty governance processes cross-culturally that were 
explicated in Chapter I, this unique context provided for an examination of fairness 
perceptions based on naturally existing phenomena. Finally, despite differences in the 
justice construct cross-culturally (Guo & Giacobbe-Miller, 2012), the organizational 
justice measures for procedural, informational and interpersonal justice were based on the 
Colquitt (2001) scales as these have been validated cross-culturally (Fischer et al., 2011). 
However, cultural equivalence testing was still necessary for the current sample given the 
many different countries represented in the sample. The measures for the fairness of 
organizational level distributive justice (academic freedom) were based on the fairness of 
an organizational policy measure established by Greenberg (1994). For most of the scale 
items a 6-point Likert type scale was chosen to avoid central tendency bias that exists in 
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some Asian cultures like China (C. Hui, Lee, & Rousseau, 2004). The justice scales were 
modified to test the proposed hypotheses. 
Even though multiple studies have demonstrated the reliability of the justice 
measures [e.g. (Colquitt, 2001; Fischer et al., 2011)], a reliability test was run to ensure 
the reliability of the measures in this study. A reliability test was also run on the faculty 
control items. With the exception of the academic freedom (AF) scale, all scales had 
reliabilities above .90.  The AF scale had a .82 reliability, which is acceptable for 
hypothesis testing. 
Evidence of the validity of the multi-factor model of the organizational justice 
measurement has been found for the US (Colquitt, 2001) and for a number of other 
countries (Fischer et al., 2011). However, as the current sample comprises people 
working in 47 different countries it was necessary to conduct both a CFA and a construct 
equivalence test. A CFA and a construct equivalence test was also tested for the 
measurement of the faculty control variables. CFAs were conducted on the organizational 
justice and faculty control scales to provide evidence for using the eight- and seven- 
factor structure respectively. Goodness-of-fit statistics such as RMSEA, CFI, and GFI, 
were examined to check the overall fit of the measurement model. To conduct the 
construct equivalence tests the steps outlined by Byrne (2009) were used to test 
configural invariance and measurement invariance. To test for scalar invariance the 
procedures outlined by Hult et al. (2008) were used. 
As establishing what proportion of justice perceptions is culturally based was one 
of the questions the research is attempting to answer, a hierarchical linear modeling 
(HLM) approach was used for testing the hypotheses. HLM was the most appropriate 
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analysis technique for testing the proposed hypotheses as it allows for multi-level 
analysis in which the proportion of variance that is attributable to different levels can be 
determined. In this case, Level 1 was the individual-level and Level 2 was the country-
level. Although there are no previously published articles that have determined the 
minimum sample size required for drawing valid conclusions from HLM analysis, a 
commonly held rule is twenty unique Level 2 data points (Sayer, 2012). This can be 
reduced (to as few as 12) if there is a large enough sample size at Level 1. However, as 
stated above, the current sample consists of 47 unique countries.  
SPSS 22.0 was used to test reliabilities. AMOS 22.0 was used to conduct the 
CFAs and construct equivalence and HLM 7.0 was used to conduct the HLM analysis. 
 
Analysis 
Measures 
All of the governance measures are designed such that increased levels of control 
(governance) indicate increased compliance with UNESCO/AAUP standards. Descriptive 
statistics and correlations for all of the variables in this study are listed in Table 1. Except 
where noted, response options for governance and justice measures were 6-point Likert 
items with anchors of “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree”. An option of “Do Not 
Know/Unsure” was also provided for individuals who may not be familiar with the 
governance procedures in their university or did not have an opinion about its fairness. 
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Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations 
    Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Female 
0.36 0.48 N.A.         
2 YearsLiving 
16.98 12.44 -.070* N.A.       
3 IndustryTenure 
16.57 10.22 -.154** .635** N.A.     
4 ResearchFocus 
0.22 0.41 -.063* -.054 -.005 N.A.   
5 TeachingFocus 
0.09 0.29 .039 -.039 -.039 -.168** N.A. 
6 LifeOneCountry 
0.49 0.50 .078** .388** .102** -.062* -.096** 
7 HireCont 
4.66 1.25 -.071* .037 .013 .089** -.079** 
8 TenCont 
4.00 1.41 -.049 .087** .013 .082* -.126** 
9 PerfCont 
3.71 1.36 -.031 .009 .029 -.003 -.059 
10 PromCont 
3.85 1.34 -.092** .021 .032 .002 -.072* 
11 AF 
4.87 0.92 -.126** .063 .094** .115** -.045 
12 InfoHire 
3.64 1.36 -.052 .034 .049 .040 -.110** 
13 InfoProm 
3.62 1.38 -.015 .009 .022 -.028 -.082* 
14 Guidelines 
2.88 0.77 -.125** .137** .173** .031 -.120** 
15 PJHire 
4.10 1.08 -.100** .055 .047 .054 -.092** 
16 PJTenureCont 
3.93 1.13 -.116** .102** .061 .072* -.106** 
17 PJPerf 
3.98 1.10 -.070* .042 .059 .036 -.041 
18 PJProm 
3.89 1.16 -.091* .056 .085* .047 -.039 
19 DJAF 
5.00 1.10 -.080* .080* .078* .111** -.100** 
20 IJHire 
3.73 1.28 -.043 .088* .063 .046 -.129** 
21 IJProm 
3.78 1.28 -.037 .055 .033 -.014 -.048 
22 IPJ 
4.52 1.00 -.055 .060 .064 .044 -.104** 
23 PD 
49.92 24.71 .141** -.120** -.117** -.100** .133** 
24 IND 
59.76 26.04 -.053 .183** .116** .081** -.170** 
25 Masc 
46.93 20.83 .075* .052 .013 .086** -.002 
26 UA 
48.45 21.02 -.007 .019 .027 -.050 .121** 
27 LongTerm 
41.67 18.80 -.046 -.135** -.056 .088** -.034 
28 Indul 
60.04 18.52 .023 .143** .136** -.050 -.037 
  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).         
  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).         
  
Reliabilities on the 
diagonal               
 
 82 
Table 1 (cont’d): Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations 
    6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Female 
              
2 YearsLiving 
              
3 IndustryTenure 
              
4 ResearchFocus 
              
5 TeachingFocus 
              
6 LifeOneCountry 
N.A.             
7 HireCont 
.081** 0.942           
8 TenCont 
.142** .507** 0.925         
9 PerfCont 
.076* .452** .584** 0.906       
10 PromCont 
.052 .503** .662** .679** 0.909     
11 AF 
.007 .241** .256** .255** .292** 0.819   
12 InfoHire 
.050 .471** .468** .496** .538** .413** 0.964 
13 InfoProm 
.037 .402** .418** .479** .550** .345** .749** 
14 Guidelines 
.057 .386** .381** .402** .427** .424** .572** 
15 PJHire 
.050 .661** .456** .516** .493** .386** .679** 
16 PJTenureCont 
.086* .490** .663** .596** .605** .450** .663** 
17 PJPerf 
.027 .459** .477** .688** .564** .436** .628** 
18 PJProm 
.018 .471** .568** .616** .726** .466** .666** 
19 DJAF 
.063 .279** .241** .289** .309** .742** .429** 
20 IJHire 
.086* .494** .476** .509** .508** .421** .858** 
21 IJProm 
.090* .439** .440** .467** .522** .398** .738** 
22 IPJ 
.054 .413** .412** .455** .457** .518** .630** 
23 PD 
-.092** .092** .047 .159** .104** -.081* .035 
24 IND 
.273** -.017 .012 -.065* -.070* .021 -.022 
25 Masc 
-.085** -.001 -.037 -.005 -.068* -.042 -.079* 
26 UA 
-.111** -.001 -.073* -.032 -.014 .057 -.017 
27 LongTerm 
.014 .141** .091** .106** .082* .061 .103** 
28 Indul 
.132** -.139** -.105** -.071* -.060 -.064 -.016 
  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).         
  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).         
  
Reliabilities on the 
diagonal               
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Table 1 (cont’d): Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations 
    13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 Female 
              
2 YearsLiving 
              
3 IndustryTenure 
              
4 ResearchFocus 
              
5 TeachingFocus 
              
6 LifeOneCountry 
              
7 HireCont 
              
8 TenCont 
              
9 PerfCont 
              
10 PromCont 
              
11 AF 
              
12 InfoHire 
              
13 InfoProm 
0.973             
14 Guidelines 
.571** 0.908           
15 PJHire 
.602** .578** 0.901         
16 PJTenureCont 
.616** .615** .744** 0.917       
17 PJPerf 
.616** .599** .708** .799** 0.919     
18 PJProm 
.688** .622** .687** .781** .788** 0.927   
19 DJAF 
.349** .447** .398** .486** .485** .478** 0.957 
20 IJHire 
.738** .641** .689** .680** .663** .683** .463** 
21 IJProm 
.874** .634** .638** .672** .635** .731** .413** 
22 IPJ 
.576** .579** .607** .624** .628** .603** .554** 
23 PD 
.094** -.108** .104** .020 .041 .041 -.241** 
24 IND 
-.065 .142** -.065 .021 -.002 -.022 .168** 
25 Masc 
-.089* .004 -.029 -.047 -.063 -.079* -.093** 
26 UA 
.004 -.102* -.009 -.090* -.030 -.011 -.002 
27 LongTerm 
.094** .010 .132** .100** .100** .090* .075* 
28 Indul 
-.020 .093* -.125** -.029 -.047 -.018 .047 
  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).         
  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).         
  
Reliabilities on the 
diagonal               
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Table 1 (cont’d): Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations 
    20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
1 Female 
                
2 YearsLiving 
                
3 IndustryTenure 
                
4 ResearchFocus 
                
5 TeachingFocus 
                
6 LifeOneCountry 
                
7 HireCont 
                
8 TenCont 
                
9 PerfCont 
                
10 PromCont 
                
11 AF 
                
12 InfoHire 
                
13 InfoProm 
                
14 Guidelines 
                
15 PJHire 
                
16 PJTenureCont 
                
17 PJPerf 
                
18 PJProm 
                
19 DJAF 
                
20 IJHire 
0.954               
21 IJProm 
.811** 0.956             
22 IPJ 
.624** .591** 0.911           
23 PD 
.039 .031 -.076* N.A.         
24 IND 
.018 .019 .053 -.787** N.A.       
25 Masc 
-.043 -.058 -.092* .265** -.023 N.A.     
26 UA 
-.056 -.006 .020 .263** -.227** .190** N.A.   
27 LongTerm 
.085* .047 .016 .190** -.227** -.249** -.052 N.A. 
28 Indul 
-.018 .002 .032 -.511** .555** -.098** -.218** -.386** 
  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).     
      
  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).     
      
  
Reliabilities on the 
diagonal                 
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Hiring Control (HireCont) was a 5-item scale. Survey item asked respondents to 
indicate the extent that they agree that faculty control the following aspects of the hiring 
process: Recruitment of candidates, Selection of candidates for interviews, Interviewing 
candidates, Selecting candidates to be hired, Preventing undesired hires. The Cronbach’s 
alpha for this measure is 0.94. 
Tenure/Contract Extension Control (TenCont) was a 3-item scale. Items asked 
respondents to indicate the extent that they agree that faculty control the following 
aspects of the tenure/contract extension process: Setting standards for tenure/contract 
extensions, Evaluating cases for tenure/contract extensions, Recommending peers for 
tenure/contract extensions. The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is 0.93. 
Performance Evaluation Control (PerfCont) was a 4-item scale. Items asked 
respondents to indicate the extent that they agree that faculty control the following 
aspects of the performance evaluation process: Setting the standard for performance, 
Conducting evaluations of peers, Providing feedback to peers, Determining when 
performance evaluations occur. The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is 0.91. 
Promotion Control (PromCont) was a 4-item scale. Items asked respondents to 
indicate the extent that they agree that faculty control the following aspects of 
promotions: Setting standards for promotion, Evaluating faculty promotion cases, 
Recommending peers for promotion, Determining when promotion occurs. The 
Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is 0.91. 
Academic Freedom (AF) was a 5-item scale. Items asked respondents to indicate 
the extent that they agree that faculty had the following aspects of academic freedom: 
Selecting research topics, Determining publication outlets, Researching without 
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administrative or government interference, Teaching without administrative or 
government interference, Determining course content. The Cronbach’s alpha for this 
measure is 0.82. 
Information in Hiring (InfoHire) was a 4-item scale. Items asked respondents to 
indicate the extent that they agree that authority figures shared information regarding the 
following aspects of the hiring process: Freely share information regarding hiring 
decisions, Provide clear information regarding hiring decisions, Provide adequate 
information regarding hiring decisions, Communicate transparently. The Cronbach’s 
alpha for this measure is 0.96. 
Information in Promotion (InfoProm) was a 4-item scale. Items asked respondents 
to indicate the extent that they agree that authority figures shared information regarding 
the following aspects of the promotion process: Freely share information regarding 
promotion/tenure decisions, Provide clear information regarding promotion/tenure 
decisions, Provide adequate information regarding promotion/tenure decisions, 
Communicate transparently. As the promotion and tenure process can be two separate 
employment actions, ideally this scale would have been split into one focusing on the 
information provided for tenure/ contract renewals and one focusing on the information 
provided for the promotion process. However, given a concern of survey fatigue, it was 
decided that the promotion/ tenure questions could be combined. The Cronbach’s alpha 
for this measure is 0.97. 
University Guidelines (Guidelines) was a 6-item scale. Item asked respondents to 
indicate the extent that they agree that their university has guidelines for the following 
aspects of the employment relationship: Recruitment of new faculty, Hiring of new 
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faculty, Tenure of faculty (if available), Contract extensions of faculty, Promotion of 
faculty to higher ranks, Academic freedom. Responses for this measure were on a 4-point 
scale with options of “no guidelines”, “some guidelines”, “clear guidelines”, and “clear 
guidelines that are followed”. An option of “Do Not Know/Unsure” was provided for 
individuals who may not be familiar with the governance procedures in their university. 
The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is 0.91. Although the items of this scale deal with 
different aspects of the employment relationship, this variable serves as a proxy for 
establishing the extent to which policies are in-line with UNESCO/AAUP standards. The 
aspects of the employment relationship mentioned in this scale are discussed in 
UNESCO/AAUP guidelines and the high alpha of the scale seems to indicate that 
guidelines in one area of the employment relationship indicate a high probability of there 
being guidelines in another area. 
Procedural Justice in Hiring (PJHire) was a 7-item scale. A sample item asks 
respondents to indicate the extent that they agree “Faculty have influence over the 
decision to hire new faculty members”. The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is 0.90. 
Procedural Justice in Tenure/Contract Decisions (PJTenCont) was a 7-item scale. 
A sample item asks respondents to indicate the extent that they agree “Faculty have 
influence over the tenure/contract decision procedures”. The Cronbach’s alpha for this 
measure is 0.92. 
Procedural Justice in Performance Decisions (PJPerf) was a 7-item scale. A 
sample item asks respondents to indicate the extent that they agree “Faculty have 
influence over the procedures”. The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is 0.92. 
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Procedural Justice in Promotion Decisions (PJProm) was a 7-item scale. A 
sample item asks respondents to indicate the extent that they agree “Faculty have 
influence over the procedures”. The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is 0.93. 
Distributive Justice of Academic Freedom (DJAF) was a 4-item scale. A sample 
item asks respondents to indicate the extent that they “support (their) university’s 
academic freedom policy”. The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is 0.96. 
Informational Justice of Hiring (IJHire) was a 5-item scale. A sample item asks 
respondents to indicate the extent that they agree “The criteria for the decisions are 
thoroughly explained” by authority figures. The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is 
0.95. 
Informational Justice of Promotion Decisions (IJProm) was a 5-item scale. A 
sample item asks respondents to indicate the extent that they agree “The criteria for the 
decisions are thoroughly explained” by authority figures. The Cronbach’s alpha for this 
measure is 0.96. 
Interpersonal Justice (IPJ) was a 7-item scale. A sample item asks respondents to 
indicate the extent that they agree authority figures “Treat you in a polite manner”. The 
Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is 0.91. 
 Country was coded as a categorical variable with each country having a unique 
identifying number and represents the country in which the participant is currently living. 
Table 2 lists the countries represented in this study. 
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Table 2: Countries Represented in Sample 
Argentina Estonia Lebanon Philippines Thailand 
Australia Finland Lithuania Poland Turkey 
Belgium France Luxembourg Russia United Kingdom 
Brazil Greece Malaysia Saudi Arabia United States 
Canada Hong Kong Mexico Singapore Portugal 
Chile Iceland Netherlands South Africa Bulgaria 
China India New Zealand South Korea Croatia 
Columbia Ireland Norway Sweden 
 Denmark Japan Pakistan Switzerland 
 Egypt Jordan Peru Taiwan 
  
Control Variables. Sex, years working in current country, current institution focus, years 
working in academia, and life spent in the same country were all included as control 
variables. Although data were collected for age, current institution type, years working at 
current institution, and status as a current student, in keeping with a recent call to limit 
the inclusion of control variables unless necessary (Spector & Brannick, 2011), these 
were not included in the final analysis as they were not theoretically important and a 
correlation analysis revealed they were not correlated with the variables of interest. Sex 
was measured as a categorical variable coded as 0 “male”, 1 “female”. Years working in 
the current country and years working in academia were measured as continuous 
variables. Current institution focus was split into two variables “teaching” and “research” 
and dummy coded. Life spent in the same country was measured as a categorical variable 
coded as 0 “No”, 1 “Yes” and represents a faculty member working in the same country 
s/he is from and where s/he obtained her/his PhD. 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
 In order to further test the validity of the organizational justice measures in 
hypothesis testing, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) analysis was conducted. Results 
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are reported in Table 3. There were 49 items included in this analysis. These items were 
from the measures of procedural justice in hiring (PJHire), procedural justice in 
tenure/contract decisions (PJTenCont), procedural justice in performance review 
(PJPerf), procedural justice in promotion decisions (PJProm), distributive justice of 
academic freedom (DJAF), informational justice of hiring (IJHire), informational justice 
of promotion decisions (IJProm), and interpersonal justice (IPJ). Results indicate that the 
eight-factor model was significantly better than either the four-factor or one-factor 
models. Although the CFI and RMSEA of the eight-factor model suggest poor fit, as 
these are the dependent variables being tested in separate HLM models, this CFA was 
conducted to demonstrate that an eight-factor model was a better fit than a one-factor or 
four-factor model. Given the significant difference in the χ2 statistic and CFI value 
between the four-factor model and eight-factor model, this test served its purpose to 
justify the use of the eight-factor model. 
Table 3: Justice Variables CFA 
 
χ2 Δχ2 df Δdf CFI ΔCFI RMSEA 
One-factor 12,375.76 
 
1127 
 
0.562 
 
0.147 
Four-factor 
 
4805.647 
 
6 
 
0.197 0.112 
Eight-factor 
 
2051.979 
 
22 
 
0.069 0.093 
 
In order to further test the validity of the faculty control variables for hypothesis 
testing, a CFA was also conducted on these variables. Results are reported in Table 4. 
There were 29 items included in this analysis. These items were from the measures of 
governance of hiring (HireCont), governance of tenure/contract (TenCont), governance 
of performance evaluations (PerfCont), governance of promotion (PromCont), 
governance of academic freedom (AF), governance of information in hiring (InfoHire), 
and governance of information in promotion (InfoProm). Results indicate that the seven-
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factor model was significantly better than either the five-factor or one-factor models. The 
CFI and RMSEA of the seven-factor model suggest reasonable model fit. However, and 
like the organizational justice CFA discussed above, these independent variables are 
being tested in separate HLM models. Thus, this CFA was conducted to demonstrate that 
a seven-factor model was a better fit than other models. Given the significant difference 
in the χ2 statistic and CFI value between the five-factor model and seven-factor model, 
this test served its purpose to justify the use of the seven-factor model. 
Table 4: Faculty Control Variables CFA 
 
χ2 Δχ2 df Δdf CFI ΔCFI RMSEA 
One-factor 8619.841 
 
377 
 
0.488 
 
0.204 
Five-factor 
 
5250.218 
 
10 
 
0.326 0.125 
Seven-factor 
 
1228.560 
 
11 
 
0.132 0.068 
 
Construct Equivalence Tests 
 As this study involves cross-cultural comparisons amongst 47 countries, construct 
equivalence needs to be established in order to verify that the constructs are represented 
equivalently across countries. This process begins by establishing configural equivalence 
which determines if the factor loading patterns are the same across groups. This model 
then serves as the baseline against which subsequent models are compared. Once 
configural equivalence is established, measurement equivalence can be checked. 
Measurement equivalence is the extent to which parameters comprising the measurement 
of variables are similar across cultural groups. In a measurement model, parameters are 
estimated for one group and estimates for all remaining groups are constrained to equal 
those of this group. If the change in χ2 or CFI is statistically non-significant, full 
measurement equivalence is established. Finally, scalar equivalence must be established 
to demonstrate that the intercepts are equal across groups. 
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Ideally, construct equivalence testing is conducted on all of the unique groups 
represented in a sample. However, given the constraints of SEM I was not able to 
conduct construct equivalence testing on all of the countries individually. Instead, I 
conducted two separate construct equivalence tests; one used quartile separation of the 
power distance (PD) dimension to break the sample into four groups, the other broke the 
sample into what could be termed as “The West” and “The Rest”. As many of my 
variables involve a distinction between faculty and authority figures, the use of PD was 
logical given that it is a dimension concerned with the separation between those with 
authority and those without it. Breaking the counties into The West and The Rest groups 
comes from the idea that there are other characteristics besides proximity that can 
indicate similarities between countries (Inglehart & Carballo, 1997).  
Organizational Justice Variables 
The construct equivalence test results for the organizational justice variables using 
the PD grouping are reported in Table 5. Results indicate configural equivalence for all 
organizational justice variables using the PD grouping. Three of the procedural justice 
variables (PJHire, PJTenCont, and PJProm) required two of the error variances to be 
constrained. These constraints were left in place for subsequent construct equivalence 
tests. As results indicated between group configural equivalence for all variables, the next 
step was to test measurement equivalence.  
 Based on the chi-squared and CFI difference tests, results indicate measurement 
equivalence for the following organizational justice variables: PJHire, PJTenCont, 
PJPerf, PJProm, IJHire, IJProm, and IPJ. Based on the CFI difference test, results 
indicate measurement equivalence for DJAF. As the change in CFI of the DJAF variable 
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was well below acceptable cutoffs, this indicates that even though the chi-square test was 
significant, this was still culturally invariant. Therefore, as results indicated between 
group measurement equivalence for all variables, the final step was to test scalar 
equivalence. 
 Based on the chi-squared and CFI difference tests, results indicate scalar 
equivalence for the following organizational justice variables: PJPerf, PJProm, IJHire, 
and IJProm. Based on the CFI difference test, results indicate scalar equivalence for 
PJTenCont. Results indicate scalar variance for the following organizational justice 
variables: PJHire, DJAF, and IPJ. The significant differences of both the chi-square and 
CFI values in the PJHire, DJAF and IPJ variables indicate that the scales of these 
measures are different cross-culturally, this is not surprising given what cross-cultural 
research has demonstrated regarding the preferences of some cultures to use extreme 
scores while others favor neutral scores (Hult et al., 2008; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 
1998). One way to ensure scalar equivalence even when difference tests suggest cultural 
variance is to use centered scores. Centering the scores was done in the HLM program 
which was used in hypothesis testing. Thus, it can be concluded that there is scalar 
equivalence.
 9
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Table 5: Construct Equivalence for Justice Variables PD Grouping 
 
Configural Invariance 
        
 
                              χ2 Δχ2 df Δdf sig.? GFI CFI ΔCFI RMSEA 
PJHire 177.402 
 
52 
  
0.965 0.967 
 
0.061 
PJTenCont 244.451 
 
52 
  
0.909 0.950 
 
0.072 
PJPerf 388.235 
 
56 
  
0.865 0.916 
 
0.087 
PJProm 187.312 
 
52 
  
0.993 0.968 
 
0.059 
DJAF 58.378 
 
8 
  
0.967 0.987 
 
0.085 
IJHire 139.626 
 
20 
  
0.930 0.973 
 
0.087 
IJProm 144.575 
 
20 
  
0.925 0.970 
 
0.092 
IPJ 434.662 
 
56 
  
0.842 0.910 
 
0.099 
          
 
Measurement Invariance 
        PJHire 
 
23.555 
 
18 n.s. 0.939 
 
0.001 0.047 
PJTenCont 
 
21.210 
 
18 n.s. 0.902 
 
0.000 0.062 
PJPerf 
 
15.725 
 
18 n.s. 0.860 
 
0.001 0.076 
PJProm 
 
23.048 
 
18 n.s. 0.928 
 
0.001 0.052 
DJAF 
 
22.863 
 
17 sig. 0.954 
 
0.003 0.066 
IJHire 
 
11.017 
 
12 n.s. 0.924 
 
0.001 0.069 
IJProm 
 
11.713 
 
12 n.s. 0.920 
 
0.000 0.073 
IPJ 
 
11.948 
 
18 n.s. 0.840 
 
0.002 0.085 
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Table 5 (cont’d): Construct Equivalence for Justice Variables PD Grouping 
 
Scalar Invariance 
        PJHire 
 
80.340 
 
21 sig. 
  
0.016 0.049 
PJTenCont 
 
41.452 
 
21 sig. 
  
0.006 0.057 
PJPerf 
 
30.156 
 
21 n.s. 
  
0.002 0.068 
PJProm 
 
25.995 
 
21 n.s. 
  
0.001 0.046 
DJAF 
 
148.873 
 
29 sig. 
  
0.015 0.069 
IJHire 
 
15.444 
 
15 n.s. 
  
0.000 0.057 
IJProm 
 
13.679 
 
15 n.s. 
  
0.000 0.060 
IPJ 
 
67.780 
 
21 sig. 
  
0.011 0.080 
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The construct equivalence test results for the organizational justice variables using 
the 2 Region grouping are reported in Table 6. Results indicate configural equivalence for 
all organizational justice variables using the 2 Region grouping. As with the tests run 
using the PD grouping, three of the procedural justice variables (PJHire, PJTenCont, and 
PJProm) required two of the error variances to be constrained. These constraints were left 
in place for subsequent construct equivalence tests. As results indicated between group 
configural equivalence for all variables, the next step was to test measurement 
equivalence. 
 Based on the chi-squared and CFI difference tests, results indicate measurement 
equivalence for the following organizational justice variables: PJHire, PJTenCont, 
PJPerf, PJProm, IJHire, IJProm, and IPJ. Based on the CFI difference test, results 
indicate measurement equivalence for DJAF. As the change in CFI of the DJAF variable 
was well below acceptable cutoffs, this indicates that even though the chi-square test was 
significant, this was still culturally invariant. Therefore, as results indicated between 
group measurement equivalence for all variables, the final step was to test scalar 
equivalence. 
Based on the chi-squared and CFI difference tests, results indicate scalar 
equivalence for the following organizational justice variables: PJPerf, PJProm, IJHire, 
and IJProm. Based on the CFI difference test, results indicate scalar equivalence for the 
following organizational justice variables: PJTenCont, DJAF, and IPJ. Results indicate 
scalar variance for PJHire. As discussed above in the scalar equivalence test run on the 
PD grouping, one way to ensure scalar equivalence even when difference tests suggest 
cultural variance is to use centered scores. Centering the scores was done in the HLM 
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program which was used for hypothesis testing. Thus, it can be concluded that there is 
scalar equivalence. 
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Table 6: Construct Equivalence for Justice Variables 2 Region Grouping 
 
Configural Invariance 
        
 
                               χ2 Δχ2 df Δdf sig.? GFI CFI ΔCFI RMSEA 
PJHire 112.938 
 
26 
  
0.965 0.977 
 
0.061 
PJTenCont 211.512 
 
26 
  
0.923 0.954 
 
0.098 
PJPerf 342.860 
 
28 
  
0.883 0.923 
 
0.118 
PJProm 161.375 
 
26 
  
0.944 0.969 
 
0.082 
DJAF 44.643 
 
4 
  
0.975 0.990 
 
0.106 
IJHire 119.629 
 
10 
  
0.941 0.976 
 
0.116 
IJProm 122.838 
 
10 
  
0.937 0.975 
 
0.122 
IPJ 435.153 
 
28 
  
0.851 0.916 
 
0.135 
          
 
Measurement Invariance 
        PJHire 
 
10.914 
 
6 n.s. 0.962 
 
0.001 0.057 
PJTenCont 
 
7.598 
 
6 n.s. 0.920 
 
0.000 0.088 
PJPerf 
 
1.611 
 
6 n.s. 0.883 
 
0.001 0.106 
PJProm 
 
11.726 
 
6 n.s. 0.940 
 
0.001 0.076 
DJAF 
 
10.587 
 
3 sig. 0.969 
 
0.002 0.087 
IJHire 
 
3.606 
 
4 n.s. 0.939 
 
0.000 0.098 
IJProm 
 
3.187 
 
4 n.s. 0.936 
 
0.000 0.102 
IPJ 
 
8.593 
 
6 n.s. 0.849 
 
0.001 0.123 
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Table 6 (cont’d): Construct Equivalence for Justice Variables 2 Region Grouping 
 
Scalar Invariance 
        PJHire 
 
47.175 
 
7 sig. 
  
0.010 0.061 
PJTenCont 
 
20.046 
 
7 sig. 
  
0.003 0.083 
PJPerf 
 
7.010 
 
7 n.s. 
  
0.000 0.097 
PJProm 
 
12.062 
 
7 n.s. 
  
0.001 0.070 
DJAF 
 
33.332 
 
4 sig. 
  
0.007 0.088 
IJHire 
 
3.034 
 
5 n.s. 
  
0.001 0.083 
IJProm 
 
6.357 
 
5 n.s. 
  
0.001 0.088 
IPJ 
 
33.697 
 
7 sig. 
  
0.005 0.115 
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Faculty Control Variables 
The construct equivalence test results for the faculty control variables using the 
PD grouping are reported in Table 7. Results indicate configural equivalence for all 
faculty control variables using the PD grouping. The AF variable required two of the 
error variances to be constrained. These constraints were left in place for subsequent 
construct equivalence tests. As results indicated between group configural equivalence 
for all variables, the next step was to test measurement equivalence. 
 Based on the chi-squared and CFI difference tests, results indicate measurement 
equivalence for the following faculty control variables: PromCont, AF, InfoHire, and 
InfoProm. Based on the CFI difference test, results indicate measurement equivalence for 
the following faculty control variables: HireCont and PerfCont. As the change in CFI of 
the HireCont and PerfCont variables were below acceptable cutoffs, this indicates that 
even though the chi-square test was significant, measurement was still culturally 
invariant. Therefore, as results indicate between group measurement equivalence for all 
variables, the final step was to test scalar equivalence. 
 Based on the chi-squared and CFI difference tests, results indicate scalar 
equivalence for InfoHire. Based on the CFI difference test, results indicate scalar 
equivalence for the following faculty control variables: HireCont, PromCont, and 
InfoProm. Results indicate scalar variance for the following faculty control variables: 
PerfCont and AF. As discussed above, one way to ensure scalar equivalence even when 
difference tests suggest cultural variance is to use centered scores. Centering the scores 
was done in the HLM program which was used for hypothesis testing. Thus, it can be 
concluded that there is scalar equivalence.
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Table 7: Construct Equivalence for Faculty Control Variables PD Grouping 
 
Configural Invariance 
      
 
χ2 Δχ2 df Δdf sig.? GFI CFI ΔCFI RMSEA 
HireCont 155.275 
 
20 
  
0.945 0.973 
 
0.081 
PerfCont 45.496 
 
8 
  
0.977 0.986 
 
0.071 
PromCont 113.635 
 
8 
  
0.940 0.958 
 
0.124 
AF 73.136 
 
16 
  
0.968 0.969 
 
0.063 
InfoHire 33.991 
 
8 
  
0.982 0.994 
 
0.061 
InfoProm 47.944 
 
8 
  
0.973 0.992 
 
0.079 
          
 
Measurement Invariance 
      HireCont 
 
22.583 
 
12 sig. 0.937 
 
0.002 0.067 
PerfCont 
 
18.292 
 
9 sig. 0.967 
 
0.004 0.055 
PromCont 
 
5.764 
 
9 n.s. 0.939 
 
0.001 0.083 
AF 
 
18.247 
 
12 n.s. 0.961 
 
0.004 0.050 
InfoHire 
 
7.049 
 
9 n.s. 0.978 
 
0.001 0.040 
InfoProm 
 
3.419 
 
9 n.s. 0.971 
 
0.001 0.050 
          
 
Scalar Invariance 
       HireCont 
 
30.125 
 
21 sig. 
  
0.003 0.058 
PerfCont 
 
66.736 
 
12 sig. 
  
0.020 0.062 
PromCont 
 
26.219 
 
12 sig. 
  
0.005 0.068 
AF 
 
185.052 
 
43 sig. 
  
0.043 0.060 
InfoHire 
 
4.782 
 
12 n.s. 
  
0.001 0.026 
InfoProm 
 
25.439 
 
12 sig. 
  
0.003 0.045 
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The construct equivalence test results for the faculty control variables using the 2 
Region grouping are reported in Table 8. Results indicate configural equivalence for all 
faculty control variables. The AF variable required two of the error variances to be 
constrained. These constraints were left in place for subsequent construct equivalence 
tests. As results indicated between group configural equivalence for all variables, the next 
step was to test measurement equivalence. 
 Based on the chi-squared and CFI difference tests, results indicate measurement 
equivalence for the following faculty control variables: PerfCont, AF, InfoHire, and 
InfoProm. Based on the CFI difference test, results indicate measurement equivalence for 
the following faculty control variables: HireCont and PromCont. As the change in CFI of 
the HireCont and PerfCont variables were below acceptable cutoffs, this indicates that 
even though the chi-square test was significant, measurement was still culturally 
invariant. Therefore, as results indicate between group measurement equivalence for all 
variables, the final step was to test scalar equivalence. 
 Based on the chi-squared and CFI difference tests, results indicate scalar 
equivalence for the following faculty control variables: HireCont and InfoHire. Based on 
the CFI difference test, results indicate scalar equivalence for the following faculty 
control variables: PromCont and InfoProm. Results indicate scalar variance for the 
following faculty control variables: PerfCont and AF. As discussed above, one way to 
ensure scalar equivalence even when difference tests suggest cultural variance is to use 
centered scores. Centering the scores was done in the HLM program which was used for 
hypothesis testing. Thus, it can be concluded that there is scalar equivalence. 
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Table 8: Construct Equivalence for Faculty Control Variables 2 Region Grouping 
 
Configural Invariance 
      
 
χ2 Δχ2 df Δdf sig.? GFI CFI ΔCFI RMSEA 
HireCont 127.696 
 
10 
  
0.954 0.977 
 
0.105 
PerfCont 42.602 
 
4 
  
0.979 0.986 
 
0.101 
PromCont 98.520 
 
4 
  
0.955 0.962 
 
0.162 
AF 84.253 
 
8 
  
0.964 0.959 
 
0.100 
InfoHire 27.793 
 
4 
  
0.986 0.995 
 
0.081 
InfoProm 37.564 
 
4 
  
0.980 0.993 
 
0.100 
          
 
Measurement Invariance 
      HireCont 
 
13.099 
 
4 sig. 0.949 
 
0.002 0.092 
PerfCont 
 
1.742 
 
3 n.s. 0.978 
 
0.000 0.075 
PromCont 
 
8.792 
 
3 sig. 0.951 
 
0.002 0.126 
AF 
 
0.681 
 
4 n.s. 0.964 
 
0.002 0.080 
InfoHire 
 
2.304 
 
3 n.s. 0.984 
 
0.000 0.060 
InfoProm 
 
0.084 
 
3 n.s. 0.980 
 
0.001 0.072 
          
 
Scalar Invariance 
       HireCont 
 
3.678 
 
5 n.s. 
  
0.000 0.079 
PerfCont 
 
17.406 
 
4 sig. 
  
0.005 0.107 
PromCont 
 
42.398 
 
4 sig. 
  
0.014 0.085 
AF 
 
38.771 
 
5 sig. 
  
0.018 0.081 
InfoHire 
 
4.613 
 
4 n.s. 
  
0.001 0.049 
InfoProm 
 
12.032 
 
4 sig. 
  
0.002 0.065 
 104 
There were only three items in the TenCont variable which prevented conducting 
a construct equivalence test on it. Therefore, I conducted a construct equivalence test on 
the seven-factor model used in the faculty control variable CFA. Results for this test are 
listed in Table 9. Results of the test conducted on the PD grouping indicate configural 
equivalence, measurement equivalence, structural equivalence based on the change in 
CFI, and scalar equivalence based on the change in CFI. The Cronbach’s alpha for the 
TenCont measure is 0.93 and the standardized estimates for the 3 items are .84, .96, and 
.90. All of these are above acceptable cut-offs and therefore it was determined that 
TenCont is also culturally invariant and can be used in hypothesis testing. 
University Guidelines 
Finally, a construct equivalence test was run on the items used to measure 
University Guidelines (Guidelines) and the results are reported in Table 10. Results of the 
test on the PD grouping indicate configural equivalence, measurement equivalence, and 
scalar variance. Results of the test on the 2 Region grouping indicate configural 
equivalence, measurement equivalence, and scalar equivalence based on the change in 
CFI. Two of the error variances were constrained for these tests. Furthermore, and as 
discussed above, one way to ensure scalar equivalence even when difference tests suggest 
cultural variance is to use centered scores. Centering the scores was done in the HLM 
program which was used for hypothesis testing. Thus, it can be concluded that there is 
scalar equivalence.
 1
0
5
 
Table 9: Construct Equivalence for TenCont 
 
PD Grouping 
        
 
χ2 Δχ2 df Δdf sig.? GFI CFI ΔCFI RMSEA 
Configural 2951.244 
 
1424 
  
0.759 0.924 
 
0.041 
Measurement 
 
75.315 
 
66 n.s. 0.754 
 
0.001 0.040 
Structural 
 
85.493 
 
63 sig. 0.748 
 
0.001 0.040 
Scalar 
 
206.303 
 
87 sig. 
  
0.006 0.040 
 
 
Table 10: Construct Equivalence for University Guidelines 
 
PD Grouping 
       
 
χ2 Δχ2 df Δdf sig.? GFI CFI ΔCFI RMSEA 
Configural 246.021 
 
32 
  
0.883 0.926 
 
0.103 
Measurement 
 
10.539 
 
15 n.s. 0.879 
 
0.002 0.084 
Scalar 
 
48.224 
 
18 sig. 
  
0.011 0.076 
          
 
2 Region Grouping 
       Configural 230.721 
 
16 
  
0.888 0.927 
 
0.144 
Measurement 
 
4.724 
 
5 n.s. 0.887 
 
0.000 0.125 
Scalar 
 
21.563 
 
6 sig. 
  
0.005 0.114 
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Hypothesis Testing 
For the HLM analyses, the first model represents the null model, the second 
model includes the control variables and the individual-level independent variables (the 
respective governance variable and the guidelines variable), and the third model adds in 
the country-level independent variables (the six Hofstede dimensions). For two of the 
dependent variables (DJAF and IJHire) in which there were multiple Hofstede 
dimensions with main effects, model four represents the added effect of the interactions 
between those variables and model five includes the country-level variables as 
moderators between the governance/guidelines and the dependent variable. For the other 
dependent variables model four adds the country-level variables as cross-level 
moderators in the governance and guidelines relationship. 
 
Distributive Justice Models 
The results of the HLM analysis for the distributive justice (perceived fairness) of 
the level of academic freedom (DJAF) in the respondent’s institution are listed in Table 
11. The variance component for the intercept in Model 1 is significant (τ00 = 0.114, p < 
.001), indicating that country-level factors impact distributive justice (DJ) perceptions. 
The interclass correlation (ICC) is 0.10, which suggests that approximately 10% of the 
variance in DJ is due to country-level factors and 90% is due to individual-level factors. 
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Table 11: Hierarchical Linear Modeling Results for DJAF 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Individual-Level 
   
  
Intercept 5.084***(0.114***) 5.033***(0.071***) 5.061***(0.026***) 5.066***(0.023) 
Years Living 
 
0.002(0.000) 0.002(0.006) 0.003(0.000) 
Industry Tenure 
 
 -0.008*(0.000)  -0.008*(0.000)  -0.008*(0.000) 
Sex 
 
0.048(0.014) 0.055(0.021) 0.049(0.024) 
Life One Country 
 
 -0.030(0.062)  -0.060(0.003)  -0.065(0.003) 
Research 
 
0.008(0.029)  -0.025(0.021)  -0.011(0.026) 
Teaching 
 
 -0.186(0.091)  -0.152(0.122)  -0.165(0.140) 
AF 
 
0.769***(0.033) 0.767***(0.033) 0.767***(0.030) 
Guidelines 
 
0.216***(0.002) 0.209***(0.004) 0.210***(0.004) 
  
   
  
Country-Level 
   
  
Power Distance (PD) 
  
 -0.005* -0.007 
Individualism (IND) 
  
0.002 0.001 
Masculinity (MAS) 
  
-0.002 -0.001 
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) 
  
0.004*** -0.008 
Long-Term Orientation (LT) 
  
0.004* 0.004 
Indulgence (INDUL) 
  
0.000 0.000 
  
   
  
Interactions 
   
  
PDxUA 
   
0.000 
PDxLT 
   
neg 0.000 
UAxLT 
   
0.000 
  
   
  
Model Deviance 2401.418 1123.119 1106.172 1103.876 
Δ Model Deviance   1278.299*** 16.947* 2.295 
Entries are estimates of fixed effects with robust standard errors. Estimates of variance components 
 are in parentheses. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Model 2 includes the control variables and IVs at the individual-level. The 
coefficient for time spent in academia (industry tenure) is also significant (γ20 = -0.008, p 
< .05) but is a negative relationship. This suggests that faculty perceive less fairness in 
academic freedom the longer they are in academia. The coefficient for academic freedom 
is significant (γ70 = 0.769, p < .001) as is the coefficient for Guidelines (γ80 = 0.216, p < 
.001). Neither of the variance components for these variables is significant suggesting no 
country-level differences in the relationship between them and perceived fairness of 
academic freedom. Model 3 adds the country-level independent variables. The 
coefficients for Hofstede’s dimensions of power distance (PD), (γ01 = -0.005, p < .05), 
uncertainty avoidance (UA) (γ04 = 0.004, p < .001) and long term orientation (LT) (γ05 = 
0.004, p < .05) are significant. Model 4 adds the country-level interactions. In model 4, 
none of the cultural value main affects are significant nor are the interaction affects. The 
change in deviance from model 3 to model 4 is also not significant suggesting that model 
4 does not explain significantly more of the variance than model 3. Thus, even if there 
had been significant interactions, the amount of additional variance explained would not 
be statistically significant. 
Hypothesis 1a stated that institutional policies and practices that provide more 
control to faculty, thereby increasingly in compliance with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines 
in assuring academic freedom for faculty, will be seen as the most distributively fair 
regardless of country. As mentioned above, the variance components of both Academic 
Freedom and Guidelines are not significant suggesting that the more policies and 
practices meet UNESCO/AAUP guidelines the fairer they are perceived regardless of 
country. Thus, H1a is supported. 
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Hypothesis 1b was a competing hypothesis to H1a and stated that there would be 
country level differences in fairness perceptions even when institutional policies and 
practices are in compliance with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines in assuring academic 
freedom for faculty. As mentioned above, the variance components of both Academic 
Freedom and Guidelines are not significant suggesting that the more policies and 
practices meet UNESCO/AAUP guidelines the fairer they are perceived regardless of 
country. Thus, H1b is not supported. 
Hypothesis 1c stated that the relationship between institutional policies and 
practices to DJ perceptions will be moderated by the cultural dimension of uncertainty 
avoidance. Specifically, policies and practices that do not provide guidelines ensuring 
academic freedom will be seen as more unfair by individuals from high uncertainty 
avoidance countries compared to individuals from low uncertainty avoidance countries. 
As stated above, neither of the variance components of Academic Freedom nor 
Guidelines were significant suggesting that regardless of country, when policies and 
practices do not comply with UNESCO/AAUP standards it is seen as less distributively 
fair. Thus, H1c is not supported. 
Hypothesis 5a stated that there would be significant interactions between the 
cultural dimensions of PD & UA. Both of these cultural dimensions had significant main 
effects but the interaction term is not significant. Thus, H5a is not supported. 
Procedural Justice Models 
The results of the HLM analysis for the Procedural Justice in Hiring (PJHire), in 
Tenure/ Contract Decisions (PJTenCont), in Performance Appraisals (PJPerf) and in 
Promotion Decisions (PJProm) are listed in Tables 12-15. 
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In terms of the perceived fairness of the hiring process, the variance component 
for the intercept in Model 1 is significant (τ00 = 0.082, p < .001), indicating that country-
level factors impact procedural justice (PJ) perceptions. The ICC is 0.07, which suggests 
that approximately 7% of the variance in PJ perceptions is due to country-level factors 
and 93% is due to individual-level factors. Model 2 includes the control variables and 
individual-level independent variables. The relationship between years living and the 
perceived fairness of the hiring process is positive and significant (γ10 = -0.124, p < .05) 
suggesting that the longer an individual is living in a country, the higher they perceive the 
fairness of the hiring process. The relationships between industry tenure (γ20 = -0.007, p < 
.05) and sex (γ30 = -0.124, p < .05) to PJ perceptions at the individual level are both 
negative and significant. In terms of industry tenure, this suggests that the longer a 
faculty member is employed in academia, the lower they perceive the fairness of the 
hiring process. In terms of sex, this suggests that females report lower perceived fairness 
of the hiring process than their male counterparts. The variance component of life in one 
country is significant (τ40 = 0.007, p < .05) suggesting that there are between country 
differences in the relationship between life in one country and PJ of the hiring process. 
The coefficient for control of the hiring process (ContHire) is significant (γ70 = 0.507, p < 
.001) as is the variance component (τ70 = 0.007, p < .05). The coefficient for Guidelines is 
significant (γ80 = 0.493, p < .001) as is the variance component (τ80 = 0.029, p < .01). 
Taken together this suggests that there are country-level differences in the relationship 
between both control of the hiring process and Guidelines and the perceived fairness of 
the hiring process. Model 3 adds the country-level independent variables but there are no 
significant effects of cultural values. Furthermore, the change in model deviance is not 
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significant indicating this model does not explain additional variance compared to model 
2. 
In terms of the perceived fairness of the tenure/ contract renewal process 
(PJTenCont), the variance component for the intercept in Model 1 is significant (τ00 = 
0.086, p < .001), indicating that country-level factors impact PJ perceptions. The ICC is 
0.07, which suggests that approximately 7% of the variance in PJ perceptions is due to 
country-level factors and 93% is due to individual-level factors. Model 2 includes the 
control variables and the individual-level independent variables. The variance component 
of years living is significant (τ10 = 0.000, p < .01) suggesting a between country 
difference in its relationship with the perceived fairness of the tenure/ contract renewal 
process. The coefficient for control of the tenure/ contract renewal process (TenCont) is 
significant (γ70 = 0.413, p < .001) as is the variance component (τ70 = 0.014, p < .001). 
The coefficient for Guidelines is significant (γ80 = 0.625, p < .001) as is the variance 
component (τ80 = 0.043, p < .01). Taken together this suggests there are significant 
between-country differences in the effects of the control of the tenure/ contract renewal 
process and Guidelines on the perceived fairness of the tenure/ contract renewal process. 
Model 3 adds the country-level independent variables. The effect of MAS is negative and 
significant (γ03 = -0.004, p < .05) but based on the change in deviance, the model does not 
explain significantly more variance than model 2.
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Table 12: Hierarchical Linear Modeling Results for PJHire 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Individual-Level 
   
  
Intercept 4.139***(0.0823***) 4.178***(0.021) 4.198***(0.007) 4.206***(0.007) 
Years Living 
 
0.007*(0.000) 0.004(0.000) 0.004(0.000) 
Industry Tenure 
 
 -0.007*(0.000)  -0.004(0.000)  -0.004(0.000) 
Sex 
 
 -0.124*(0.001)  -0.145*(0.015)  -0.138*(0.021) 
Life One Country 
 
 -0.019(0.077**)  -0.006(0.075)  -0.017(0.084**) 
Research 
 
0.041(0.038) 0.046(0.040) 0.064(0.044) 
Teaching 
 
0.097(0.035) 0.101(0.102) 0.072(0.118) 
HireCont 
 
0.507***(0.007*) 0.501***(0.008*) 0.516***(0.007**) 
Guidelines 
 
0.493***(0.029**) 0.507***(0.027**) 0.450***(0.028***) 
  
   
  
Country-Level 
   
  
PD 
  
0.006 0.006 
IND 
  
0.001 neg. 0.000 
MAS 
  
-0.003 -0.003 
UA 
  
0.001 0.001 
LT 
  
-0.001 -0.001 
INDUL 
  
neg 0.000 0.000 
  
   
  
Cross-Level Moderations 
   
  
PDxHireCont 
   
0.0020 
INDxHireCont 
   
0.0000 
UAxHireCont 
   
0.002* 
PDxGuidelines 
   
-0.0030 
INDxGuidelines 
   
-0.0010 
UAxGuidelines 
   
 -0.004** 
  
   
  
Model Deviance 2408.983 1034.512 1028.214 1019.123 
Δ Model Deviance   1374.471*** 6.299 9.091 
Entries are estimates of fixed effects with robust standard errors. Estimates of variance components 
 are in parentheses. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table 13: Hierarchical Linear Modeling Results for PJTenCont 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Individual-Level 
   
  
Intercept 3.928***(0.086***) 3.934***(0.022*) 3.93***(0.015) 3.95***(0.013) 
Years Living 
 
0.003(0.000*) 0.003(0.000**) 0.002(0.000**) 
Industry Tenure 
 
 -0.004(0.000)  -0.003(0.000)  -0.003(0.000) 
Sex 
 
 -0.096(0.096)  -0.095(0.093)  -0.091(0.095) 
Life One Country 
 
 -0.064(0.033)  -0.050(0.044)  -0.066(0.031) 
Research 
 
0.110(0.110) 0.115(0.127) 0.105(0.135) 
Teaching 
 
0.193(0.118) 0.171(0.116) 0.141(0.063) 
TenCont 
 
0.413***(0.014***) 0.409***(0.014***) 0.417***(0.006) 
Guidelines 
 
0.625***(0.043**) 0.637***(0.041**) 0.626***(0.029) 
  
   
  
Country-Level 
   
  
PD 
  
0.001 0.001 
IND 
  
-0.002 -0.003 
MAS 
  
 -0.004*  -0.004* 
UA 
  
-0.001 -0.001 
LT 
  
-0.001 -0.001 
INDUL 
  
0.001 0.001 
  
   
  
Cross-Level Moderations 
   
  
PDxTenCont 
   
0.003* 
INDxTenCont 
   
0.0000 
UAxTenCont 
   
0.0010 
PDxGuidelines 
   
-0.0020 
INDxGuidelines 
   
0.0020 
UAxGuidelines 
   
 neg. 0.000 
  
   
  
Model Deviance 2030.670 1001.310 997.039 981.887 
Δ Model Deviance   1029.360*** 4.271 15.152 
Entries are estimates of fixed effects with robust standard errors. Estimates of variance components 
 are in parentheses. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table 14: Hierarchical Linear Modeling Results for PJPerf 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Individual-Level 
  
  
Intercept 3.978***(0.040*) 4.021***(0.017) 4.054***(0.011) 
Years Living 
 
0.006(0.000) 0.008(0.000) 
Industry Tenure 
 
 -0.006(0.000)  -0.007(0.000) 
Sex 
 
 -0.102(0.030)  -0.095(0.032) 
Life One Country 
 
 -0.118(0.048)  -0.135(0.057) 
Research 
 
0.125(0.069) 0.119(0.074) 
Teaching 
 
0.196(0.152) 0.191(0.088) 
PerfCont 
 
0.469***(0.005) 0.464***(0.002) 
Guidelines 
 
0.541***(0.019) 0.550***(0.013) 
  
  
  
Country-Level 
  
  
PD 
  
0.001 
IND 
  
0.001 
MAS 
  
 -0.005* 
UA 
  
0.000 
LT 
  
0.001 
INDUL 
  
-0.001 
  
  
  
Model Deviance 2201.133 1043.338 1037.807 
Δ Model Deviance   1157.795*** 5.531 
Entries are estimates of fixed effects with robust standard errors. Estimates of variance 
components 
are in parentheses. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table 15: Hierarchical Linear Modeling Results for PJProm 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Individual-Level 
   
  
Intercept 3.876***(0.092***) 3.896***(0.019) 3.931***(0.011*) 3.914***(0.004**) 
Years Living 
 
0.008**(0.000) 0.008*(0.000) 0.007*(0.000) 
Industry Tenure 
 
 -0.010*(0.000)  -0.010**(0.000)  -0.009**(0.000) 
Sex 
 
 0.018(0.028) 0.018(0.030) 0.004(0.021) 
Life One Country 
 
 -0.143*(0.006)  -0.120(0.010)  -0.079(0.015) 
Research 
 
0.167*(0.035) 0.186**(0.051) 0.194*(0.065) 
Teaching 
 
0.026(0.037) 0.003(0.027) 0.010(0.001) 
PromCont 
 
0.484***(0.023*) 0.471***(0.024*) 0.469***(0.013***) 
Guidelines 
 
0.624***(0.060) 0.647***(0.048) 0.644***(0.039***) 
  
   
  
Country-Level 
   
  
PD 
  
0.003 0.002 
IND 
  
-0.001 -0.002 
MAS 
  
 -0.003*  -0.003* 
UA 
  
0.002 0.002 
LT 
  
0.001 0.000 
INDUL 
  
0.002 0.002 
  
   
  
Cross-Level Moderations 
   
  
PDxPromCont 
   
0.032*** 
INDxPromCont 
   
0.002*** 
UAxPromCont 
   
0.0020 
PDxGuidelines 
   
 -0.010** 
INDxGuidelines 
   
-0.0040 
UAxGuidelines 
   
-0.0030 
  
   
  
Model Deviance 2165.480 1019.593 1012.325 994.565 
Δ Model Deviance   1145.887*** 7.268 17.760 
Entries are estimates of fixed effects with robust standard errors. Estimates of variance components 
 are in parentheses. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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In terms of the perceived fairness of the performance review process (PJPerf), the 
variance component for the intercept in Model 1 is significant (τ00 = 0.04, p < .05), 
indicating that country-level factors impact PJ perceptions. The interclass correlation 
(ICC) is 0.03, which suggests that approximately 3% of the variance in procedural justice 
perceptions is due to country-level factors and 97% is due to individual-level factors. 
Model 2 includes the control variables and the individual-level independent variables. 
The coefficient for control of the performance review process is significant (γ70 = 0.469, 
p < .01) as is the coefficient for Guidelines (γ80 = 0.541, p < .05). Neither of the variance 
components for these variables are significant suggesting no country-level differences in 
their effects on the perceived fairness of the performance review process. Model 3 adds 
the country-level independent variables. The effect of MAS is negative and significant 
(γ03 = -0.005, p < .05) but based on the change in deviance, the model does not explain 
significantly more variance than model 2. 
In terms of the perceived fairness of the promotion process (PJProm), the variance 
component for the intercept in Model 1 is significant (τ00 = 0.092, p < .001), indicating 
that country-level factors impact procedural justice perceptions. The ICC is 0.07, which 
suggests that approximately 7% of the variance in procedural justice perceptions is due to 
country-level factors and 93% is due to individual-level factors. Model 2 includes the 
control variables and the individual-level independent variables. The coefficient of years 
living is significant (γ10 = 0.008, p < .01) suggesting that the longer a faculty member 
lives in the country they are working in, the higher their perceived fairness of the 
promotion process. The relationship between industry tenure and PJ of the promotion 
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process at the individual level is negative and significant (γ20 = -0.010, p < .05) 
suggesting that the longer a faculty member works in academia the lower their 
perceptions of the fairness of the promotion process. The relationship between life in one 
country and PJ of the promotion process at the individual level is negative and significant 
(γ40 = -0.143, p < .01) suggesting that those who obtained their PhDs and are working in 
the country they are from have lower fairness perceptions of the promotion process than 
those who have spent time outside of the country they are working in. The coefficient of 
research is significant (γ50 = 0.167, p < .05) suggesting that faculty working in a research 
institution have higher PJ perceptions of the promotion process than those at teaching or 
balanced institutions. The coefficient for control of the promotion process (PromCont) is 
significant (γ70 = 0.484, p < .001) as is the variance component (τ70 = 0.023, p < .05). The 
coefficient for Guidelines is significant (γ80 = 0.624, p < .001) but the variance 
component is not. Model 4 adds the country-level independent variables. Once again the 
effect of MAS is negative and significant (γ03 = -0.003, p < .05) but based on the change 
in deviance, the model does not explain significantly more variance than model 2. 
Hypothesis 2a stated that institutional policies that comply with UNESCO/AAUP 
guidelines in giving faculty control over governance processes will be seen as more 
procedurally fair than those that do not comply regardless of country. The perceived 
fairness of hiring, the tenure/ contract renewal process, and the promotion process all had 
significant variance components for the control and/or guideline variables. There were no 
significant variance components for the control or guideline variables in the perceived 
fairness of the performance appraisal process suggesting the more policies and practices 
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meet UNESCO/AAUP guidelines regarding performance appraisals, the fairer they are 
perceived regardless of country. Thus, H2a is partially supported. 
Hypotheses 2b, 2c, and 2d stated the relationship between institutional policies 
and practices to PJ perceptions will be moderated by the cultural dimensions of IND 
(H2b), PD (H2c), and UA (H2d). Although model 4 in the above tables indicates 
significant cross-level moderating effects of the cultural dimensions on the relationship 
between policies and practices and fairness perceptions, none of the models that included 
those interactions were significantly better fitting than the models that did not included 
them. This suggests that these interactions do not explain significantly more variance 
than the models that do not include them. Thus, H2b, H2c, and H2d are not supported. 
Hypotheses 4 stated that controlling for institutional policies and practices, 
perceptions of PJ will be lower for individuals from low PD countries compared to those 
from high PD countries. There was not a significant main effect of PD in any of the PJ 
models. Thus, H4 is not supported. However, the cultural dimension of MAS did have a 
significant and negative relationship in terms of the perceived fairness of the tenure/ 
contract renewal process, the performance appraisal process, and the promotion process 
although this effect did not explain a significantly more amount of variance than models 
in which cultural values were not included. 
Hypotheses 5b stated there would be a significant interaction between PD and 
UA. There were no main effects of these variables so there was no way to test this 
hypothesis in the current sample. Thus H5b is not supported. 
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Informational Justice Models 
The results of the HLM analysis for the Informational Justice in Hiring (IJHire) 
and in Promotion Decisions (IJProm) are listed in Tables 16 and 17. 
In terms of the perceived fairness of the information provided in hiring (IJHire), 
the variance component for the intercept in Model 1 is significant (τ00 = 0.070, p < .001), 
indicating that country-level factors impact informational justice (IJ) perceptions. The 
ICC is 0.04, which suggests that approximately 4% of the variance in IJ perceptions is 
due to country-level factors and 96% is due to individual-level factors. Model 2 includes 
the control variables and individual-level independent variables. The relationship 
between industry tenure and the perceived fairness of the information provided in hiring 
at the individual level is negative and significant (γ20 = -0.009, p < .01) suggesting that 
the longer a faculty member works in academia, the lower his/her perceptions of the 
fairness of information provided in hiring. The coefficient for the sharing of information 
regarding hiring (InfoHire) is significant (γ70 = 0.718, p < .001) as is the variance 
component (τ70 = 0.007, p < .01). The coefficient for Guidelines is significant (γ80 = 
0.320, p < .001) but the variance component is not. Model 3 adds the country-level 
independent variables. The cultural dimensions of PD (γ01 = 0.007, p < .001), IND (γ02 = 
0.005, p < .01), and UA (γ04 = -0.003, p < .05) are all significant. In the case of PD and 
IND, the relationship is positive so as they increase so too does the perceived fairness of 
the information provided regarding hiring. In the case of UA, the relationship is negative 
so as it increases the perceived fairness of the information provided regarding hiring 
decreases. However, the change in deviance from model 3 compared to model 2 is not 
significant suggesting that the cultural main effects do not explain a significantly higher 
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amount of variance. Model 4 adds the interaction terms for the country-level variables. 
The interaction of PD & IND (γ07 = -0.0002, p < .001) and IND & UA (γ09 = -0.0002, p < 
.001) are both negative and significant. In model 4 the variance component of guidelines 
also becomes significant (τ80 = 0.017, p < .05). However, the change in deviance 
comparing model 4 to model 3 is not significant (p = .65) suggesting that the interaction 
terms do not explain a significantly more of the variance than do the variables in model 3.
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Table 16: Hierarchical Linear Modeling Results for IJHire 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Individual-Level 
   
  
Intercept 3.719***(0.070***) 3.726***(0.014) 3.701***(0.008*) 3.694***(0.003**) 
Years Living 
 
0.007*(0.000) 0.007(0.000) 0.008(0.000) 
Industry Tenure 
 
 -0.009**(0.000)  -0.009**(0.000)  -0.009**(0.000) 
Sex 
 
 -0.018(0.015)  -0.028(0.016)  -0.027(0.011) 
Life One Country 
 
 -0.032(0.040)  -0.069(0.000)  -0.075*(0.000) 
Research 
 
0.045(0.064) 0.064(0.000) 0.070(0.002) 
Teaching 
 
 -0.133(0.065)  -0.100(0.122)  -0.086(0.115) 
InfoHire 
 
0.718***(0.007**) 0.720***(0.009**) 0.732***(0.009**) 
Guidelines 
 
0.320***(0.012) 0.317***(0.016) 0.302***(0.017*) 
  
   
  
Country-Level 
   
  
PD 
  
0.007*** 0.013** 
IND 
  
0.005** 0.007* 
MAS 
  
-0.002 -0.001 
UA 
  
 -0.003*  -0.012* 
LT 
  
-0.002 -0.003 
INDUL 
  
-0.001 -0.003 
  
   
  
Interactions 
   
  
PDxIND 
   
 -0.0002*** 
PDxUA 
   
0.000 
INDxUA 
   
 -0.0002*** 
  
   
  
Model Deviance 2461.837 961.585 952.251 945.106 
Δ Model Deviance   1500.252*** 9.334 7.145+ 
Entries are estimates of fixed effects with robust standard errors. Estimates of variance components 
 
are in parentheses. + p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table 17: Hierarchical Linear Modeling Results for IJProm 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Individual-Level 
  
  
Intercept 3.729***(0.090***) 3.743***(0.042) 3.711***(0.034) 
Years Living 
 
0.006(0.000) 0.005(0.000) 
Industry Tenure 
 
 -0.003(0.000*)  -0.002(0.000*) 
Sex 
 
 -0.086(0.028*)  -0.087(0.029*) 
Life One Country 
 
 -0.006(0.029*)  -0.010(0.031*) 
Research 
 
 -0.014(0.053)  -0.012(0.047) 
Teaching 
 
0.004(0.004)  0.014(0.004) 
InfoProm 
 
0.735***(0.034***) 0.737***(0.034***) 
Guidelines 
 
0.274***(0.062***) 0.272***(0.080***) 
  
  
  
Country-Level 
  
  
PD 
  
0.000 
IND 
  
0.001 
MAS 
  
neg 0.000 
UA 
  
 -0.002* 
LT 
  
-0.003 
INDUL 
  
-0.002 
  
  
  
Model Deviance 2276.030 841.790 838.030 
Δ Model Deviance   1434.24*** 3.759 
Entries are estimates of fixed effects with robust standard errors. Estimates of variance components 
are in parentheses. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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In terms of the perceived fairness of the information provided in the promotion 
process (IJProm), the variance component for the intercept in Model 1 is significant (τ00 = 
0.090, p < .001), indicating that country-level factors impact IJ perceptions. The ICC is 
0.06, which suggests that approximately 6% of the variance in IJ perceptions is due to 
country-level factors and 94% is due to individual-level factors. Model 2 includes the 
control variables and the individual-level independent variables. The variance component 
for industry tenure is significant (τ20 = 0.000, p < .05) suggesting between country 
differences in the effect of industry tenure on the perceived fairness of the information 
provided regarding promotion decisions. The variance component for sex is significant 
(τ30 = 0.028, p < .05) suggesting between country differences in the effect of sex on the 
perceived fairness of the information provided regarding promotion decisions. The 
variance component for life in one country is significant (τ40 = 0.029, p < .05) suggesting 
between country differences in the effect of life in one country on the perceived fairness 
of the information provided regarding promotion decisions. The coefficient for the 
sharing of information regarding promotion decisions (InfoProm) is significant (γ70 = 
0.735, p < .001) as is the variance component (τ70 = 0.034, p < .001). The coefficient for 
Guidelines is significant (γ80 = 0.274, p < .001) as is the variance component (τ80 = 0.062, 
p < .001). Model 3 adds the country-level independent variables. The cultural dimension 
of UA is negative and significant (γ04 = -0.002, p < .05) but based on the change in 
deviance the model does not explain significantly more variance than model 2. 
Hypothesis 3a stated that institutional policies that comply with UNESCO/AAUP 
guidelines regarding transparency in hiring and appraisal results will be perceived as 
more informationally fair than those policies that do not comply. The perceived fairness 
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of the information provided regarding hiring (IJHire) and promotion (IJProm) both had 
significant variance components for the sharing of information and/or guideline variables. 
Thus, H3a is not supported. 
Hypothesis 3b stated that the relationship between transparency and information 
fairness perceptions will be moderated by the cultural characteristic of power distance. 
There was a positive and significant main effect of PD on the perceived fairness of the 
information provided regarding hiring but not on the perceived fairness of the 
information provided regarding promotion decisions. Thus, H3b is partially supported. 
Table 18 provides a summary of the results of the hypothesis testing. 
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Table 18: Summary of Hypothesis Testing Results 
No. Hypothesis Result 
1a (universal) Institutional policies and practices that comply with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines in 
assuring academic freedom for faculty will be seen as more distributively fair than 
those that do not comply. These perceptions will not vary by country. 
Supported 
1b (cultural 
effects) 
Institutional policies and practices that comply with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines in 
assuring academic freedom for faculty will not be seen as more distributively fair than 
those that do not comply. These perceptions will vary by country. 
Not Supported 
1c (cultural 
effects) 
The relationship between institutional policies and practices to distributive justice 
perceptions will be moderated by the cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance. 
Institutional policies and practices that do not provide guidelines ensuring academic 
freedom will be seen as more unfair by individuals from high uncertainty avoidance 
countries compared to individuals from low uncertainty avoidance countries. 
Not Supported 
2a (universal) Institutional policies (regarding hiring, tenure/ contract renewal, promotion, and 
performance appraisal) that comply with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines regarding 
governance processes will be seen as more procedurally fair than those that do not 
comply. These perceptions will not vary by county. 
Partially Supported 
(Regarding Performance 
Appraisal) 
2b (cultural 
effects) 
The relationship between institutional policies (regarding hiring, tenure/ contract 
renewal, promotion, and performance appraisal) and practices to procedural justice 
perceptions will be moderated by the cultural dimension of individualism-
collectivism. Institutional policies and practices that leave decision control to a third 
party will be seen as more fair by individuals from collectivistic countries than those 
from individualistic countries. 
Not Supported 
2c (cultural 
effects) 
The relationship between authoritarian decision-making to procedural justice 
perceptions will be moderated by the cultural dimension of power distance. 
Authoritarian decision-making will be seen as more fair by those from high power 
distance countries compared to those from low power distance countries. 
Not Supported 
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2d (cultural 
effects) 
The relationship of institutional policies (regarding hiring, tenure/ contract renewal, 
promotion, and performance appraisal) that provide guidelines for governance 
processes to procedural justice will be moderated by the cultural dimension of 
uncertainty avoidance. Institutional policies that provide guidelines for governance 
processes will be seen as more fair by those from high uncertainty avoidance 
countries compared to those from low uncertainty avoidance countries. 
Not Supported 
3a (universal) Institutional policies (regarding hiring and promotion) that comply with 
UNESCO/AAUP guidelines regarding transparency in employment decisions will be 
perceived as more informationally fair than those policies that do not comply. These 
perceptions will not vary by county. 
Not Supported 
3b (cultural 
effects) 
The relationship between transparency and information fairness perceptions will be 
moderated by the cultural characteristic of power distance. Institutional policies 
(regarding hiring and promotion) that do not provide for transparency in employment 
decisions will be perceived as less informationally fair by those from low power 
distance countries compared to those from high power distance countries. 
Partially Supported 
(Regarding Hiring) 
4 (cultural 
effects) 
Controlling for institutional policies and practices, perceptions of procedural justice 
will be lower for individuals from low power distance countries compared to those 
from high power distance countries. 
Not Supported 
5a (interactive 
cultural 
effects) 
Perceptions of distributive justice resulting from institutional policies that comply 
with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines regarding academic freedom will be highest for 
individuals from countries that are both high in power distance and high in 
uncertainty avoidance. 
Not Supported 
5b (interactive 
cultural 
effects) 
Perceptions of procedural justice resulting from institutional policies that comply with 
UNESCO/AAUP guidelines regarding governance process will be highest for 
individuals from countries that are both low in power distance and high in uncertainty 
avoidance. 
Not Supported 
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Discussion 
Cross-cultural Distributive Justice 
 There are three noteworthy findings from the HLM analysis conducted on the 
perceived fairness of academic freedom. The first is that, as stated in Hypothesis H1a, the 
findings suggest that there are no country-level differences in the relationship of 
university policies and practices on the perceived fairness of academic freedom. That is, 
the more university guidelines protect academic freedom and the more those policies are 
followed, the fairer faculty see it regardless of which country they are working in. This 
fits with prior research demonstrating that having clear rules that are followed increases 
fairness perceptions (Leventhal, 1980). This is also in-line with the AAUP/UNESCO 
standards stating that the protection of academic freedom is of paramount importance for 
the academic profession and is recognized as a fundamental principle of the profession 
(American Association of University Professors, 2015a). Thus, it seems that academic 
freedom is a core value of the profession. Therefore, the finding that the perceived 
fairness of a core value of a profession like academic freedom does not vary by country 
makes sense given that it has been suggested that core values are particularly resistant to 
change or outside influence (Lachman, Nedd, & Hinings, 1994; Ralston, Gustafson, 
Cheung, & Terpstra, 1993). Further evidence of the lack of between country differences 
in the perceived fairness of academic freedom comes from the fact that the effect of 
whether an individual has spent their life living and working in one country is not 
significant. That is, these perceptions do not change whether a faculty member is only 
exposed to her/his home country fairness norms or is exposed to fairness norms in 
multiple countries. Taken together, this suggests that there may be certain aspects of an 
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employment relationship that are so inherently important to the nature of the job such that 
the absence of which creates an unfair situation. 
 The second noteworthy finding comes from the significant main effects of the 
cultural dimensions. It was found that higher PD countries have lower perceived fairness 
of academic freedom. Hofstede (1980a) suggests that those high in PD accept that there 
are status differences in society and at work expect their superiors to tell them what to do 
(Hofstede et al., 2010). Therefore, one possible explanation for this finding is that as 
academic freedom is the ability to research and teach with autonomy, it may be the case 
that those who expect to be told what to do have lower fairness perceptions when they are 
given autonomy. Essentially, autonomy violates their expectation regarding workplace 
norms. Indeed, it has been established that the extent to which expectations are met can 
have an impact on justice perceptions with unmet expectations resulting in lower 
perceptions of justice (Porter & Steers, 1973). Another possible explanation mentioned in 
Chapter II is that those high in power distance are more inclined to focus on their rewards 
(Breland et al., 2011; Tyler et al., 2000). Therefore, all things being equal, those high in 
power distance have lower perceptions of justice in this case because they are particularly 
sensitive to assurances of academic freedom (a reward for being faculty). 
It was also found that there are significant positive relationships of UA and LT 
with the perceived fairness of academic freedom. In the case of UA, this is perhaps due to 
the fact that those individuals seeking to reduce uncertainty (those having high UA) look 
for cues that things are “normal” or following an established set of expectations. As 
academic freedom is a core value of the profession, when faculty from high UA countries 
have academic freedom, this provides evidence that things are normal, certain and more 
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in line with their expectations. Justice effects have been demonstrated to be stronger for 
those in high uncertainty avoidance countries (Shao et al., 2013) which explains why the 
perceived fairness of academic freedom goes up as UA does. Regarding the cultural 
dimension main effect of LT, this is the first study that I am aware of to find evidence 
that LT may be a factor in distributive justice perceptions. The dearth of research in the 
justice literature on this dimension leaves us to speculate as to the reasons for this 
finding. As suggested in Chapter II, individuals from long-term oriented countries are 
more likely to focus on maintaining relationships and the possibility of future rewards 
(Hofstede et al., 2010). This suggests they might be more concerned with procedural and 
interactional fairness and not with distributive fairness. However, people from short-term 
oriented societies are more likely to be concerned with immediate rewards (Hofstede et 
al., 2010). Therefore, the current findings might be the result of people from short-term 
oriented countries having lower perceived fairness of academic freedom because they are 
particularly attuned to reward fairness. 
The third noteworthy finding is the fact that the effect of industry tenure has a 
negative relationship with the perceived fairness of academic freedom. That is, 
AAUP/UNESCO guidelines state that tenure needs to be protected as a way to protect 
academic freedom and that once tenure is obtained, faculty supposedly have complete 
academic freedom. In some countries, like Australia and China, tenure is essentially 
given as soon as a faculty member becomes employed at a university. However, there are 
many countries that, like the US, have a probationary period in which new faculty must 
meet certain criteria in order to be granted tenure. Regardless of whether tenure is granted 
at the initial employment stage or after a probationary period, it would seem logical to 
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assume based on AAUP/UNESCO guidelines that once a faculty member has tenure or 
its functional equivalent, they would not see academic freedom eroded over time. 
However, the negative relationship of length of industry employment with the perceived 
fairness of academic freedom suggests this is not the case. This begs the question of what 
is causing this unexpected relationship. This could stem from a situation like that in the 
UK (move from tenure to fixed-term contracts) and Finland (perceived erosion of 
freedom when a US style tenure system was introduced) in which faculty see changes in 
university structures over time. That is, faculty have a certain level of expectations 
regarding their academic freedom and when those expectations are no longer met (Porter 
& Steers, 1973), this lowers their perceptions of justice. Or, in a worse case, faced with a 
perceived reduction in academic freedom it causes a faculty member to withdraw from a 
university. A recent example of this occurred at Northwestern when a faculty member 
resigned in protest after feeling her work was being censored by the University’s 
administration (Kingkade, 2015). Another possible explanation comes from faculty 
seeing an erosion of academic freedom that results in adverse employment actions on a 
colleague. There was recently a case in which a faculty member was terminated from a 
tenured position for his/her personal feelings regarding a socially sensitive subject that 
were posted on an online website (American Association of University Professors, 
2015b). This seems a direct violation of academic freedom and given that injustice 
witnessed by an individual but bestowed on a third party can still impact perceptions of 
justice (Tabibnia et al., 2008), this could also explain the reduction in the perceived 
fairness of academic freedom the longer a faculty member is working in academia. 
However, this finding could also be coming from some other aspect of the faculty 
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employment relationship like the erosion of academic freedom in the classroom. Indeed, 
recent attention has been drawn to the increased expectation that instructors give students 
“trigger warnings” when they intend to display or discuss potentially offensive material 
(American Association of University Professors, 2014b). The necessary inclusion of a 
trigger warning is seen as an erosion of academic freedom in the classroom (American 
Association of University Professors, 2014b). Either way, the cross-sectional nature of 
this study does not provide for answers to these questions and is a limitation to this 
research. 
 
Cross-cultural Procedural Justice 
 There were a number of interesting findings from the analysis of the procedural 
justice dependent variables. Like the distributive justice findings discussed above, the 
perceived fairness of the performance appraisal process did not differ based on country 
when policies and practices followed AAUP/UNESCO standards. This is perhaps not 
surprising given the relatively low ICC (.03) but is important none-the-less as it lends 
further credence to procedural justice research indicating that when employees have 
voice and control in employment processes it is generally seen as more fair regardless of 
country (Greenberg & Folger, 1983; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). However, these findings 
were not duplicated in the other aspects of procedural justice investigated in this study. 
Specifically, there were between country differences in the effect of guidelines and 
practices on the perceived fairness of hiring, tenure/ contract renewals, and promotion. In 
fact, with ICCs around .07, there does seem to be a fair amount of country-level effect in 
this relationship. Although the cross-level interactions do indicate that country level 
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dimensions moderate the relationship between policies, practice and procedural justice 
perceptions, the non-significance of the change in deviance statistic of the models that 
have cross-level interactions and those that do not indicate that the effects are not 
explaining a significant amount of additional variance. The fact that the current study is 
looking at general justice perceptions may help explain this. That is, much of the justice 
literature looks at justice perceptions in relation to a specific event in the employment 
relationship that has a direct impact on the respondent (last pay raise, most recent 
performance appraisal, etc.). However, this study asks for more general fairness 
perceptions of the employment relationship which may make justice perceptions less 
salient for the individual. This, in turn, may reduce the effect that the cultural values 
might have. Thus, the moderating effects of the cultural dimensions may prove more 
important in other situations. 
 Continuing this point, although none of the procedural justice models that 
included the cultural dimensions were better fitting than the models with individual-level 
variables only, the fact that the cultural dimension of masculinity is significant in all of 
them is important to note. Perhaps this is due to the fact that masculine societies value 
competition (Hofstede, 1980a) and control over process is perceived as a way to ensure 
that they “win”. Regardless of the theoretical reasoning, the current findings suggest that 
it may be worthwhile to conduct further research into the effects of the masculinity-
femininity dimension on justice perceptions. As noted previously, there is a dearth of 
research on this cultural value and the significant effect indicates that it is an important 
cultural value for researchers to consider. 
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 Years living in one country is significant at the individual level for the perceived 
fairness of hiring and promotion and at the country level for the perceived fairness of 
tenure/ contract renewals. This suggests that the longer you live in a country, the more 
fair you see the hiring and promotion processes. One possible explanation for this is that 
perceptions of organizational justice can be influenced by others, such as co-workers and 
team members. Recent research suggests that team level perceptions of justice form what 
is called a ‘justice climate’ which can impact individuals’ own views of justice (Li & 
Cropanzano, 2009). Employees working within a team may share their perceptions with 
one another which can lead to a shared interpretation of the fairness of events (Roberson 
& Colquitt, 2005; Roberson & Williamson, 2012). It has also been suggested that 
individuals can “learn” justice evaluations from team members and these can lead to 
homogeneity of justice perceptions within teams, creating a strong justice climate 
(Roberson & Colquitt, 2005). Thus, group-level perceptions of justice can be 
conceptualized as an antecedent to individuals’ justice perceptions. Indeed the link 
between team and justice climate to individual perceptions of justice has been made 
extensively in the justice literature (Colquitt et al., 2005; Elovainio, Kivimauki, Eccles, & 
Sinervo, 2002). Another interpersonal influence on justice perceptions is culture. As 
mentioned previously, justice seems to matter to people all over the world (Leung, 2005), 
but reactions differ in different countries (Brockner et al., 2001; Erdogan & Liden, 2006; 
Shao et al., 2013). Taken together this explains how people living in one country become 
socialized to new fairness norms and explains the significant difference that years living 
in one country has on the perceived fairness of hiring and promotion.  
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It is also interesting that industry tenure has a negative relationship with the 
perceived fairness of hiring and promotion. This could represent the fact that as you 
spend more time in academia, you have more opportunity to be denied a job you feel 
qualified for or see others be denied a job that you think they are qualified for. It could 
also represent a departure from the process and as you get further from a personal 
experience with the hiring process (because you have been employed at the same 
institution for a long time) your perceptions of fairness about that process decline. 
Finally, it might simply be from the fact that once you become a faculty member and you 
see the process from the other side, you perceive it as less fair than when you are unaware 
of how the process works. 
The fact that women in this sample report lower perceptions of justice in hiring 
than their male counterparts is interesting. Answers as to why this is happening were not 
the focus of the research conducted here but it is worth mentioning given the troublesome 
nature of the finding. As a means of speculation, this finding could be the result of 
women seeing the hiring process result in few female hires thereby deeming it less fair 
than their male counterparts (the sample from the survey was only 36% female and there 
is no reason to believe that this represents a departure from the percentage of female 
faculty members that exists in the full population). Or perhaps this is the result of women 
witnessing some other type of discrimination in the hiring process itself. Either way, this 
is clearly an area for future research. However, it is a positive sign that the effect of sex is 
not significant in other procedural aspects of the employment relationship like tenure/ 
contract renewal or promotion decisions. Therefore, and luckily, at least in the current 
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analysis, it seems that women feel that there are not other areas of the employment 
relationship in which there is gender discrimination. 
It is interesting to note that respondents from research institutions reported higher 
perceptions if justice in the promotion process than those from teaching or balance 
focused institutions. This could be the result of clearer guidelines and expectations at 
research institutions due to the fact that they often have an externally valid promotion 
system. That is, in order to be promoted at a research institution, it is expected that you 
have publications. These publications are widely available to academics inside and 
outside of a university that a particular faculty member is working in. Therefore, 
someone outside the university may look at the number or quality of publications a 
faculty member has and say that they either deserve or do not deserve a promotion at that 
institution. In fact, it is not uncommon for research-focused institutions to request 
external reviews of a faculty member’s credentials before granting that faculty member a 
promotion. This adds external legitimacy to the process and may explain the significant 
result found here. On the other hand, evaluations of teaching proficiency can be more 
open to subjectivity and therefore respondents from institutions that rely heavily on such 
evaluations for promotion may have a system that is seen as less fair. 
 
Cross-cultural Informational Justice 
 As with the perceived fairness of hiring and promotion, here we also see between 
country differences in the relationship between policies and practices and IJ. It is 
interesting to note however that there is only a significant difference in the relationship 
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between policies and IJ of hiring when the cultural value interaction terms are entered 
into the model.  
That being said, IJ of hiring is the only justice variable in this sample to have 
significant interaction terms of the cultural values. Even considering the model does not 
explain significantly more variance than the model that does not contain the interaction 
terms, it is still an interesting finding. This provides some initial evidence of the potential 
interactive effects of cultural values, which could help further our understanding of how 
culture works. Continuing with the discussion of the cultural dimensions, support for the 
effect of power distance was present for IJ of hiring but not for IJ of promotion. This 
furthers our understanding of the PD dimension as it provides more evidence that those 
high in PD are more focused on their personal rewards (Tyler et al., 2000). That is, the 
hiring process of another faculty member is unlikely to affect a faculty member’s rewards 
but the promotion process directly affects individual rewards. Thus, faculty in high PD 
countries may be more inclined to let university authority figures make hiring decisions 
and not require any explanations for those decisions. However, when that same faculty 
member is faced with a promotion possibility, s/he does require more information as 
receiving or not receiving a promotion could impact her/his rewards. Although there was 
no hypothesis regarding the effect of individualism on informational justice the 
significance of this cultural value is not surprising to see given the significant effect of 
power distance. This is due to the fact that individualism and power distance are highly 
correlated. The significant effect of UA is interesting as it seems to suggest that 
information is a way to mitigate uncertainty and the absence of such information is seen 
as more unfair by those in high UA countries. This effect also holds in IJ of promotion 
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although the amount of variance explained by the model with country-level variables 
included is not significantly different from the model with only individual-level variables. 
It is also noteworthy that like PJ of hiring, the effect of industry tenure is 
significant and negative for IJ of hiring. Interestingly, industry tenure is also significant 
in IJ of promotion but it is significant in terms of between country differences. Perhaps 
this is due to the fact that the longer one is in academia, the more opportunities there are 
for there to be communication gaps between decision makers and faculty. It could also 
indicate a recent trend similar to what occurred in Denmark in which one of my 
respondents reported their system going from one of the most democratic in the world in 
which faculty had most of the decision making authority to one of the least in which 
decision making is concentrated amongst university authority figures. 
Also, like in PJ of hiring, we see the effect of life in one country as significant in 
IJ of hiring but here it is significant at the individual level. This effect is also negative 
indicating that those who have spent their whole lives in one country have lower 
perceptions of justice than their counter-parts who have not. Life in one country is also 
significant in the IJ of promotion relationship but it is the between country differences 
driving that significance. The effects of life in one country on both IJ of hiring and IJ of 
promotion may suggest that exposure to different cultures and fairness norms broaden 
what one considers fair. Take for example reward allocation preferences. There is a 
plethora of evidence of a preference for equitable rewards in individualistic countries 
(Benjamin, 2011; Fischer & Smith, 2003; Giacobbe-Miller et al., 2003) but we also see 
preference for reward allocation change with exposure to new organizational goals in 
collectivistic societies (C. C. Chen et al., 2002; He et al., 2004). Thus, it may be the case 
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that some justice perceptions are somewhat fluid and that exposure to new fairness norms 
can shape those perceptions. 
Finally, the between-country effect of sex on IJ of promotion is significant 
indicating that in some countries women report different justice perceptions than their 
counterparts in other countries. It is possible that this is the result of unequal treatment 
that women are subjected to in some countries and adds further support for the 
differences in justice perceptions based on sex (Lee & Farh, 1999; Lee, Pillutla, & Law, 
2000). 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Summary of Studies 1 & 2 
The two studies undertaken in the present research sought to use triangulation to 
answer three important research questions: (1) Are justice perceptions universal or are 
they affected by cultural values; (2) is there an interactive effect of cultural dimensions 
on justice perceptions; and (3) what is the extent that faculty governance differs cross-
culturally and the effect of these variations on perceptions of fairness? 
The first study was qualitative and began answering the first and third research 
questions by establishing the extent to which faculty governance differs cross-culturally 
and the effect on justice perceptions. The semi-structured interviews indicated variation 
in faculty governance systems but suggested ambiguity as to whether or not similarly 
structured systems were perceived as equally fair across countries. Faculty governance 
ranged from situations in which there were no written guidelines or standardized 
procedures for any aspect of the employment relationship to systems that were 
thoroughly vetted through extensive written policies that protected academic freedom, the 
employment relationship, and created standardized practices. Interviewees also indicated 
that the transparency of employment actions communicated through information seemed 
to play a large role in the perceived fairness of the employment relationship. This is in-
line with psychological contract literature that suggests that employees seek information 
as a means to monitor and negotiate their environment (Shore & Tetrick, 1994). Indeed, 
information seeking behaviors have been shown to increase when employees are 
concerned about advancement and rewards in the work place (De Vos, Buyens, & Schalk, 
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2005) and provides further validation of the reported need that faculty had for 
information transparency. The results from this study suggested that testing hypotheses 
looking at whether or not the perceived fairness of academic freedom, hiring, tenure/ 
contract renewal, performance review, and promotion processes were universally held to 
one standard or culturally variant was worthwhile. This study also suggested that in 
addition to looking at the fairness of information provided by authority figures in the 
promotion process, it was necessary to look at the fairness of the information provided in 
the hiring process. These results were then used to inform the Study 2 survey. 
The second study was quantitative and answered research question two as well as 
completing the answer to questions one and three. In completing the answer to the first 
and third research questions this study may have uncovered the most interesting findings 
from this research and clarified some of the ambiguous results found in Study 1. That is, 
it was demonstrated that academic freedom seems to be a universal concern for faculty no 
matter what country they are working in. This indicates that there are some aspects of the 
employment relationship that may be culturally invariant. Essentially, if faculty feel they 
lack a very basic tool they need to successfully complete their job, they will see an unfair 
work environment. This is akin to asking a car washer to wash cars without sponges. 
Without this basic tool necessary to successfully complete their job, of course they would 
see it as an unfair working environment! However, this study also indicated that there are 
some aspects of the employment relationship in which policies and procedures found 
unfair in one country might not be deemed unfair in another. There was cross-national 
variation in the perceived fairness of policies and practices regarding hiring, tenure/ 
contract renewal, and promotion processes as well as the information provided regarding 
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hiring and promotion. This provided evidence that there is cultural variation in the 
perceived fairness of the employment relationship for university faculty. 
To finalize the answer to question one, hierarchical linear modeling analysis 
indicated that Hofstede’s cultural dimensions did not have wide spread significant 
relationships either directly on justice perceptions or as a moderating effect between 
institutional policies and practices and justice perceptions. Thus, although it seems that 
culture does play a role in the relationships investigated here, Hofstede’s cultural values 
do not explain this role. There were a number of explanations for these findings discussed 
above but an additional one comes from the idea of justice heuristics. That is, the current 
study did not take a deep dive into how justice perceptions are formed in individual 
countries. This omission is an area of future research. 
There were also a number of other interesting findings that came out of finalizing 
the answer to research question three including how the effect of some of the control 
variables is different depending on the type of employment action (hiring, tenure, 
promotion, etc.) and/or depending on the country in which faculty are working. This 
lends further credence to the studies demonstrating that definitions of fairness can be 
culturally variant (Guo & Giacobbe-Miller, 2012; Leung, 2005). 
Finally, in answering the second question, there was only one model in which 
there were significant interactions and that involved perceptions of informational justice 
in the hiring process. The lack of significant results here can also be explained by the 
above mentioned idea of justice heuristic. That is, without knowing how individuals from 
a given country perceive justice, it is difficult to make accurate predictions about how 
cultural values might affect that relationship.  
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Contributions 
 By completing this research it is hoped that I have contributed to the literature in 
three important ways. First, to my knowledge this is the only organizational justice study 
involving a sample of 47 countries. This has allowed for an understanding as to the extent 
that culture actually influences justice perceptions. That is, the hierarchical linear 
modeling approach used has demonstrated the amount of variance in justice perceptions 
that can be attributed to the country level. It is intriguing as well that the amount of 
variance in justice perceptions depends on the aspect of the employment relationship 
being studied. Specifically, only three percent of the variance was attributable to the 
country level when it came to the performance review process but ten percent when it 
came to academic freedom. This should help guide cross-cultural justice researchers 
going forward by further clarifying when a cultural effect may or may not be found. 
Specifically, if the county-level variance of a certain aspect of the employment 
relationship is low (i.e. there is little higher level effect) an investigation using cultural 
dimensions may not be warranted. If, however, there is a large percentage of variance 
attributable to the country level, further investigation of cultural effects would be a 
worthwhile research endeavor. 
Second, this research has demonstrated that there may be core values of some 
professions that are culturally invariant. In the case of academic freedom, we see that 
reactions to policies and practices did not vary at the country level. Thus, the more 
policies and practices protect academic freedom in-line with UNESCO/AAUP guidelines, 
the fairer faculty see it regardless of country. This suggests that the extent to which cross-
cultural variation is found might depend on what aspect of the employment relationship 
 143 
participants in research are being asked about. Therefore, as cross-cultural justice 
research continues, it will be important for researchers to be aware of what aspect of the 
employment relationship they are investigating.  
Third, although there has been a significant amount of research looking at the 
relationship between Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and justice perceptions, the current 
research suggests that there may be alternative explanations for how culture affects 
justice. Although there were some significant effects of the Hofstede dimensions on 
justice judgments, these effects did not generally explain country level differences in 
justice perceptions. There was however a significant amount of country-level variation in 
justice perceptions. Thus, researchers may want to look for other possible explanations 
for culture that have more power than the Hofstede dimensions. Given the evidence 
found here of the differences in justice heuristics between countries, the best way of 
doing this may be to conduct more indigenous studies (Tsui, 2004) that provide for a 
local understanding of the justice construct. 
 
Limitations & Directions for Future Research 
One limitation of this research is that given the number of countries sampled, the 
resources were not available to interview or survey in the native language of each 
country. This is a limitation because language is a prominent means by which culture is 
maintained (Hall, 1966) as well as how it shapes behavior, interactions and beliefs 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966). This not only limited the robustness of information 
obtained but also limited the range of countries sampled. Not only were very few African 
and Latin American countries represented in this study but also the countries sampled in 
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Study 1 were not all sampled in Study 2. Despite this limitation, there was a strong 
presence of Asia-Pacific countries and the overall representation of 47 unique countries is 
the most comprehensive cross-cultural justice study conducted to date. However, future 
research should focus on some of the less well-understood regions of the world. 
Another limitation of this study is that it is cross-sectional in nature. The finding 
that some fairness perceptions (particularly in the case of academic freedom) decrease as 
years employed in academe increases is interesting but a longitudinal study may have 
been able to further determine why this is occurring. The CAP survey has taken two 
snapshots of the faculty employment relationship, which has provided for a general 
feeling of how faculty perceived their employment relationship. Specifically, faculty 
were asked about the extent they felt satisfied with their current job. Percentages of 
respondents to this question that indicated they were very highly or highly satisfied with 
their jobs ranged from a low of forty-seven in the UK to a high of eighty-seven in Mexico 
(Locke et al., 2011) and this had increased between the first CAP survey and second. 
Therefore, it would be beneficial to understand how faculty members fairness perceptions 
have changed over time especially given the positive correlation between organizational 
justice and job satisfaction (Colquitt et al., 2001). 
Comparing the measurement and loading patterns of survey responses in one 
country to those in all of the other countries in a sample is how cross-cultural construct 
equivalence is conducted. Given the number of countries represented in this study, it was 
not possible to conduct construct equivalence testing in this manner. Therefore, the 
manner in which the constructs represented here are the same country to country is not 
known and is another limitation of this study. However, the two substitute methods 
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(groupings) that were used do provide some evidence of construct equivalence but further 
validation of the equivalence of the constructs is necessary in future research. 
Finally, data was obtained from a sample of essentially one type of employee 
working in one industry. Although educated individuals (i.e. faculty in universities) have 
been shown to be well indoctrinated in their country’s value systems (Taras, Kirkman, & 
Steel, 2010) and thus accurate representations of their cultural groups, generalizability of 
these results is somewhat limited. Future research should test these findings in other 
organizational settings.  
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